

VOLUME XXV

JUL 14 1930

NUMBER 3

*July 1930*

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# CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

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*A Quarterly Journal* devoted to re-  
search in the Languages, Literatures,  
History, and Life of Classical Antiquity

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THE UNIVERSITY of CHICAGO PRESS  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.

# CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

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VOL. XXV

CONTENTS FOR JULY 1930

No. 3

"Episodes" in Old Comedy	By Gilbert Norwood	217
Silence in Tragedy and the Three-Actor Rule	By Alfred Cary Schlesinger	230
Senatorial and Civil Years in Athens	By Benjamin D. Meritt	236
Livy's Account of the Equites	By H. Hill	244
The Athenian "Proedroi"	By Stanley Barney Smith	250
Notes and Discussions		277
Book Reviews		285

GEORGE THOMSON and PAUL SHOREY: Greek Lyric Meter.—JAKOB A. O. LARSEN: *Sortito and Sorti in CIL*, I, 200.—PAUL SHOREY: On Pindar *Pgth.* iv. 96 ff.—EUGENE S. MCCARTNEY: A Greek Enigma (Greek Anthology xiv. 41).—PAUL SHOREY: Bacon and Demosthenes Again.—ALFRED P. DORJAHN: Apollonius Dyscolus on Homer.

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Classical Philology is published quarterly in the months of January, April, July, and October, by the University of Chicago at the University of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The subscription price is \$4.00 per year; the price of single copies is \$1.00. Postage is prepaid by the publishers on all orders from the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama Canal Zone, Republic of Panama, Dominican Republic, Canary Islands, El Salvador, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Hayti, Uruguay, Paraguay, Hawaiian Islands, Philippine Islands, Guam, Samoa Islands, Balearic Islands, Spain, and Venezuela. Postage is charged extra as follows: For Canada and Newfoundland, 15 cents on annual subscriptions (total \$4.15), on single copies, 4 cents (total \$1.04); for all other countries in the Postal Union 25 cents on annual subscriptions (total \$4.25), on single copies, 6 cents (total \$1.06). Patrons are requested to make all remittances payable to the University of Chicago Press in postal or express money orders or bank drafts.

The following are authorized agents:

For the British Empire, except North America, India, and Australasia: THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, Petter Lane, London, E.C. 4, England. Yearly subscriptions, including postage, 19s. 2d. each; single copies, including postage, 6s. 4d. each.

For Japan: THE MARUEN COMPANY, LTD., Tokyo.

For China: THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LTD., Paoshan Road, Shanghai. Yearly subscriptions, \$4.00; single copies, \$1.00, or their equivalents in Chinese money. Postage extra, on yearly subscriptions 25 cents, on single copies 6 cents.

Claims for missing numbers should be made within the month following the regular month of publication. The publishers expect to supply missing numbers free only when losses have been sustained in transit and when the reserve stock will permit.

Business correspondence should be addressed to The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.

Communications for the editors and manuscripts, which must be typewritten, should be addressed to the Editor of CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

The articles in this Journal are indexed in the International Index to Periodicals, New York, N.Y.

Entered as second-class matter July 5, 1906, at the post-office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on June 6, 1918.

PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.

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## "EPISODES" IN OLD COMEDY

BY GILBERT NORWOOD

IN ONE of the Lexica Segueriana (Bekker, *Anecd.*, p. 253) we read the following definition: 'Ἐπεισῶδιον κυρίως μὲν τὸ ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ ἐπιφερόμενον τῷ δράματι γέλωτος χάριν ἔξω τῆς ὑποθέσεως, καταχρηστικῶς δὲ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἐξαγώνιον πρᾶγμα. This contradicts three other views.

The first affirms that an "episode" in comedy is the same as an "episode" in tragedy, namely, an "act." Thus the Tractatus Coislinianus (Kaibel, *Com. Gr. Frag.*, I, i, 52 f.) says: μέρη τῆς κωμῳδίας τέσσαρα· πρόλογος, χορικόν, ἐπεισῶδιον, ἔξοδος . . . ἐπεισῶδιόν ἐστι τὸ μεταξὺ δύο χορικῶν. The same doctrine appears in Tzetzes (*Ἰαμβοὶ τεχνικοὶ περὶ κωμῳδίας*, vss. 14 f., Kaibel, p. 40; also in his prose, *ibid.*, pp. 21, 28). G. F. A. Neumann (De *episodiis Aristophaneis*) assumes throughout the meaning "act," and H. T. Hornung (De *partibus comoediarum Graecarum*, p. 7 n.), mentioning our passage in the Seguerianum, remarks airily: "*nihil ad nos.*" Kock, as we shall see, took the same view. But it must be entirely rejected. The definition clearly fails for comedy, because in the epiirrhematic portions the acts do not fall between whole choric songs (as in tragedy), but between parts thereof;<sup>1</sup> and if it is replied that the Tractatus and Tzetzes do not say "whole choric songs," we shall then have to recognize each part of an obviously homogeneous act as a separate episode. But there is little need to labor the point; this enumeration actually ignores the parabasis.

<sup>1</sup> So Zieliński (*Gliederung der allattischen Komödie*, p. 216) says rightly from his point of view (see below): "Epeisodia kommen nur in der zweiten Hälfte des Dramas vor, die auf die Parabase folgt."

The second doctrine sees episodes in the loosely connected scenes so commonly found after (and sometimes before) the parabasis in our eleven extant plays. Zielinski (*Die Gliederung der altattischen Komödie*) calls, for example, the "coaching" of Philocleon by his son (*Wasps* 1122-1264) an episode, and so with many other passages. Poppelreuter (*De comoediae Atticae primordiis*), who finds in the slackly knit second half the original Athenian comedy, understands the Seguerianum to mean by ἐξω τῆς ὑποθέσεως "post parabasis" (p. 44); the ἐπεισόδια are for him each and all of such scenes as the Boeotian's visit in the *Acharnians*. Sieckmann (*De comoediae Atticae primordiis*)<sup>1</sup> follows Poppelreuter here: "scaenas illas dissolutas, quas didicimus a poetis ipsis pro compositione episodica nominatas esse" (p. 35). Süß (*Rhein. Mus.*, LXIII, 12-38) is concerned with the importance of the βωμολόχος, but incidentally accepts (p. 30) the term "episode" in this sense. So Körte (Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Enc.*, 1251) writes of "die Gruppen locker aneinander gereihter Episoden." Finally, Cornford in *The Origin of Attic Comedy*, while brilliantly opposing Poppelreuter, tentatively accepts (e.g., p. 141) the name "episode." Now, with these important and interesting discussions concerning the loosely strung scenes we are not here concerned; our sole point is that they should not be called "episodes." Argument about labels is sometimes important; here the misuse of this word by very able and learned scholars tends to prevent us from perceiving that there were other, quite different, scenes in old comedy, and from attempting to find and appreciate them. The passages to which Poppelreuter gives the name *Kasperlespiel* do of course exist in profusion, but not a single ancient authority calls them ἐπεισόδια. That name has been naturally enough, though wrongly, applied to them because of Aristotle's word ἐπεισοδιώδης (not ἐπεισόδιον), employed to describe badly constructed tragedies (*Poetic* 1451 b 36, *Met.* 1090 b 12). Ancient critics and criticasters of course recognized this laxity, but not one of them uses ἐπεισοδιώδης or ἐπεισόδιον when discussing it. Tzetzes (Kaibel, p. 18) calls it ἀταξία. Platonius (*ibid.*, p. 6) writes of Cratinus: εὐστοχος δὲ ὢν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τῶν δραμάτων καὶ διασκευαῖς, εἴτα προίων καὶ διασπῶν τὰς ὑποθέσεις οὐκ ἀκολουθῶς πληροῖ τὰ δράματα.

<sup>1</sup> Sic. He did not trouble to find a new title. In what follows, *didicimus a poetis ipsis* is utterly unjustified; what *pro compositione* means I do not know.

The third view is expounded by Bernhardt, and is intermediate between that of the Seguerianum and the second doctrine just mentioned. In his *Grundriss d. griech. Lit.* (II, ii, 611) he offers this definition:

Ein wahres Episodium war wol die diejenige Scene, welche nicht unmittelbar im Fortgang und Plan der Handlung lag, sondern aus freier Erfindung eingeschoben der Idee des Ganzen dienen und ihre sittliche Bedeutung plastisch darstellen sollte: z. B. das Einschiebsel der beiden in den Wolken sich be-  
streitenden Λόγοι.

This halfway position is due to his rejecting the *dürre Notiz* of the Seguerianum and taking rather as his guide the scholium on Euripides' *Troades* 1129: τοῦτο δὲ [the sudden departure of Neoptolemus] πρὸς τὴν δραματικὴν ὑπόθεσιν μεμχάνηται, ὅπως τὸ ἐπεισῶδιον ἐπαγάγοι τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, τὴν τε ἀσπίδα παρεισενέγκοι καὶ τὸν Ἀστυνάκτα. Certainly those two magnificent passages, the Λόγοι dispute and Hecuba's lament, are technically on an exact level in this regard; though entirely germane to the subjects of the dramas in which they occur, they are nevertheless developed for their own sake—they might have been shorter, and had they been entirely omitted<sup>1</sup> we should never have suspected our loss. Bernhardt, in fact, assumes, like Nese-mann, that ἐπεισῶδιον means in comedy what it means in tragedy; but, unlike him, he takes the tragic ἐπεισῶδιον as (what we may call) half-intrusive. (As a matter of fact, in tragic criticism ἐπεισῶδιον is a word neither of praise nor of blame,<sup>2</sup> whereas ἐπεισοδιώδης is a reproach, meaning that the separate acts stand out too separately.)

But the Seguerianum states plainly that "an episode is properly that element in a comedy which is brought into the play, outside of the plot, to raise laughter." And the addition is important, that its non-technical meaning is "irrelevant matter." This is more than "half-intrusive" passages like the interview with Euripides in the *Acharnians* or the mock-trial in the *Wasps* or the scene of Cinesias and Myrrhine in *Lysistrata*, all of which are strictly analogous to the Λόγοι dispute quoted by Bernhardt. No; the Seguerianum, rightly or wrongly, intends an interlude, a technically irrelevant farcical inser-

<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, the first version of the *Clouds* probably had no Λόγοι.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle (*Poetic* 1459 a) calls the "Catalogue of Ships" an ἐπεισῶδιον. It is plainly not irrelevant, but "half-intrusive"; that is, appropriate in its essence, but expanded to greater length than is strictly needed.

tion, not a scene like the rehearsal by Falstaff and the Prince of the latter's interview with his father—a passage “half-intrusive” exactly as those just mentioned—but a scene like the *Pyramus and Thisbe* presented by Bottom and his mates. Or, since the latter has of course a manufactured connection with Theseus and the lovers, we may go even farther perhaps, and find the truest English instance of a comic *ἐπεισόδιον* in the interlude performed by Mak and the shepherds while unconsciously awaiting the angel who announces the Nativity.<sup>1</sup> Now, are we to accept this so thoroughgoing assertion? When we consider how well known the tragic episode must have been, we shall think it unlikely that an independent definition of the comic episode could survive into the age of lexicographers did it not rest on fact.

Pollux had written (iv. 108): Καὶ ἐπεισόδιον δὲ ἐν δράματι πρᾶγμα τι συναπτόμενον. Much more valuable confirmation, were it not obviously copied from the Seguerianum, is provided by the *Etymologicum magnum* (p. 356, l. 28 [Gaisford]): Ἐπεισόδιον: Τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον τῷ δράματι γέλωτος χάριν, ἔξω τῆς ὑποθέσεως ὄν· καταχρηστικῶς δὲ τὸ ἐξαγώνιον ἅπαν πρᾶγμα. Still more striking is the passage in Plutarch (*adv. Stoicos* 1066A) quoted by Meineke (II, 756ff.), where the doctrine is repudiated that Providence suffers wickedness as “a delightful and elegant interlude” in the order of the universe (ἡδὺ καὶ κομψὸν ἢ κακία γέγονεν ἐπεισόδιον). This is excellent confirmation. To remove any possible doubt that he means comedy, note the next words: οὐδὲ δι’ εὐτραπελίαν ἢ ἀδικίαν καὶ γέλωτα καὶ βωμολοχίαν προστέτριπται τοῖς πράγμασιν. Even more illuminating is *Conviv. Disp.* 629C:

τῶν εἰς τὰ δεῖπνα καὶ τὰ συμπόσια παρασκευαζομένων . . . τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαν ἔχει τάξιν, ὥσπερ οἶνος καὶ σιτία καὶ ὄψα, καὶ στρωματὰ δηλαδὴ καὶ τράπεζαι· τὰ δ’ ἐπεισόδια γέγονεν ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν, χρείας μὴ συναγομένης, ὥσπερ ἀκροάματα καὶ θεάματα καλεῖται λωτοποιούς τις ἐκ Καλλίου Φίλιππος· οἷς παροῦσι μὲν ἡδοναί, μὴ παρόντα δὲ οὐ πάντ’ ποθοῦσιν οὐδ’ αἰτιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν ὥς ἐνδεέστερον ἔχουσιν.

So in *Sympos.* 710D he describes Alcibiades’ share in Agathon’s banquet as an *ἐπεισόδιον*. Crinagoras (*Anth. Pal.* vi. 232. 6) calls almonds, etc., *δαψιλῇ οἰνοπόταις γαστροῖς ἐπεισόδια*. Meineke, though he does not state it, plainly takes the “interlude” view, and so does Bergk (*Comm. de rell. com. att. ant.*, p. 205): “ἐπεισόδιον ea est pars

<sup>1</sup> “Towneley Plays” (*Secunda Pastorum*).

fabulae, quae praeter institutum et propositum quasi obiter intertextitur."

Let us now turn to the remains of old comedy. The word *ἐπεισόδιον* occurs there not more than twice. One undoubted instance appears in Metagenes, *Φιλοθύτης*, fragment 14 (Kock) (II, 708):

κατ' ἐπεισόδιον μεταβάλλω τὸν λόγον, ὥς ἂν  
καιναῖσι παροψίσι καὶ πολλαῖς εὐωχῆσω τὸ θέατρον.

Kock (*ad loc.*) will have it that κατ' ἐπεισόδιον means "uno quoque episodio," and since "nulla causa excogitari potest cur eandem fabulae partem Athenienses in tragoedia aliter, aliter in comoedia adpellare debuerint,"<sup>1</sup> he must mean that Metagenes gives variety, difference, between each scene. But (a) his phrase *eandem fabulae partem* flagrantly begs the question; (b) the meaning attributed to the fragment is on general grounds inconceivable, for its content is true of nearly all plays, so that it would be absurd to mention it so emphatically; (c) *παροψίς* is properly a "side-dish," an "extra," not part of the regular menu (as *uno quoque episodio* implies); cf. Aristophanes *Δαίδαλος*, fragment 187 (Kock):

πάσας γυναῖκας ἐξ ἑνὸς γέ του τρόπου  
ὥσπερ παροψὶς μοιχὸς ἐσκευασμένος

(so Aesch. *Ag.* 1447: *εὐνῆς παροψώνημα τῆς ἐμῆς χλιδῆς*) and Sotades, *Παραλυτρούμενος*, fragment 3 (Kock):

παροψὶς εἶναι φαίνομαι τῷ Κρωβύλῳ.  
τοῦτον μασᾶται, παρακατεσθίει δ' ἐμέ.

Metagenes' meaning is plain enough, if we are not misled by the tragic episode, if we remember the significance of *παροψίς* and note that it is here plural. This is an extract from the parabasis, as the matter shows; and he is describing his usual method: "I vary my plots by interpolated scenes, thus feasting the audience on many new side-dishes."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> So on the *Πυτίνη* (see below) he says: "*ἐπεισόδιον* cur non idem in comoedia significare possit quod in tragoedia, fabulae partem canticis choricis inclusam, nullam video causam."

<sup>2</sup> Poppelreuter (*op. cit.*, p. 44) gives an unnatural explanation, due to his insistence that the second half of an old comedy merely reproduces the *ἀραξία* of the primitive type: "Eo loco, quo comoedia mea episodica esse incipit, argumentum antea excultum omitto, ut varias personas inducam." If this was common to all comedy, why say it?



The other passage is from Cratinus' *Πυτίνη* (frag. 13 [Meineke]; see Kock, frag. 195):

ληρεῖς ἔχων· γράφ' αὐτὸν  
ἐν ἐπεισοδίῳ· γελοῖος ἔσται Κλεισθένης κυβεύων  
ἐν τῇδε τοῦ κάλλους ἀκμῇ.

Unfortunately the text is doubtful. Meineke obtains it from the scholium on *Clouds* 354: Οὗτος δὲ ἐπὶ κιναιδίᾳ διαβάλλεται. τοῦτον δὲ ὡς γυναικίζόμενον οὐκ Ἀριστοφάνης διαβάλλει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Κρατῖνος ἐν Πυτίνῃ λέγων· Ληρεῖς ἔχων· γράφ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἐπεισοδίῳ· γελοῖος ἔσται Κλεισθένης κυβεύων· ἐν τῇ τοῦ κάλλους ἀκμῇ. Kock follows Pierson in reading: . . . Κρατῖνος ἐν Πυτίνῃ λέγων οὕτως ἐν ἐπεισοδίῳ·

ληρεῖς ἔχων· γελοῖος ἔσται Κλεισθένης κυβεύων  
ἐν τῇδε τοῦ κάλλους ἀκμῇ.

Dindorf, in his edition of the scholia, gives precisely the same reading of the quotation, saying that "illa γράφων—ἐπεισοδίῳ alius scholii lacinia esse videntur." But *ap.* Kock (*ut supra*) he reads the second line thus: ἐν τῇδε τοῦ κάλλους ἀκμῇ· γράφ' αὐτὸν ἐν σποδείῳ. The last word, he says, means *lupanar*. Bergk (*Rel. Com. Att.*, p. 206) reads:

A. ληρεῖς ἔχων· γράφ' αὐτὸν  
ἐν ἐπεισίῳ. B. γελοῖος ἔσται Κλεισθένης κυβεύων  
ἐν τῇδε τῇ κάλλους ἀκμῇ.

Ἐπείσιον he appears to take as *lupanar*. Finally, Suidas gives (*s.v.* Κλεισθένης ἀκρατέστερος [Gaisford]):

Οὗτος ἐπὶ κιναιδίᾳ διεβέβλητο, καὶ ἐγυναικίζετο. Καὶ Κρατῖνος·  
Ληρεῖς ἔχων·  
γράφων αὐτ' ἐν ἐπεισοδίῳ·  
γελοῖος ἔσται Κλεισθένης κυβεύων.

But whatever the reading, unless we accept the *lupanaria* blindly, we have here an ἐπεισόδιον; whether we put the word into Cratinus' own verse or not, there is a clear reference to an episode by him. Now, if it means only an ordinary act, the scholiast and Suidas have no reason at all for mentioning that this passage occurs in one. It is an interlude, precisely of the kind described in the Seguerianum. Of its content we know something beyond the words just considered; fragment 196

(Kock) reads: 'Τέρβωλον δ' ὑποσβέσας ἐν τοῖς λύχνοισι γράφον. There would seem to have been a racy discussion of young politicians, each being relegated to some spot better suited to his habits than the Pnyx. One is reminded of Koko's song in *The Mikado* ("I've Got a Little List"), or of Portia and Nerissa discussing the suitors. Hyperbolus, being a lamp-merchant, is to be "listed in the Lamp-Market"—not a brilliant effort, despite ὑποσβέσας. Cleisthenes is sent to a gambling-party.

The evidence, then, that ἐπεισῶδιον in comedy means not an ordinary act or scene as in tragedy, but a confessedly inserted irrelevant interlude, is unmistakable: Cratinus, Metagenes, Plutarch, and the Seguerianum all point the same way. We come now to an example in Aristophanes which must be treated separately because erroneously repudiated by recent scholarship.

Suidas (s.v. Δαιταλεῖς) writes: Οὕτως Ἀριστοφάνης, ἐπιδείπνιον βασιλεὺς θέαν τοῖς δαιταλεῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἀξιόλογον χαριζόμενος, τοῦτ' ἐδείκνυν. Zonaras, no doubt copying Suidas, gives, under the same lemma: Ἀριστοφάνης ἐπιδείπνιον θέαν τοῖς δαιταλεῦσιν ὁ βασιλεὺς χαριζόμενος. From this Bergk (*ap. Meineke*, II, 1029) obtained:

ἐπιδείπνιον βασιλεὺς θέαν  
τοῖς δαιταλεῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἄξιον λόγον,  
χαριζόμενος τὸ δῶμα τοῦτ' ἐδείκνυν.<sup>1</sup>

"The king-archon, to pleasure the banqueters with an after-dinner spectacle, exhibited this play as an interesting plot" (or, reading λόγον, "as worth attention"). But before estimating the point and value of this fragment, we must examine its authenticity. Meineke (V, i, 62) withdrew it: "Non Aristophanis haec verba sunt, sed Theophyl. Simoc. *Hist.* v. 5, ut iam Toupius monuit." Everyone since then seems to have acquiesced; no mention of the fragment appears in Kock, Dindorf, or Hall and Geldart. Yet it should have been plain that Toup had found a mare's nest. These are the words of Theophyl-

<sup>1</sup> Ἐδείκνυν for ἐδείκνυ is rare but classical: cf. Antiphon v. 76. τὸ δῶμα was inserted first by Ranke (*De Arist. Vita Comm.*, p. 274). Fritzsche (*De Daetalsensibus*, p. 6) reads the second line as τοῖς δαιταλεῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἄξιον, λόγων and translates the whole: "Rex Daetalsensibus quum convivale sermonis spectaculum, ut fas est, gratificaretur, hoc (nescio quid) exhibebat."

actus Simocattes, who describes a horrible "entertainment" given by Chosroes, the Persian king, to Roman and Median commanders:

"Ἦδη δὲ τοῦ δείπνου μεσοῦντος ὁ Βρυζάκιος δέσμιος ἐς μέσον παράγεται, ῥίνα καὶ ὦτα ἀνάπηρος. ὅτε δὲ παιγνίων τοῖς δαιτυμόσι παρανάλωμα γέγονεν, ἐπιδείπνιον ὁ βασιλεὺς θέαν τοῖς δαιταλεῦσιν ὥσπερ ἀξιόλογον χαριζόμενος, τοῖς ὑπασπισταῖς τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν ἀσκήμῳ προστάξας θεσπίσματος, τῷ σχήματι τῆς χειρὸς, θανάτῳ τοῦτον ἐκδίδωσιν· οὐ γὰρ εἰωχυμένοις θέμις τοῖς Πέρσαις διαλαλεῖν.

Now, apart from the fact that Suidas gives Aristophanes as his authority, observe (a) that he adds words—τοῦτ' ἐδείκνε—not found in Theophylactus, (b) that there is no reason why Theophylactus himself should not be quoting Aristophanes. The play was extremely well known throughout antiquity, and he had a good knowledge of classical Greek literature. When discussing the sources of the Nile (vii. 17), he displays a wide acquaintance with the philosophers, historians, and geographers; among the other authors quoted, whether by name or not, are Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Plato, Demosthenes—and Aristophanes. Not only does he use distinctively Aristophanic words, such as φροντιστήριον (*Hist.* i. 14), ἐρεβοδιφᾶν (*ibid.* ii. 7; vi. 5; *Letters* xxiv [Hercher, p. 770]), ἐγκεκορδυλημένος (*Hist.* ii. 12), and κενταυρικῶς (*ibid.* iv. 7; v. 3); more to the purpose, he quotes a phrase, and not a phrase likely to have been picked up without reading—δέυρο ξυναυλίαν κλαύσωμεν (*Knights* 8f., *Letter* xxxii [Hercher, p. 72]). Modest as this collection<sup>1</sup> is, the upshot from it and from Suidas' mention of Aristophanes is clear: It may well be that Theophylactus is himself quoting the poet in his ἐπιδείπνιον passage, and therefore we have no reason at all to doubt Suidas when, quoting the words that Theophylactus uses, he names Aristophanes. These lines should, then, be restored to our list of Aristophanic fragments, and (because of τοῖς δαιταλεῦσιν) to the fragments of the *Banqueters* in particular.

Now, despite certain varieties of restoration, this passage states that the "king" (i.e., of course, the king-archon) gave an after-dinner spectacle to the guests as a treat. This naturally cannot mean the play of the *Banqueters* itself; that was offered not by the archon but by

<sup>1</sup> It may be reinforced by those passages in which Kock (*III*, 440 ff.) sees possible quotations or reminiscences of comedy.

the *choregus*, not to a group but to the Athenian people. It refers—it cannot but refer—to some spectacle given in the course of the play proper, a true comic *ἐπεισῶδιον*, an interlude having no organic connection with the main plot.<sup>1</sup> This fact helps to explain, and is illustrated by, certain lexicographical information. Orion (49. 10) says: *Δαιταλεῖς δρᾶμα Ἀριστοφάνους, ἐπειδὴ ἐν ἱερῷ Ἡρακλέους δειπνοῦντες καὶ ἀναστάντες χοροὶ ἐγένοντο*. Derived probably from this is part of the definition in *Et. magn.*, page 286, line 19: *Δρᾶμα· Ποίημα, πρᾶγμα . . . λέγεται δὲ δράματα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν θεατρικῶν μιμηλῶς γινόμενα, ὡς ἐν ὑποκρίσει, ὡς φησιν Ἀριστοφάνης, ἐπειδὴ ἐν ἱερῷ Ἡρακλέους δειπνοῦντες ἐγένοντο [ἐγένοντο Dindorf] χοροί*. On this latter passage Gaisford says that Aristophanes of Byzantium is meant, and that *ἐπειδὴ* . . . *χοροί* is in the wrong place; it belongs to the lemma *Δαιταλεῖς*, as the Orion passage shows. We may add that the earlier part (*λέγεται* . . . *ὑποκρίσει*) is copied verbally from Suidas, *s.v.* *Δρᾶμα*. But though the *Etymologicum* evidence has no independent value, the Orion passage deserves the closest attention. We have no reason to suspect it, the sense of it is perfectly clear, and it confirms what we read in Suidas and Theophylactus. It cannot mean simply that the chorus of the *Banqueters* consisted of the guests, for two reasons: If that were all, there would be no reason for such commonplace information to be handed down from Alexandria to the lexicographers; moreover, the plural<sup>2</sup> *χοροί* is impossible in that meaning.

What happened was surely this. The early portion of the comedy was filled by the action of which we know a great deal: the rustic father's complaint about his depraved city-bred son, the discussion of hard words in Homer and Solon, some contrast or perhaps dispute (Zieliński's *ἀγών*) between the good and the bad son, and the narrative describing the lawsuit brought by the bad son against his father. Then came the parabasis. There remained that later portion which in our extant plays is usually occupied or partly occupied by short scenes—these, as has already been mentioned, are what Poppelreuter and

<sup>1</sup> So Ranke (*op. cit.*, xxxii, 273): "comoedia in comoedia." He goes on to use the *ἐπιδείκνιον* fragment (discredited only later).

<sup>2</sup> Dindorf, followed by Ranke, Fritzsche, and others, altered it to *χορός*. But see below.

others understand by comic *ἐπεισόδια*—depicting the results of the hero's success: introducing the applicants for peace-wine (*Acharnians*), the traders to whom peace has brought prosperity or ruin (*Peace*), the visitors to Chremylus (*Plutus*), etc. This portion always shows the most languid development of plot, sometimes no development at all. Magnificent as is that section of the *Frogs*, the action there advances very slowly, if we may use the word "advance" of a mere arithmetical accumulation of evidence, similar to the competition of Cleon and Demosthenes in the *Knights*. The *Thesmophoriazusae* itself, though by far the finest of the eleven in construction, contains unsuccessful preliminary attempts to rescue the captive. In the *Acharnians*, the earliest of all, this looseness is more marked than in any of its successors. Now, the corresponding part of the *Banqueters* was even more rudimentary than in the *Acharnians*, where all these miscellaneous scenes do at any rate center on Dicaeopolis. The youthful poet needed some time and experience to reach even that stage; the latter part of the *Banqueters* contained an interlude or interludes (but let us neglect the number for a moment). The king-archon who has been president<sup>1</sup> of the banquet provides a little drama for the pleasure of Heracles' guests, as the anonymous Lord provides *The Taming of the Shrew* for Christopher Sly, though this latter of course is vastly longer.

Can we gather anything about this interlude beyond the bare fact that it occurred? Mere guessing is easy but unprofitable. Ranke (*op. cit.*, p. 274) thought that it treated the quarrel between father and son; but in that case the *ἐπεισόδιον* would be entirely germane to the plot, indeed the core of it. He suggested too (p. 275) that Heracles was a character of the *Banqueters*. On general grounds he would be appropriate to the interlude (cf. *Peace* 741); but we have real indications of another though by no means inconsistent view. Aristophanes offered a burlesque of those Megarian farces so often mentioned with contempt by Athenian writers. It is not our present business to discuss the historical relations of Megara (whether Sicilian or Isthmian) and Athens in regard to comedy; but it is plain that the vigor with which

<sup>1</sup> A natural supposition, since he had to select the *παράσχοι*, or at any rate to see that they were selected (*Athen.* vi. 235c).



the latter repudiates the former betrays an uneasy consciousness of debt. There can be no doubt that Attic comedy (including our extant dramas) itself contained a "Megarian" element—crude horseplay and jokes stupid as well as obscene. Aristophanes took as his main topic the subject most obvious to a brilliant lad fresh from school: the various and conflicting theories of education. But he did not fill his play with this. His talent (as the *Acharnians* by itself is almost enough to prove) did not reach so far; and he employed also the other theme that had caught his attention, the vulgarity and barrenness of contemporary comic drama. That such works as the *Beasts* of Crates or the *Dionysalexandros* of Cratinus were, so far as we can tell, excellent plays and very likely as good as anything Aristophanes himself was to produce before the *Clouds*, need not trouble us, for obvious reasons. The new playwright put himself forward, like Terence and Marlowe, as the scourge of cheap "popular" writing and the inaugurator of a new type. More than once<sup>1</sup> in later life he was to proclaim his own excellence as the man who made comedy a great art-form; and in this first essay he attacked the crude vulgarity of his contemporaries. For this supposition the evidence is fairly good. In our rehabilitated fragment, as given by Suidas, ὥσπερ ἀξιόλογον is significant; whether we read ἀξιον λόγον or ἀξιον λόγου, the implication remains that the interlude is not praiseworthy. We seem to hear him protesting: "The archon actually offered this as a tolerable show"; and the imperfect ἐδείκνυνεν helps that idea—it was the archon's opinion.<sup>2</sup> Some of our fragments would suit this burlesque perfectly, and (though this is of course a bold statement) they seem quite unfitted to the main plot.

<sup>1</sup> Especially in *Peace* 749 f.:

ἐποίησε τέχνην μεγάλην ὑμῖν κἀπύργωσ' οἰκοδομήσας  
ἐπεσιν μεγάλους καὶ διανοίας καὶ σκώμμασιν οὐκ ἀγοραίοις—

very like the language (*Frogs* 1003 f.) used of Aeschylus himself.

<sup>2</sup> Similarly in what is sometimes called the "philosophic imperfect" (cf. Goodwin, *MT*, p. 13), e.g., *Crato* 47D: διαφθερούμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δίκαιῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο, where ἐγίγνετο means "We said: 'it becomes.'" This pregnant use of the imperfect is to be seen in *Medea* 590 f.:

οὐ τοῦτό σ' εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ βάρβαρον λέχος  
πρὸς γῆρας οὐκ εὐδοξον ἐξέβαινέ σοι,

though there is a further refinement probably, the reported idea being future: "You began to realize that a foreign wife would be discreditable when you were no longer a dashing young hero."

They exhibit the tricks of the cunning and unscrupulous slave, so familiar in later comedy, whose earliest unmistakable appearance in extant work is the conversation between Xanthias and "Aeacus" in *Frogs* 738-55, though Nicias and Demosthenes at the opening of the *Knights* give a clear premonition thereof. One fragment (203 [Kock]) certainly belongs to this class, and Bergk assigns it to *ludicrum illud episodium*:

ἡ χόνδρον ἔψων, εἴτα μνίαν ἐμβαλὼν  
εἰδίδου ῥοφεῖν ἄν.

Others are:

οὐκ αἰσχυνοῦμαι τὸν τάριχον τουτονὶ  
πλύνων ἄπασιν ὅσα σίνουδ' αὐτῷ κακά [200 (Kock)],

which probably means: "I shall not hesitate to befool this rascal as a punishment for all the offenses I know him to have committed";

ὄλωλα· τίλλων τὸν λάγων ὀφθήσομαι [212 (Kock)],

(where Fritzsche, *op. cit.*, p. 104, sees an allusion to a poisoned fish, skinned by the slave at command of the wicked son!); and

ταχύ νυν πέτου καὶ μὴ τροπίαν οἶνον φέρε [213 (Kock)].

The poet has given us in the *Peace* (739 ff.) a racy catalogue of these rudimentary and vulgar farces, including a (real or imaginary) quotation therefrom (vss. 746 f.):

ὦ κακόδαιμον, τί τὸ δέρμ' ἔπαθες; μὲν ὑστρίχλις εἰσέβαλέν σοι  
ἐς τὰς πλευρὰς πολλῇ στρατιᾷ κάδενδροτόμησε τὸ νῶτον;

The offense, we gather, lies not in the coarseness and crudity alone but also in the nullity of the persons. For he himself gives us plenty of scurrilous jests, but made the body of his play from public affairs and important people, οὐκ ἰδιώτας ἀνθρωπίσκους κωμῳδῶν οὐδὲ γυναικας (vs. 751).

One question is still outstanding: Did the *Banqueters* contain more than one *ἐπεισόδιον*? It is difficult to dogmatize. Only one element in our evidence suggests more than one, the plural χοροί in *Orion*. This has been "corrected" to χορός amid general agreement, but no reason for the change is offered; probably it is regarded as obvious that one play can have but one chorus. Yet the plural gives an excel-

lent, though unusual, sense. "Rising from table, they became choruses"; that is, tiny plays were performed, each with a miniature chorus drawn for the moment from the twenty-four. Perhaps each little band numbered seven, like the comic chorus at the Delphic Soteria and the tragic chorus in a Cyrenaic wall-painting.<sup>1</sup> But we should not press this plural so far. Even if correct, it may refer to the familiar division into *ἡμιχόρια*: in that case it would suggest that in the play proper one half (consisting of the *παράσιτοι* themselves) sided with the father, the other half (their sons) with the depraved son. Further, we cannot be sure that the later portion of the *Banqueters* was long<sup>2</sup> enough for more than one such interlude, since (as in the *Wasps*) the parabasis may have been placed well toward the end of the comedy. Nor have we any known parallels in the rest of Aristophanes' work: the parodies in the *Thesmophoriazusae* are germane to the plot, and we are told nothing to our purpose about the *Δράματα ἢ Κέντραυρος*.

TORONTO

<sup>1</sup> See Haigh and Pickard-Cambridge, *The Attic Theatre*<sup>3</sup>, p. 290.

<sup>2</sup> It is perhaps worth while to quote two possible helps to a notion of the length of an *ἐπεισόδιον*. The *Liber Glossarum* (Kaibel, p. 72) reports: "sed in fabulis primae [sc. comoediam] contulerunt <non> magnas, ita ut non excederent in singulis versus trecentos." Birt (*Antikes Buchwesen*, pp. 446, 496) gives reason for supposing that the average length of Epicharmus' plays was only a little more than four hundred lines.

## SILENCE IN TRAGEDY AND THE THREE-ACTOR RULE

BY ALFRED CARY SCHLESINGER

SILENCE in tragedy, generally speaking, is a stoic virtue which would be regarded, no doubt, with great approval—especially by the neighbors. The silence of which I wish to speak, however, is quite limited in scope and specific in character. I am referring to the silence observed by certain few characters in Greek tragic drama—a silence which is used by some scholars<sup>1</sup> as evidence for the so-called “three-actor rule.” As one who believes that the three-actor rule is a post-classical invention—not to say delusion—I am interested to see whether any reason can be assigned for the silence of these characters, except the reason that actors were scarce. I shall consider the various instances approximately in chronological order, in which process I shall give Sophocles precedence over Euripides without regard to exact dates. I should add that in some cases the character under the microscope is not only silent but absent from the stage.

The first instance, from Aeschylus' *Persians*, is one of these cases of absence. Atossa's departure at line 851 and subsequent failure to return are sometimes<sup>2</sup> attributed to the need for her actor to play the rôle of Xerxes. I think, however, that Atossa failed to reappear simply because there was nothing further for her to do. The conclusion of the play is a *kommos* between Xerxes and the chorus. One character and the chorus is the standard arrangement for such an episode. (In Aeschylus' *Seven*, there is, of course, a special reason for having twin characters, i.e., both Antigone and Ismene). Therefore, there would have been nothing for Atossa to do had she returned—unless Aeschylus had introduced an entirely new episode, involving some sort of interaction between Xerxes and Atossa. But in a discussion of this kind, we must certainly regard the general outline of a play as fixed—that is, we must take it that Aeschylus wanted the *Persians* to include just the episodes which it does contain and no

<sup>1</sup> I refer particularly to Kaffenberger, *Das Dreischauspielergesetz in der griechischen Tragödie*, and Flickinger, *The Greek Theater and Its Drama*, pp. 162 ff.

<sup>2</sup> E.g., Flickinger, p. 175.

more. Atossa's absence, then, at the end of the play is due to the fact that there is no further dramatic service for her to perform. The peculiar motivation of her departure<sup>1</sup> is due not to her failure, or inability, to return, but to the difficulty of getting her off-stage when she has no back-scene palace to which to retire.

In Sophocles' *Ajax*, the absence of Teucer in the first part and of Tecmessa in the second part is ascribed to a lack of enough actors to handle these rôles. But surely in the first part a character is wanted who will attempt to console Ajax and restore his spirit after his despair; in the second part, a champion is required to defend his helpless body. For the first rôle, Tecmessa, not Teucer, is demanded; for the second, Teucer, not Tecmessa; the presence of Teucer at first or Tecmessa later would be a pointless duplication.

In the *Trachiniae* again, it is supposed that Iole refuses to speak because there was no speaking actor to take her part. But if she had spoken, we would have had to have a whole new episode inserted, or her remarks would have amounted to nothing. And what would be the purpose of this episode? Iole's place in the play is due to the effect she produces on Deianira. But this effect is well brought out without Iole's saying a word. Why then should she speak?

Next we come to the silence of Ismene in the *Oedipus at Colonus*, lines 1099-1555.<sup>2</sup> Now during these 456 lines Antigone speaks (a) 5 half-lines and 6 whole lines, (b) 23 lines in one speech, (c) 4½ lines, (d) 4 lines, (e) 11 lines and 4 half-lines, or, in all, 48 lines and 10 half-lines—that is, about one-eighth of the total number. Now it would have been possible to divide these lines between Antigone and Ismene, but would any advantage have been gained? The speeches are only a small part of the action; they express filial and sisterly feelings which both girls shared; was it not natural, then, that Antigone, traditionally the active sister, should speak for both? Except for the appeal on behalf of Polyneices (and here the choice of Antigone as the speaker has special significance) no force would have been added to these utterances by Ismene's intervention as a speaker. I take it, then, that these lines were assigned to one speaker for convenience and brevity, and to Antigone because she was, to a greater or less degree, the more appropriate mouthpiece for these expressions.

<sup>1</sup> Ll. 832 ff.; cf. Flickinger, p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Flickinger, p. 182.



It is also stated that Oedipus' farewell to his daughters was put off-stage to avoid the necessity for Ismene's speaking. I suspect that we might add that the off-stage scene also was designed to keep Antigone from speaking. The play is long; farewells are necessarily a bit trite. Too, the note of sadness is kept down to a minimum at the conclusion of the play as we have it. Also the element of the miraculous in Oedipus' death is better developed by the play as it is than it would be by a version with everything on-stage except the last moment of Oedipus. It is quite easy, then, to account for the arrangement of the play's ending without supposing a shortage of actors.

Again, in Euripides' *Ion*, the absence of Xuthus in the latter part of the play is due to the fact that there is no place for him in the conflict between Ion and Creusa. He cannot reconcile them and to suppress them merely postpones an outbreak. He could hardly side with Creusa against Ion, and if he sided with Ion, Creusa's plight, desperate as it is, would be impossible. Also, it would hardly be well to raise the question (a delicate one) of Xuthus' feelings about Creusa's early and hitherto-unknown misfortune. The entire composition of the plot, then, requires Xuthus' absence after he has accepted Ion as his son.

In this play, we may observe in passing that in the scene following line 747 the Old Man manages the entire conversation with the chorus, while Creusa, aside from a few laments, says nothing. Here is a case of silence which is clearly independent of the number of actors available. But it is hardly necessary to mention this, since the silent actor is so well recognized a phenomenon of Greek tragedy that we hardly need to be reminded of his existence. It may be well, nevertheless, to include an instance or two of this kind for comparison with the silences under discussion.

The silence of Pylades throughout Euripides' *Electra* is also attributed to scarcity of actors. Now Pylades has a positive passion for silence in Greek tragedy. In the *Choephoroi*, he speaks once, briefly—though with great effect; Aeschylus was noted for effective use of speech after silence.<sup>1</sup> In Sophocles' *Electra*, Pylades is not present at all. Even in the *Iphigenia in Tauris* and the *Orestes*, he has comparatively little to say. The truth is that Pylades, while admi-

<sup>1</sup> *Frogs* 911 ff.

nable, is a bit one-sided. All we know about him is that he is a faithful friend. This particular trait is developed for the audience sometimes by his own remarks, sometimes by others' comments, and in Euripides' *Electra*, simply by his presence. Now in both *Electras* Orestes is distinctly second fiddle to Electra. Hence Pylades is still less important. Therefore he has nothing to do in either play, whereas in the *Choephoroi* he has a chance for action, since Orestes is the chief mover in the killings. Pylades' presence in the *Electra* is, then, a bit of parade on the part of Euripides, due to his importance in the legend; his silence is due to his negligibility in the play.

Kaffenberger says that Thoas in the *Iphigenia in Tauris* is made to veil his head<sup>1</sup> so that he will not have to speak immediately afterward to the mute Orestes. But surely it is a more probable reason to say that this device is used by Iphigenia to promote the deception of Thoas, for what possible subject of conversation could there be between the king and the captive?

In this play, we have another instance of silence obviously not connected with the number of actors. When Orestes is introducing Pylades to Electra, Pylades says nothing. Why? Clearly because he has nothing really significant to say; Orestes can speak for him with better effect.

Lastly, the *Orestes* contains a number of silences. This may seem a surprising statement at first, for surely in this play Euripides cannot be accused of niggardliness in the matter of episodes or conversation. If he ever earned the reputation for chattering given him by Aristophanes,<sup>2</sup> it is here. Nevertheless there is an occasional silence on the part of some character. For one, Hermione at lines 124-25 says nothing. This is because she is being sent on an errand, and needs to say nothing, as long as she goes. Pylades is absent at first; before his arrival, Electra departs; like Teucer and Tecmessa, they are respectively the defending friend and the comforting woman; for assuagement by Electra there is no place while Orestes deals with Menelaus and Tyndareus; for help from Pylades there is no need until after the threat against Orestes develops. And now for the final scene of the play. Electra, Hermione, and Pylades are all present on the roof of the palace while Orestes bandies words with Menelaus, but none of

<sup>1</sup> Ll. 1217-18.

<sup>2</sup> *Frogs* 948 ff.

them says anything. Does this silence mean that they could not speak? No. They simply had nothing interesting to say. Electra is abetting Orestes and Pylades, but has no personal contribution to make. Poor Hermione, with a sword at her throat, may be pardoned for finding herself at a loss for small talk. And Pylades? Pylades has a distinct opportunity to speak, for Menelaus addresses a question to him. But Pylades says nothing. Could he say nothing because a mute actor was then impersonating him?<sup>1</sup> Rather let us ask if there was anything for him to say. Menelaus' question was, in substance, "Pylades, do you approve of these goings-on?" What can Pylades reply? Shall he say "Yes"? This would be acceptable, but redundant. He has in effect said "Yes" a dozen times before—in fact, he concocted the scheme of killing Helen.<sup>2</sup> Then what point could there be in his saying "Yes" to Menelaus? But if he says "No," or even "Yes and no," then we must have a whole new episode to explain when and why he changed his mind—all to no purpose which will not better be served by Apollo. Therefore there is nothing significant which Pylades can say. But for Orestes to answer for him—practically to snatch the answer from his mouth—is a neat touch toward characterizing the hot-headed Atreides. Therefore, the interests of the play are best served by the existing arrangements in this scene.

The explanation given above for these scenes is not at all thrilling. It is quite simple, negative, and colorless—namely, that these various characters fail to speak because they have nothing to say. But this explanation seems to me clearly the true one. The scholars who draw from these scenes arguments in favor of the three-actor rule are really basing their arguments on the assumption that a play will necessarily be improved by having more conversation in it—that is, that any dramatist will make all his characters talk as much as possible. I do not mean that these scholars would defend this assumption openly so

<sup>1</sup> I have never seen reasons advanced why a Greek "super" could not speak a few lines on occasion; it is generally assumed that no super did do so, and this assumption is fundamental to the theory of the three-actor rule. But I see no reason why some supers might not have spoken a few lines, provided that the part was not made too strenuous. Pylades in the *Choephoroi* is as to length of speech a counterpart of the modern butler who has to say only "The carriage waits without"—of course his importance is much greater.

<sup>2</sup> L. 1105.

stated, but that unconsciously they rest on it their remarks about the scenes in question. But it is in accord with the principle of restraint which visibly operates in other forms of fifth-century Greek art to suppose that a Greek dramatist worked as a rule on the opposite assumption, namely, that a play should contain no remarks which do not contribute significantly to the progress of the play—that is, either to plot or characterization. Of course the Greek playwright did not strip his plays of all embroidery by omitting all characters or speeches which were not strictly necessary. But his tendency—and this is particularly true of Sophocles—was to make every line count, and hence to omit superfluous talk.<sup>1</sup> We need not be surprised, then, if some characters occasionally refuse to avail themselves of chances to appear or to utter speeches. We need not seek any esoteric explanation for the phenomenon, but may simply pause to admire the restraint and economy of the Greek dramatist in accomplishing his ends. I hope this paper may help to lay the ghost of the three-actor rule by removing some apparent evidence for it. May the attention of the reader be directed instead to the lean effectiveness of the Greek dramatic masterpieces!

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<sup>1</sup> Euripides, as mentioned above, was considered quite loquacious, though as compared to Shakespeare he is quite thrifty in most of his plays both with characters and with conversation.

## SENATORIAL AND CIVIL YEARS IN ATHENS

By BENJAMIN D. MERITT

IN SEARCHING for new evidence on the relation between the senatorial and the civil years in Athens toward the close of the fifth century before Christ, I have again and again had occasion to study a squeeze of *IG, I<sup>2</sup>, 304*, which was made for me in Paris in the summer of 1925. For the discovery of new correspondences between the two calendars, the important part of the inscription is that which was cut on the upper portion of the reverse face of the stone, giving lines 66-92, according to the present numbering of lines in the *Corpus*. This document records the amounts of money borrowed by the Athenian state from the treasurers of Athena in 407/6, and the great importance which it has for chronological study lies in the fact that dates of payments are given by both the senatorial and the civil years.

It is true that the part of the stone here under consideration has been so badly worn as to be almost illegible, but even from the squeeze it is possible to discern more than has been indicated in the transcript of the *Corpus*. The name of the month Munichion is still visible in line 68 as Μονιχιῶν[s]. Furthermore, it is evident from the position of scattered letters here and there on the stone that lines 66-76 were written *stoichedon*, with a length of line of seventy-three letters. Other traces of letters upon the squeeze offered the hope that a careful examination of the stone itself might reveal at least one double date, both by civil month and by prytany, and so in December of 1929 I visited the Louvre Museum with the express object of gleaning from this inscription such new readings as might be possible. I wish here to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Etienne Michon, of the department of Greek and Roman antiquities at the Louvre, who placed every facility at my disposal for this work, and whose sympathetic help contributed largely to the satisfactory outcome of the study.

Without going further into the detail of the tedious and difficult processes involved in the reading of the stone, I give here the new text of lines 68-75, with some comments on the bearing which this text has upon the calendar in the latter part of the fifth century.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I hope to publish soon a revised text of the entire reverse face of this stone.



- 68 [ . . . ]θεν Φαινίπποι Παιονίδει[ι] τρίτ[ει κα]ὶ εἰκοστῇ τῇ  
 πρυ[τα]νεία[ς] τρίτ[ει] Μονιχιῶνο[ς] ἰ[στ]  
 69 [αμ]ένο  $\varepsilon$ ΤΧΧΓΓ[+τ+][+τ+][+τ+][+τ+] $\varepsilon$ [λ]λενοταμίαι[ς καὶ] παρέ[δροις]  
 . . . . . στρατ . . . . .  
 70 [ . . . ]ονι ἔκτει καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῇ πρυτανείας ἔ[κ]τε[ι Μ]ον[ι]χι[ο]δ[ο]νος  
 ἰσταμέν]ο . . . . . τ . . . . .  
 71 [ . . . . ]ίλο  $\varepsilon$  ἔλλενοταμίαις [καὶ π]αρέδρο[ις] Λυσιθέο[ι]  
 [Θυμαίτ]άδ[ει καὶ συνά]ρχοσιν δευτέραι  
 72 [τῇ]ς πρυτανείας ἐβδόμει[ι] ἐπ[ι] δέ[κ]α Μονι[χ]ι[ο]δ[ο]νος . . . Δ . . .  
 [ἔ]λλενο[ταμίαις] κ[αὶ] παρέδροις 'Α  
 73 [θε]ροδόροι Μελιτεῦ [κ]αὶ συν[άρ]χοσιν τε[τ]άρ[τ]ε[ι] τῇ  
 πρυτανείας ἐνάτει Μονιχιῶνο[ς] ἐ[ς] τ[ὲν] δ[ι]  
 74 [οβ]ελίαν  $\varepsilon$ ΤΤ $\varepsilon$  λογισταῖ[ς] 'Α[ρ]χεδέμοι [Μ]α[ρ]αθονίοι  
 . . . . .  
 75 [ . . . ]ονι Κοπρεῖοι ἐβδόμει τῇ[ς] πρυτανείας ἐνάτ[τ]ε[ι]  
 Μονιχιῶνος φθίν]ο[ντος] - - - - -

It is evident here that several new equations between the senatorial and civil years have been recovered, and on the basis of the evidence presented we may formulate these equations as follows:

Lines	Day of Prytany	Munichion
68-69 . . . . .	23d =	3
70 . . . . .	26th =	6
71-72 . . . . .	2d =	17
73 . . . . .	4th =	(1)9
75 . . . . .	7th =	22 [ἐνάτη φθίνοντος]

Several interesting facts about the calendar, and the record of this inscription, become apparent at once. In the text of line 73 the words ἐπὶ δέκα have been omitted by error after the word ἐνάτει. The corresponding dates before and after show that the fourth day of the prytany must be equated with the nineteenth day of the month, and not with the ninth, as stated in the inscription. Such mistakes in the records of date are not unknown, and they often cause serious difficulty in making calendar calculations. Fortunately in the present instance the necessary evidence for making the proper correction is contained in this same document.

When one observes from a study of lines 41-65 of this inscription that the beginning of the civil year coincided with the beginning of

the senatorial year,<sup>1</sup> it is clear that the period during the month of Munichion covered by lines 68-75 must have comprised the end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth prytanies. In this manner the equations tabulated above may be restated as follows:

	Prytany	Munichion
407/6	VIII, 23 =	3
	VIII, 26 =	6
	IX, 2 =	17
	IX, 4 =	19
	IX, 7 =	22 [ἐνάτη φθίνωντος]

We may observe also that the eighth prytany contained 35 days, and that the month of Munichion contained 30 days. This latter conclusion follows from the fact that the ninth day from the end of the month must have been also the twenty-second day of that month.

Now, these equations cannot be reconciled with the dual nature of the Athenian calendar which I have heretofore assumed to exist down to the very last years of the fifth century.<sup>2</sup> They give to us, rather, the proof that the senatorial year had already been equated with the civil year as early as 407/6, for, by assigning 37 days to each of the last two prytanies, the two years are made coterminous at the end as well as at the beginning. The following scheme will illustrate the disposition of days in the months and prytanies:

407/6 Pryt. I, 1 = Hekatombaion 1			
	Days		Days
Prytany I.....	37	Hekatombaion.....	29
Prytany II.....	36	Metageitnion.....	30
Prytany III.....	(35)	Boedromion.....	(29)
Prytany IV.....	(35)	Pyanepsion.....	(30)
Prytany V.....	(34)	Maimakterion.....	(29)
Prytany VI.....	(34)	Posideion.....	(30)
Prytany VII.....	(34)	Gamelion.....	(29)
Prytany VIII.....	35	Anthesterion.....	(30)
Prytany IX.....	(37)	Elaphebolion.....	(29)
Prytany X.....	(37)	Munichion.....	30
		Thargelion.....	(29)
		Skirophorion.....	(30)
	354		354

406/5 Pryt. I, 1 = Hekatombaion 1

<sup>1</sup> Meritt, *The Athenian Calendar*, p. 98.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 124-26.

I have inclosed in parentheses the number of days in those months and prytanies where the exact figure is a matter of restoration. The year was beyond question an ordinary civil year of twelve months. If we were to assume an intercalated Posideion, the extra 30 days thus obtained would have to be distributed among prytanies III-VII, giving at best two prytanies of 41 days each and three prytanies of 40 days each. This extraordinary arrangement of prytanies may be rejected at once. The variation which we find is based upon the normal 35- or 36-day period of the ordinary year rather than upon the normal 38- or 39-day period of the intercalary year. If we wish to assume that the civil year contained 355 instead of 354 days, it will be necessary only to substitute 35 as the number of days in one of those prytanies where the number 34 is now restored.

Before the discovery of the calendar correspondences in the eighth and ninth prytanies of this year, it was only natural to assume that the older distinctive senatorial year with its prytanies of 36 and 37 days was still in operation. The fact that even here the first and second prytanies contained 37 and 36 days, respectively, gave support to this view. I have argued against the interpretation given by Schmidt<sup>1</sup> that this year was an ordinary year, with the civil and senatorial years of equal length, and with prytanies I, II, and X containing, respectively, 37, 36, and 37 days. Without this new evidence at our disposal my argument was, I believe, justified; but we now know that Schmidt had actually hit upon the truth of the matter. The identification of the senatorial year with the civil year, which we find implicit in the inscriptions of the latter part of the fourth century, and which is attested also by Aristotle (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* 43. 2), is now shown to have been effected as early as 407/6. During this year, at least, and subsequently, the separate senatorial year, approximately equal in length to the solar year, no longer existed.

This determination has a direct and very important bearing on our understanding of the financial records of money borrowed by the Athenian state in the fifth century. It has been my contention that such records, when given year by year, are based upon the senatorial year as distinct from the civil year and from the Panathenaic year,

<sup>1</sup> *Handbuch der griechischen Chronologie*, pp. 229-33. Cf. also Meritt, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

and I consider this contention established beyond question for the record of the four years 426/5—423/2 embodied in the famous inscription *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 324.<sup>1</sup> It seems to me obvious that the records in *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 324, which give the reckonings of interest on borrowed money, were in turn based upon the state records of the moneys borrowed, examples of which have been preserved for other years in such inscriptions as *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 296, 302, and 304. It follows that these records of money borrowed by the Athenian state were also based upon the senatorial year, and I have supported this contention by evidence from the introductory formulas of these records<sup>2</sup> and from the dates of payments recorded for the Panathenaic festival (e.g., *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 302, ll. 57–58; I<sup>2</sup>, 304, ll. 5–6).<sup>3</sup>

The accounts of the year 407/6 presented, however, an anomaly which I was unable to explain, but which did not weaken my conviction that records of state expense were based on the senatorial year. In this year the concluding lines of *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 304 (ll. 89–92) record moneys given to the state by the treasurers of Athena in the month of Hekatombaion and during the first prytany of 406. Without being able to solve this problem, I was forced to leave *sub iudice* the question of whether these accounts were really records of state expense as such—as they seem to be—or records of the treasurers of Athena based upon the Panathenaic year.<sup>4</sup> In any case the record which we have for the year 407/6 covers the period down to the Panathenaic festival of 406.

In so far as the period from 426/5 to 423/2 is concerned I quoted in my earlier study of the calendar the specific instance of the first payment in the year 424/3 to show that the records were based on the senatorial year and not on the year of the Panathenaic interval.<sup>5</sup> I also pointed out that our records might often contain, and in this case do contain, the statement that money was paid by one board of treasurers when we know perfectly well that it was actually paid by their

<sup>1</sup> Meritt, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 95–96.

<sup>2</sup> Glots, *Rev. Arch.*, XXIX (1929), 196; Meritt, *op. cit.*, pp. 95, 124–26.

<sup>3</sup> Meritt, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94; also "The Departure of Alcibiades for Sicily," *AJA*, XXXIV (1930), 125–52, especially p. 143.

<sup>4</sup> Meritt, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 17–19, 95.

successors who entered office at the time of the Panathenaea. This anomaly of record is the direct consequence of the variation between the senatorial and Panathenaic years, and for a more complete discussion I must content myself with referring again to the passages cited here from my earlier study.<sup>1</sup>

But in addition to the one instance quoted before to support my view, I may also call attention to the fact that the first payment from the treasurers of the other gods in 423/2 was made before the Panathenaic festival and yet listed as though made by the treasurers Gorgoinus and his colleagues who entered office at the time of the festival.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the first payment from the treasurers of Athena in 423/2 was made more than two weeks before the date of the Panathenaic festival, and yet it is recorded as a payment made by Timokles and his colleagues, whom we know to have entered office at the time of the festival.<sup>3</sup>

These instances give ample proof that the records of state expense for individual years were based upon the senatorial year, and they also illustrate the anomaly of record which might arise because of the divergence between this year and the year of the Panathenaic interval. I wish to emphasize here the fact that the time of the first payment from Athena's treasure in 423/2, especially, is determined by a rigid mathematical calculation<sup>4</sup> which eliminates the possibility of error in our interpretation.

And yet this interpretation has been challenged by Professor Kolbe in his review of my study of the calendar:

Bei der Berechnung der Qualität der Jahre bedient sich der Verf. mehrfach der Voraussetzung, dass Zahlungen für die Panathenäen stets vor dem Hauptfesttag, dem 28. Hekatombaion, erfolgt seien. Wenn also wie *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 302 im J. 415/4 und n. 304 in 410/9 die Zahlung erst in der II. Prytanie gemacht wurde, so sei zu folgern, dass die II. Prytanie noch vor den 28. Hekatombaion fiel. Demgegenüber hat West *Am. J. Arch.* XXIX 1925, 10 f. mit Recht geltend gemacht, dass die *ραμίαι τῆς θεᾶς* ihr Amt erst an den Panathenäen antraten. M.s. Einwand, dass die Urkunden in diesem Punkte nicht

<sup>1</sup> West also accepts the validity of this position. Cf. *Classical Weekly*, XXIII (1929), 62.

<sup>2</sup> Meritt, *op. cit.*, Plates I and II, ll. 57-58.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 38-40.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 61-67.

korrekt seien, kann ich nicht gelten lassen. Denn die Korkyrarechnung *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 295, die in einem Archontenjahre beide Schatzmeisterkollegien nennt, beweist das Gegenteil. Eine gegen den Verf. entscheidende Instanz ist die Urkunde I<sup>2</sup> 304<sub>90</sub> ff.: denn hier stehen die Zahlungen der I. Prytanie und des Hekatombaion am Schluss der Jahresrechnung: [ἐ]πὶ τῆς Ἐρεχθείδος πρώτης πρυτανεύουσας . . . ] *vac.*<sup>1</sup>

I have nowhere argued that the treasurers of Athena did not enter office at the time of the Panathenaea, and I agree with Kolbe, now as before, that *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 295, is very good proof that they did—if such proof were needed. But the second part of Kolbe's criticism puts into words a genuine objection to my interpretation of these treasurers' records, in fact the only real objection which I have been able to discover against the contention that records of state expense were based upon the senatorial year, with the two closely allied propositions that items actually paid by one board in the interval between Prytany I, 1 and Hekatombaion 28 were listed as though paid by the treasurers who entered office at the Panathenaea, and that payments for the Panathenaic festival were made before the festival date. One may well ask how we can maintain that our records of state expense were based on the senatorial year, when we find in *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 304, a record which continues into Prytany I of the following year and closes at the time of the Panathenaea.

There is only one answer to this question. Since the senatorial year is known to have been the basis for these records in the period from 426/5 to 423/2, we must assume that before 407/6 this year had ceased to be the basis for the records and that the Panathenaic year had been substituted in its stead. The discovery of new correspondences between the senatorial and civil calendars in 407/6 has shown us that at this time the old senatorial year had ceased to exist as a separate entity. When it passed out of existence it could, of course, no longer be used as a chronological framework for the records of state expense. There were left the civil year and the Panathenaic year as possible substitutes, and *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 304, teaches us that the Panathenaic year was the one adopted. But we must also recognize the fact that the period covered by our financial record in 407/6 cannot be legitimately used as

<sup>1</sup> *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1929, pp. 1063–64.



evidence for the period covered by the financial records of earlier years when the old senatorial year was still operative.

That this separate senatorial year was maintained at least through the year 410/9 is shown by the preserved record of state expenses for that year (*IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 304, ll. 1-40), where we find still the characteristic introductory formula *ἐπὶ τῆς βολῆς ἐκ Κλεγένες πρῶτος ἐγραμμάτευε*,<sup>1</sup> and where we observe that the records themselves end with the last day of the last prytany, and not at the time of the Panathenaea, as in 407/6.

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<sup>1</sup> On the significance of this formula cf. Meritt, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-26; Glotz, *loc. cit.*

## LIVY'S ACCOUNT OF THE EQUITES

By H. HILL

THE accuracy of Livy's terminology in his references to the Equites has recently been called into question, and not for the first time. In the seventh volume of the *Cambridge Ancient History* Dr. H. Stuart Jones, discussing the addition of new members to the senate in the first year of the republic, writes "Livy, it is true, says that they were chosen *ex equestri ordine*; but what meaning he attached or could have attached to this phrase it would be hard to say."<sup>1</sup> Livy's actual words in the passage referred to are *primoribus equestris gradus*,<sup>2</sup> but no doubt this is the same as his use of *equester ordo* in other places. Other historians have accused Livy not so much of vagueness as of inaccuracy. Mommsen, for instance, states that Livy's use of the phrase *equester ordo* is an anachronism due to the language of his own day and not applicable to the history of the republican period.<sup>3</sup> Most modern authorities accept this view,<sup>4</sup> which has the merit of simplicity, but will not stand the test of a close study of Livy's usage such as is attempted in this article.

We must first of all remember that within Livy's actual lifetime the whole position and organization of the Equites were revolutionized by Augustus. Before his reforms they were a loosely knit group of men with no separate organization—the *equester ordo* of Cicero's time. Augustus gave them unity and a position clearly defined in the state. This change, important as it was, cannot have escaped Livy's attention, and it is impossible to believe that he ignored the previous form of organization and wrote his history on the assumption that the order had always been as he saw it when newly reorganized by Augustus. Yet this is what Mommsen's statement implies.

It is generally agreed that the difference between the republican and imperial Equites was mainly a matter of the *equus publicus*. Under the republic there existed two different kinds of Equites—those with the

<sup>1</sup> P. 449.

<sup>2</sup> ii. 1. 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Staats.*, III, 483, n. 3; *Fr. Trans.*, VI<sup>2</sup>, 78, n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Equites Romani," and see editors of Livy. For a different view see W. B. Anderson on Livy ix. 38. 8 (Cambridge Press).

public horse, i.e., the original eighteen centuries attributed to Servius Tullius; and those who although qualified by wealth to possess it did not possess the public horse. Under the Empire no such distinction existed. All Equites were *equites equo publico*, i.e., they were Equites only by virtue of the public horse conferred by the emperor. The question at issue is whether Livy recognized this very important difference between republican and imperial conditions.

Let us first examine Livy's use of the phrase *equester ordo*. In the first place it must be noticed that the use of the phrase in the *Epitomes* is no evidence that it was used in the parallel passage of Livy. We possess Livy's words in one case to compare with the *Epitome*, and we see that the epitomator used the phrase when Livy did not.<sup>1</sup> We must therefore confine our examination to Livy's own narrative. The phrase occurs eight times in the extant books,<sup>2</sup> and in addition there are five places in which *ordo* obviously means *equester ordo*.<sup>3</sup> To these we may add the use of *equester gradus* mentioned above. In some of these passages the *equester ordo* appears as a section of the Roman army composed of men who are distinguished *honore atque ordine*.<sup>4</sup> In one case, at least, they can be nothing but the members of those equestrian centuries which dated traditionally from Romulus and were increased by various kings until their final form was reached under Servius Tullius.<sup>5</sup> Their importance is emphasized by the fact that the loss of a few of them is regarded as very serious.<sup>6</sup> They are called *iuvenes*,<sup>7</sup> and are organized for military service in *turmae*.<sup>8</sup> One reference to this military group calls for further discussion. This is the passage in which they are defined as *senatorum ferme liberi*.<sup>9</sup> It has already been noticed by commentators that there is something peculiar about *ferme*, which does not seem to fit in with the rest of the sentence. Two explanations are possible: The phrase may be a parenthetical remark of Livy's explaining why he mentions the loss of these men as serious—"they were generally sons of senators"—in which case it should be printed in brackets; otherwise it must be the

<sup>1</sup> *Ep.* xxiii; cf. Livy xxiii. 23.

<sup>2</sup> iv. 13; ix. 38. 8; xxi. 59. 9; *ibid.* 10; xxiv. 18. 7; xxvi. 36. 8; *ibid.* 12; xliii. 16.

<sup>3</sup> i. 30. 2-3; iii. 61. 7; x. 14. 11; xxxiv. 44. 5; xxxix. 44. 1.

<sup>4</sup> iii. 61. 7; cf. x. 14. 11; ix. 38. 8; xxi. 59. 9; *ibid.* 10.

<sup>5</sup> i. 30-2-3. <sup>6</sup> ix. 38. 8; xxi. 59. <sup>7</sup> x. 14. 11. <sup>8</sup> i. 30. 2; cf. x. 14. <sup>9</sup> xxi. 59. 10.

marginal note of a commentator which has been incorporated in the text, in which case it should be expelled as a gloss. If the latter view is correct, we cannot lay any stress on this particular definition of *equester ordo*; but if the comment is Livy's own, it emphasizes the exclusiveness of the order.

In their civil capacity the members of the *equester ordo* are equally distinguished. They appear as a separate group during the taking of the *census* and are next in importance to the senate.<sup>1</sup> Their chief privilege is the possession of the *equus publicus*.<sup>2</sup> They are distinct from the *plebs* (though in one case they seem to have some connection with it),<sup>3</sup> and set an example to it after the senate has led the way.<sup>4</sup> It is from among them that the first consuls choose new members for the senate.<sup>5</sup> They vote by centuries and have great influence in the *Comitia*.<sup>6</sup> From these facts we can see that Sp. Maelius, who is described by Livy as *ex equestri ordine*,<sup>7</sup> was an *eques* who had done his military service with the *equus publicus* and was waiting to enter the Senate via the magistracy.

Only one conclusion can be drawn from all this. Livy uses *equester ordo* to designate the members of the eighteen centuries of *equites equo publico*. So far Mommsen's view is correct; but this does not convict Livy of an anachronism. Closer study of his terminology reveals important points in which his *Equites* differ from those of the imperial period. In the first place, his *equester ordo* is very different from that of the imperial period. In that period *Equites* served in the army, but only as officers, never as ordinary cavalry. In Livy they are true cavalry. The fact that Livy often mentions them along with *tribuni militum* and *praefecti sociorum* is clear proof that he recognized a distinction between *Equites* and officers which did not exist in imperial times.<sup>8</sup> In this connection we may notice an interesting contrast between the language of Livy and that of Valerius Maximus. In xxv. 37-39 Livy tells us the story of L. Marcius, who took command in Spain after the death of the Scipios, and calls Marcius *eques Romanus*. Valerius Maximus, telling the same story, calls Marcius *tribunus*

<sup>1</sup> xxiv. 18; xxxiv. 44.5; xxxix. 44. 1; xliii. 16.

<sup>2</sup> See passages quoted in previous note.

<sup>3</sup> xxvi. 36. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> ii. 1. 10-11. On this see Willems, *Le senat*, I, 47-48.

<sup>6</sup> xliii. 16.

<sup>7</sup> iv. 13 and 15.

<sup>8</sup> ix. 38. 8; xxi. 59. 9-10; xxxix. 31. 16, etc.

*militum*.<sup>1</sup> In the same way Livy calls Sex. Tempanius and his fellows *equites*, while Valerius calls them *tribuni militum*.<sup>2</sup> There can be little doubt that the original authorities called them *equites*, and that Livy is reproducing republican terminology, while Valerius is assigning to these men the rank they would have held under the Empire. It should be noted here that Livy does not always call the *equites equo publico*, *equester ordo*. There are cases in which he refers to them simply as *equites* or *equites Romani*.<sup>3</sup> This is so in his references to the *recensio* and the *transvectio*, which were obviously confined to those Equites who possessed the public horse.<sup>4</sup> Incidentally, the fact that Livy makes *recensio* and *transvectio* two distinct ceremonies is another proof that he had studied republican conditions, for they were one ceremony under the Empire.

The second important respect in which Livy's Equites differ from those of the imperial period is that he conceives of two separate groups of Equites as opposed to the single homogeneous class of the Empire. Side by side with the *equester ordo* he gives us a body of cavalry serving *equo privato* or *equis suis*.<sup>5</sup> Some scholars deny that a class of such *equites equo privato* existed, and Botsford goes so far as to say, on the authority of Gerathewohl, that "in all ancient literature there is no suggestion that the *equites equo privato* formed a rank by themselves or were an institution."<sup>6</sup> Yet it is impossible to explain Livy's usage on any other assumption. The mere fact that he assumes the existence of an equestrian *census* implies that equestrian status could not, in his view, be confined to those possessing the *equus publicus*.<sup>7</sup> The men who volunteered to serve *equis suis* at Veii were qualified by their *census* amount to serve as cavalry, but as there was no room for them in the eighteen centuries of *equites equo publico*, they were presumably intended for the infantry. A dearth of cavalry caused them to offer to serve *equis suis*. If the *equites equo publico* were inadequate at this early date, it is surely justifiable, and even necessary, to assume that

<sup>1</sup> ii. 7. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Livy iv. 39-40; cf. Val. Max. vi. 5. 2.

<sup>3</sup> i. 43. 8; iv. 8; ix. 46; xxix. 37. 8; *et saepe*.

<sup>4</sup> ix. 46; xlii. 61; (*transvectio*) xxiv. 18; xxvii. 11; xxix. 37. 8; xxxix. 44. 1; xliii. 16.

<sup>5</sup> v. 7, and see CR, XLIII (Feb., 1929), 12. <sup>6</sup> *Roman Assemblies*, p. 95.

<sup>7</sup> v. 7; xxxiv. 31. 7; cf. iii. 27; xxvi. 35. 3; xxxix. 44. 1; and Willems, *op. cit.*, I, 189 ff.

they proved still more inadequate as time went on, and that volunteers were constantly necessary. This at any rate seems to have been Livy's view, since, as has been pointed out, in his narrative the *equites equo publico* are only a part of the Roman cavalry forces.<sup>1</sup> There are no grounds for the assumption, with which Botsford supports his statement, that service *equo suo* was unfair to those undertaking it. Apparently horses were provided for the volunteers at Veii, though they would not be *equi publici*. This means simply that these men were not admitted to the limited circle of those with the public horse. In the same way, the degrading of men from the eighteen centuries to serve *equo privato* would entail not a financial loss, but a loss of status, which was a much more serious punishment.<sup>2</sup> The evidence of Livy's usage is thus overwhelmingly in favor of the existence of Equites outside the *equester ordo*, as he calls it.

Had these *equites equo privato* any civilian importance? Of this we cannot be sure. But we must remember that all those possessing the equestrian census amount would not be serving in the army. There were those who had not yet begun their *militia*, and a still larger body who had completed their service and returned to civil life. It is hard to resist the conclusion that these were the forerunners of the great equestrian class of the time of the Gracchi. Livy apparently thought so since he makes the volunteering to serve *equis suis* the creation of a new social class.<sup>3</sup> In the period covered by the extant books they had little importance as civilians, and so we can detect no sure signs of their civilian activities. We may perhaps see, in the somewhat confused account of the censorship of 169 B.C., a reference to them.<sup>4</sup> By interfering with the usual practice in regard to the farming out of taxes, etc., the censors roused the ire of the *veteres publicani*. These are mentioned in close connection with the *equester ordo*, and Livy may have meant to imply that they too were Equites, as they certainly were in the later republic. He seems to be referring to them also when he speaks of the "first class" voting with the equestrian centuries against

<sup>1</sup> See especially xxi. 59. 9. Loss of *equestris ordinis aliquot* is only part of cavalry losses of Romans.

<sup>2</sup> Livy xxvii. 11, etc.; see Botsford, *op. cit.*, p. 95, n. 1. Botsford here rejects the view of Mommsen about this passage, but Mommsen is probably right.

<sup>3</sup> See *CR*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> xliii. 16.



the censor Claudius. It is extremely unfortunate that for the later history we are thrown back upon the *Epitomes*, which, though freely used by modern historians in accounts of the Equites, are, as has been said, quite untrustworthy evidence for Livy's words. Such a passage as that in *Epitome* XCIX which records the conferring of seats in the theater by Otho upon *equites Romani* would be of great value were it not that in other passages referring to Equites outside the eighteen centuries, as this does, they are called *equester ordo*. This shows absolutely no uniformity of terminology. Nevertheless there can be little doubt that the later books of Livy gave to this large class its due prominence as a political force.

To sum up: Livy conceived of a double grouping of Equites under the republic: first, the eighteen centuries of *equites equo publico*; and, second, the *equites equo privato*, whose qualification was the *census*. The former he calls *equester ordo*, but not, as most scholars say, by a confusion with the terminology of his own time, but with a full realization of the different circumstances of the republican period. *Equester ordo* means, it is true, the same thing as it did in his own day, i.e., *equites equo publico*, but these Equites are different in many ways from those of the Empire. The choice of terminology was deliberate, and if we may conjecture the reason for that choice, it was probably because his readers were familiar with *equester ordo* in this sense. The Equites as Livy pictures them are those of the republic, and he had a definite theory about republican conditions. With parts of this theory we may well disagree (few modern scholars, for example, admit the existence of a *census equester* before the time of C. Gracchus, though Livy assumes it), but we have no grounds for asserting that in this respect he lacked historical perspective.

## THE ATHENIAN PROEDROI

BY STANLEY BARNEY SMITH

IT IS a truism hardly needing proof that the various elements of the ancient Athenian government, almost without exception, contributed to the effectiveness of democratic control. If we may infer the intent of institutions from their actual result, this effectiveness was deliberately designed. Subordination of the various administrative boards to the sovereign assembly was the natural form that their democracy assumed. From this point of view it has seemed proper to reconsider, at some length and in some detail, the history and function of one of the minor Athenian committees. The *proedroi* have been comparatively neglected in modern descriptions of the Athenian state.<sup>1</sup> They do not, perhaps, deserve this neglect. A full treatment of the office will, on the contrary, cast light not only on the office itself but also on some of the larger problems of Athenian democracy. The abundance and precision of the evidence at our disposal—and the *proedroi* are among the best attested of Athenian magistrates—enable us to reconstruct, with some hope of accuracy, the general character of their government, even at periods from which no direct information has survived.<sup>2</sup> Nor will the inquiry stop with

<sup>1</sup> For numerous corrections and suggestions the writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor J. A. O. Larsen, of The Ohio State University, and to Professor W. S. Ferguson, of Harvard University. In the following pages all inscriptional references, unless otherwise noted, are to *Inscriptiones Graecae* (ed. minor), Vols. II and III, hereinafter abbreviated simply as *IG*. References to *Inscriptiones Graecae*, Vol. I, are given as *IG*, I. *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* is abbreviated as *SEG*. Michel, *Recueil d'inscriptions grecques* (1900 and 1912), is referred to as Michel. All the references to the orators are to the editions in the Teubner series. The standard modern descriptions of the office of *proedroi* are to be found in Glotz, *La cité grecque* (1928), pp. 391 f.; Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 1029; Schoemann, *Gr. Alt.*, I (1897), 402 f.; Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.*, I (1893), 305 f.; Greenidge, *Greek Constitutional History* (1914), p. 167; also the special treatment by Glotz, "L'épistate des *proédres*," *Revue des études grecques*, XXXIV (1921), 1-19; and Sandys, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens* (1912), notes on chap. xlv.

<sup>2</sup> In this matter it is well to be precise. From *IG* 772. 14; 775. 8; 779. 6; 785. 23; 788. 19; 791. 13 we may infer that the *boulé* was chosen by lot from 256/5 to 229 B.C. Other evidence on the *proedroi*—i.e., *IG* 659. 14; 660. 31; 661. 11; 676. 16—enables us to infer, with high probability, that the *boulé* was recruited in the same way in the period from 295/4 to 276/5 B.C. Evidence of this kind must, of course, be handled with caution. It would not do, for example, to conclude without further inquiry that the Athenian government was democratic in character in 321/0-319/8 B.C. or in 100/99 B.C. merely because certain inscriptions of those years—i.e., *IG* 394. 3 and 1028. 44, 96—inform us that *proedroi* were then chosen by lot.

Athens. From the days of the Delian League to the end of the Chremonidean War Athens was a great power in the Aegean world. Along with her usages, her language, and her coinage, certain of her political institutions also were diffused over the smaller city-states. We shall have occasion to note that *proedroi* are found in some places subject to Athenian control or influence.

#### I. THE ORIGIN OF THE "PROEDROI"

An inscription of 378/7 B.C. supplies the first evidence for the existence of *proedroi* as regular magistrates.<sup>1</sup> But the name at least appears before that date. An office with the name of *proedros* was an element in the two constitutional reforms of 411 B.C.<sup>2</sup> The period of unrest, from which these changes resulted, originated in the losses incident to the Peloponnesian War and, in particular, the Sicilian Expedition. In their disillusionment at the turn of affairs, men resorted to political innovation, even before 411/10.<sup>3</sup> In this latter year a thoroughgoing reorganization was taken in hand.<sup>4</sup> During the confusion that prevailed from April-May, 411, to the restoration of full democracy in May, 410 B.C., two different systems of government were in force. The first was the so-called Constitution of the Four Hundred. It was, avowedly at least, a temporary arrangement, designed to prepare the way for a permanent reform. Under the government of the Four Hundred the *proedroi* recruited the council of four hundred members by choosing a hundred citizens, each of whom in turn co-opted three others.

<sup>1</sup> IG 43. 6.

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that the author of the *Aziochus*, falsely ascribed to Plato, asserts (368d) that *proedroi* presided over the assembly that condemned the generals to death after the battle of Arginusae. This reference need not greatly concern us. Even if this work had not been regarded as spurious in antiquity (Christ-Schmid, *Gesch. d. gr. Lit.*, I [1912], 704), we should be fully entitled to impeach its veracity, since in no other account of the trial (Xen. *Hell.* I. 7; Diodorus xiii. 98 ff.; cf. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, III, 2 [1904], 1597 ff.) is the office mentioned, and since the substitution, at a later time, of the then-normal magistrate for the correct one at an earlier period is a simple and familiar anachronism.

<sup>3</sup> Thuc. viii. 1. 3; Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 387 ff. The significance of the *probouloi* lies in the fact that, as elected magistrates, they show that the Athenians no longer believed so firmly in the virtue of democracy.

<sup>4</sup> For these revolutions see Thuc. viii. 67 ff.; [Lysias] 20, *passim*; *Ath. Pol.* 29 ff.; *Cambridge Ancient History*, V (1927), 327 ff.; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, II, 1 (1914), 384 ff.; Meyer, *Gesch. des Alt.*, IV (1915), 585 ff.; Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, III, 2 (1904), 1456 ff.; Grote, *History of Greece*, VII (1869), 243 ff.; Sandys, *op. cit.* (1912), notes on chaps. xxix ff.; Goodhart, *The Eighth Book of Thucydides' History* (1893), *Introd.*, pp. xxi ff.; notes on chap. lxvii; and Ferguson, "The Constitution of Theramenes," *Class. Phil.*, XXI (1926), 72-75.

In August-September, 411 B.C., the Four Hundred were overthrown. In place of their government a more moderate constitution was installed, sponsored by Theramenes and modeled, at least so far as the council was concerned, upon the Boeotian League.<sup>1</sup> A *proedros* was chosen on each day between the sessions of the fractional *boulé*. He was selected by lot, probably from the quasi-*prytaneis*, and served as their chairman. Since five days elapsed between meetings of the fractional *boulé*, these *proedroi* formed a committee of five which out of its own membership chose by lot a presiding officer for the *boulé*. Functioning together, they applied lot to determine the order in which men should appear before the council. This Constitution of the Five Thousand, as it is called, was not destined to enjoy long life. In May, 410 B.C., it was displaced in favor of the old democratic régime; and with its disappearance the *proedroi* passed temporarily out of existence.

In these two instances the *proedroi* were identified with undemocratic forms of government.<sup>2</sup> For this reason the office as we find it in 411/10 B.C. cannot be properly connected with the occasion when *proedroi* were again made an integral part of the Athenian constitution. A very exact study of the lapidary evidence has led M. Glotz to the conclusion that the magistracy does not, in all probability, reappear in the inscriptions until 378/7 B.C. At that time the chairman of the *proedroi* (ἐπιστάτης τῶν προέδρων) supplanted the chairman of the *prytaneis* (ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων) in the *praescriptio* of Athenian public documents.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, from that time on the *proedroi* appear in the body of the decrees as the persons upon whom certain executive functions were devolved.

This change is the external mark of a far-reaching reform. Before 378/7 B.C. the presidency over meetings of *ekklesia* and *boulé* was lodged exclusively in the hands of the *prytaneis*. When the *proedroi* were instituted in that year, they received the authority to preside

<sup>1</sup> Jacoby, *Die Frag. der gr. Hist.*, II (1926), No. 66 (Hellenika von Oxyrhynchos), xi. 2 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Glotz, "L'épistate des proédres," *Revue des études grecques*, xxxiv (1921), 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the account of the formulas affecting the *proedroi*, sec. iii, below. For the *prytaneis* see Glotz, *La cité grecque* (1928), pp. 219 ff.; Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 1028 ff.; Schoemann, *Gr. Alt.*, I (1897), 401 ff.; Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.*, I (1893), 302 ff.; Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*, s.v. βουλή, p. 1025, ll. 38 ff.; *Ath. Pol.* xliii. 2 ff., where the functions of the office are described as they were about the year 330 B.C.

over public meetings. Subsequently, the *prytaneis* retained only the right to convene *ekklesia* and *boulé*, to prepare for them the legislative program, and to receive various forms of diplomatic communications.

The time of the reform was marked by high hopes.<sup>1</sup> The Persian victory at Cnidus in 394 B.C. permitted the slow revival of Athenian strength. If the peace of 387 B.C. was humiliating and could not have brought comfort to Athens, it at least allowed her to enjoy comparative security. By the year 380 B.C., when Isocrates published his *Panegyricus*, the position of Athens was substantially improved. Population also was on the gain; and we may infer from this sign, as well as from the accompanying increase in slave holdings, that economic activity and social well-being were gradually reviving.<sup>2</sup>

These changes are, to be sure, general in character. Accordingly, we must seek further if we would find the particular circumstances that led to the rehabilitation of the *proedroi*. M. Cloché, for example, has tentatively put forward and properly rejected the suggestion that the Athenians in 378/7 B.C. re-established the office because they felt that in 406 B.C. certain of the *prytaneis* had thwarted the people's will.<sup>3</sup> It is surely futile to claim with M. Foucart that the Athenians were terrified by the powers belonging to the president of the *prytaneis*, and that for this reason, "un peu avant 378, cette présidence leur fut enlevée."<sup>4</sup> The phrase *un peu avant 378* we may dismiss as unjustified by the lapidary evidence. The real refutation of the view, however, rests upon an underlying maxim of Athenian democracy. It is impossible for us to believe that, in a state where the people actually possessed political omnipotence, the people would have viewed any magistrate with such unnecessary fear "pendant de longues années après le renversement des Trente." M. Foucart's view, moreover, lacks explicitness. He does not show any particular reason why the *proedroi* should have reappeared when they did, or any particular occasion for the "restriction considérable au pouvoir des prytanes et de leur épistate."

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus xv. 28. 3; *Cambridge Ancient History*, VI (1927), 70 ff.; Grote, *op. cit.*, IX (1869), 318 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Beloch, *op. cit.*, III, 2 (1923), 410, 418.

<sup>3</sup> Cloché, "L'importance des pouvoirs de la boulé athénienne aux V<sup>e</sup> et IV<sup>e</sup> siècles avant J.-C." *Revue des études grecques*, XXXIV (1921), 245.

<sup>4</sup> Foucart, "Aristote Πολιτεία Ἀθηναίων, 62, 3," *Revue de philologie de littérature et d'histoire anciennes*, XLII (1918), 55 ff.

With much greater appositeness may the suggestion be advanced that the change was a natural step in the evolution of democratic government.<sup>1</sup> That there was such a development is indisputable. The growth of democracy in Athens is typified by the institution of pay for service in the *ekklesia* and by the increase of this *μισθός* *ἐκκλησιαστικός* to three obols.<sup>2</sup> It is further typified by the modification in the method of choosing *dikastai* which became effective probably in 378/7 B.C., and certainly at some time between 388 B.C. and 355/4 B.C.<sup>3</sup> It is still further typified by the transformation in 367/6 B.C. of the chief Athenian secretary (*γραμματεὺς τῆς βουλῆς*) from an elective official to one chosen by lot, and by the simultaneous creation of another secretary, known henceforth as the *γραμματεὺς τῆς βουλῆς*.<sup>4</sup> With this change among the secretaries the democratic impulse reached its height. In the latter half of the fourth century elective financial magistrates and administrative boards were instituted. At that time also the provinces of the individual *strategoi* were narrowed. With these changes the democratic impulse seems to have declined in force.<sup>5</sup>

Democratic ideas, accordingly, were in full sway when the *proedroi* were revived. The office was in fact designed to realize some of the aims of democracy, and we can get an excellent idea of what these aims were by a consideration of the fundamental change brought about by the creation of the *proedroi*. Previously to 378/7 B.C. the right to preside over meetings of *ekklesia* and *boulé* had been vested in the board of *prytaneis*. The *prytaneis* also prepared the matters to be laid before such meetings. The establishment of the *proedroi* reduced, and was designed to reduce, the powers of the *prytaneis*. After 378/7 the *prytaneis* continued to prepare the program of the day, but it was

<sup>1</sup> Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 921 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Cambridge Ancient History*, VI (1927), 45.

<sup>3</sup> Hommel, *Heliaia* (1927), pp. 128 ff.—an exceedingly thorough treatment of the Athenian courts.

<sup>4</sup> Ferguson, "The Introduction of the Secretary Cycle," *Klio*, XIV (1914), 393 ff.; Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 924, 1033 ff.; Brillant, *Les secrétaires athéniens* (1911), pp. 27 ff. By this change the power of the *boulé* was at least qualified, the authority and dignity of the old *γραμματεὺς τῆς βουλῆς* were weakened, and as a consequence the people exerted more directly and effectively its superior rights both over the *boulé* and over the *γραμματεὺς ὁ κατὰ τὴν πρυτανείαν*.

<sup>5</sup> Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 924 ff.



the new board of *proedroi* that presented the questions to the council or assembly and elicited their suffrages. It cannot be without the deepest significance that the prytanizing tribe was excluded from representation among the *proedroi*. This provision signified the implicit conflict of interests between a board representing one tribal unit and a board representing the remaining tribal units. The will and purpose of a constant majority were in this way effectively and deliberately protected.

If the re-establishment of the *proedroi* in 378/7 B.C. accorded with the prevailing temper of the Athenian people and with their desire to reduce the authority of the *prytaneis*, it no less accorded with a political emergency then facing Athens. The evidence, in its present form, shows that the appearance of the *proedroi* coincided with the beginning of the second Athenian confederacy.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the first mention of the office in the lapidary tradition is contained in the well-known Aristoteles inscription where the members of the league are named.<sup>2</sup> Many changes were then instituted in the public life of Athens. To say that the state was generally reorganized is not an exaggeration. Because of Spartan hostility, Athens felt obliged greatly to expand her military and naval forces.<sup>3</sup> This development, in turn, made a new financial system necessary.<sup>4</sup> Hence, after the year 378/7 B.C. we do not meet the old Solonian property classes except as relatively meaningless survivals.<sup>5</sup> In their place the Athenians substituted the system of *symmoriai*, which was based on a careful inventory of all property and on a new grouping of citizens in units charged with raising necessary and appropriate sums.<sup>6</sup>

These reforms, it will be seen at once, were bound up with the foreign relationships Athens then assumed. They were not, however,

<sup>1</sup> On the league in general see Xen. *Hell.* v. 4. 34 ff.; Diodorus xv. 28; *Cambridge Ancient History*, VI (1927), 70 ff.; Beloch, *op. cit.*, III, 1 (1922), 149 ff.; Meyer, *op. cit.*, V (1902), 380 ff.; Grote, *op. cit.*, IX (1869), 318 ff.; Marshall, *The Second Athenian Confederacy* (1905), *passim*; Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 924, 1360 ff.

<sup>2</sup> IG 43. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius ii. 62. 6; Diodorus xv. 29. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Philochorus, *PHG*, I, frag. 126; Polybius ii. 62. 7; Demosth. xiv. 19; Goodwin, "On the *Πρόεδροι* in the Athenian Senate," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, XVI (1885), 170.

<sup>5</sup> *Ath. Pol.* viii. 1; xlvii. 1, with Sandys's notes; Grote, *op. cit.*, pp. 331 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 1224 ff.; Gilbert, *op. cit.*, I (1893), 409 ff.; *Cambridge Ancient History*, VI (1927), 74.

the only reforms consummated. They are rather to be regarded as isolated elements of a larger program affecting the internal as well as the external political life of the city. With great effectiveness Professor Calhoun has urged that the judicial system also was then reorganized.<sup>1</sup> Here he would place the change in the method of constituting *dikasteria*, introduced at some time between 388 and 355/4 B.C., to which allusion has already been made. Moreover, after a close study of the material, he has concluded that in 378/7 B.C. the prescription was enacted that "pleadings and evidence must be presented in writing."

At such a time of general reform the *proedroi* were rehabilitated. We may indeed go further, on the basis of extant evidence, and tentatively set forth what we conceive to be the immediate cause of this particular innovation. This change, like the others mentioned above, would seem to have been related to the Second Athenian League.<sup>2</sup> More precisely, it concerns the relationship that the *boulé*, particularly through its committee, the *prytaneis*, bore to that confederation. A necessity of facing political situations in which foreign affairs would bulk increasingly large; a need for action that would surely overtax the service that *boulé* and *prytaneis* could effectively supply—these conditions faced Athens in 378/7 B.C. The *boulé*, for example, with the close co-operation of the *prytaneis*, received the heralds and ambassadors of foreign states and, conversely, was occasionally empowered by the *ekklesia* to send out diplomatic emissaries.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the *boulé* supervised the construction of triremes, the maintenance of navy yards, and the equipment of the *Hippeis*. In these ways the council's authority extended, either directly or indirectly, to the relations between Athens and other states.<sup>4</sup>

The establishment of the league, therefore, could hardly fail to increase materially the administrative burdens of the council. This con-

<sup>1</sup> Calhoun, "Oral and Written Pleading in Athenian Courts," *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, L (1919), 177 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cloché, *op. cit.*, pp. 246 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Ath. Pol.* xliii. 6.

<sup>4</sup> For the fifth century see, e.g., *IG* 1. 39. 4 ff. (446/5); 1. 45. b. 38 (ca. 446/5); 1. 63. 1. 8 (425/4); 1. 66. a. 13, 17 (431/0—422/1); for the fourth century see *IG* 16. 6, 10 (394/3); 22. 4 (390/89); 40. 14 (378/7). In the literary tradition see Pseud. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* iii. 2; Thuc. v. 45; 47; Aristophanes *Equites* 629 ff.; Aeschines ii. 16–17, 45, 58; [Demosth.] xlvii. 43; Demosth. li. 1; *Ath. Pol.* xli. 1; xlix. 1; Plutarch *Nikias* 10; *Alkibiades* xiv.; Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 1048 ff.

clusion, to which we should be led by a consideration of the normal duties of the *boulé*, is confirmed by extant evidence. There are several documents showing that the council was the intermediary body between the *ekklesia* and the *syndrion* of the league. According to the Aristoteles decree, the *boulé* was empowered to destroy all existing decrees that affected adversely the interests of the allies.<sup>1</sup> Another inscription of the same year records the entrance of the Chalcidians into the alliance.<sup>2</sup> According to the procedure there described, the proposal to admit the new member into the league apparently came from the *syndrion*. It was submitted to the *ekklesia* by the *boulé*. From the Athenian point of view, this function of the council was neither new nor unusual, since it was merely a development of the normal probouleutic duty which the *boulé* was constantly called upon to perform. For us the significance of the action lies in the necessary increase of the council's business.<sup>3</sup> Of similar import is the treaty struck in 375/4 B.C., which admitted the Corcyraeans, the Acarnanians, and the Cephallenians.<sup>4</sup> Nothing perhaps better illustrates the intermediary duties of the *boulé* than a decree of 362/1 B.C. making the Arcadians, the Achaeans, the Eleians, and the Phliasians allies of Athens.<sup>5</sup> Finally, the duties of the council extended to the ratification of treaties by which new members were enrolled. In conjunction with certain military officials, the *boulé* "gave and received the oaths," that is, were the representatives of the Athenian state in the formalities of acceptance.<sup>6</sup> Ratification implies notification; and it is interesting to remark that the secretary of the council arranged for the publication of these decrees.<sup>7</sup>

These then were the conditions under which the *proedroi* developed: a general democratic tendency to divide authority and responsibility

<sup>1</sup> IG 43. 31-35 (378/7).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 44. 4 ff. (378/7); cf. Diodorus xv. 30. 1.

<sup>3</sup> It is instructive to consider the rôle of the *boulé* in connection with the decree passed in honor of Dionysius of Syracuse in 369/8 B.C. (IG 103). Because of his good offices toward the Athenians and the allies, a proposal was made that the *symmachoi*, on the vote of the *boulé*, suggest such measures as seem fitting; and that the *proedroi* (if the restoration be correct) summon the *symmachoi* to attend the meeting of the *ekklesia* at which Dionysius' ambassadors set forth his proposals.

<sup>4</sup> IG 96. 5 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 112. 5 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 96. 16 (375/4); 105. 33 (368/7); 116. 15 (361/0); 124. 7 (357/6).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. 96. 14 (375/4); 98. 24 (375/4); 103. 41 (369/8); 116. 43 (361/0); 124. 2 (357/6).

and to represent adequately the interests of all classes, a desire to reduce the powers of the *prytaneis*, and a specific constitutional crisis entailing additional and excessive burdens on the *boulé* and especially on its committee, the *prytaneis*. Previously this board had sufficed both for arranging the program of the day and for presiding over meetings of *ekklesia* and *boulé*. After 378/7 B.C. these functions were divided. Henceforth, as long as we have records, the *prytaneis* prepared the program and the newer office of *proedroi* supplied the presidents.

## II. FUNCTIONS OF THE "PROEDROI"

We are fortunately able to trace in very considerable detail the function and history of the office the origin of which we have just described. At the outset of our inquiry we meet an interesting anomaly. Well attested though the *proedroi* are, they did not in fact constitute a magisterial commission permanently and constantly in being. On the contrary, they were chosen only when the *prytaneis* convened the *ekklesia* or the *boulé*. This event, to be sure, was not infrequent. From the institution of the *proedroi* until 307 B.C.<sup>1</sup> the *ekklesia* regularly met at least forty times a year. The *boulé*, at the time Aristotle wrote the *Constitution of the Athenians*, met every day except on holidays.<sup>2</sup> If, then, we assume that it was necessary to create the college of *proedroi* on at least two hundred and fifty days of the year, we shall be well within the bounds of plausibility.<sup>3</sup> This frequency of creation had its significance, since it gave to the office that semblance of a permanent magistracy which may have accounted in part for the method by which it was recruited.<sup>4</sup>

The *proedroi* were drawn from the *boulé*. Accordingly, they were

<sup>1</sup> In this year two new tribes were added (cf. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* [1911], p. 64). While we cannot be certain how the increase in the number of the tribes and the *prytaneiai* affected the number of meetings of *ekklesia* and *boulé*, it would appear probable that the sessions became correspondingly more frequent.

<sup>2</sup> *Ath. Pol.* xliii. 3 ff.

<sup>3</sup> This estimate leaves a large margin. The scholiast on Aristophanes *Vespae* 663 informs us that there were about sixty holidays in a year; see also Pseud. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* iii. 2, 8; Thuc. ii. 38. 1; [Plato] *Alcibiades* β. 148c—all passages laying stress on the great number of holidays at Athens. I owe these references to Kalinka's note on Pseud. Xen. *Ath. Pol.*, loc. cit.

<sup>4</sup> In general, special or occasional functionaries were not chosen by lot (cf. Headlam *Election by Lot at Athens* [1891], pp. 72 ff.).

taken from an aggregation of men chosen by lot.<sup>1</sup> When it was necessary to create *proedroi*, the chairman of the *prytaneis* chose by lot nine *bouleutai*,<sup>2</sup> one from each of the tribes not then serving as *prytaneis*. By the same method of lot he also determined which of the nine was to be chairman. This process of selection the Athenians retained in connection with the *proedroi* until the installation of Antipater's government in 322/1 B.C.<sup>3</sup> At that time some change affecting the *proedroi* may have taken place, by which individual members of the college were made personally responsible for their conduct.<sup>4</sup> How the *proedroi* were chosen by 322/1 to 318 B.C. we do not know. In view of the known character of that constitutional change, it is at least probable that *cheirotomia* was substituted for *klerosis*. Lot was presumably reintroduced in the course of the brief democratic revival that occurred in the spring of 318 B.C.<sup>5</sup> In the winter of that year and the early months of 317 B.C. the state was again reorganized, assuming a form that lasted unchanged for ten years.<sup>6</sup> During this period popular organs of government were rarely utilized. It is perhaps for this reason that no inscriptions of that date have survived containing any of the formulas involving *proedroi*. Nevertheless, that Demetrius of Phalerum, no less than Antipater before him, completely eradicated election by lot, is on the surface a plausible supposition. In 307 B.C. Demetrius Poliorcetes restored the democracy, and we know that *proedroi* were again designated by lot.<sup>7</sup> From then until the ex-

<sup>1</sup> *Ath. Pol.* xliii. 2; xlii. 1.

<sup>2</sup> This number, as will be noted, changed with any change in the number of the tribes.

<sup>3</sup> Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* (1911), pp. 22, 98. It has been found impossible to supply the complete list of references that show how the *proedroi* were chosen. In all that follows it is to be understood that, except where expressly noted, there is ample evidence to prove any statements made about the manner of selecting the *proedroi*.

<sup>4</sup> The evidence for this inferred change affecting the college of *proedroi* is the appearance of the term *symproedroi* in 320/19 B.C.; cf. *IG* 399. 3 (ca. 320/19); 400. 1 (ca. 320/19); 448. 39 (318/7); Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 1029. The inference of a change is by no means certain; see in general Wilhelm, "Bürgerrechtsverleihungen der Athener," *Mitteilungen des kaiserlichen deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung*, XXXIX (1914), 257 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 39.

<sup>7</sup> It has seemed well to collect here the various bits of subsidiary evidence that indirectly concern the *proedroi* from the year 307 until approximately 50 B.C. This evidence is of two kinds: (1) evidence as to the cyclical rotation of certain offices through the tribes; and (2) evidence as to the manner in which other elements of Athenian government were appointed. (1) From 307 until 238/7 B.C., when the records practically

tion of political independence at Athens this was the method by which the office was filled.

Each tribe that was not performing duty as *prytaneis* contributed, as has been noted, one member to the college of *proedroi*. During each *prytaneia* only one tribe provided *prytaneis*. It is accordingly clear that the number of the *proedroi* at a given time was one less than the existing number of tribes. With any shifting in the number of tribal contingents the number of *proedroi* likewise changed. From 378/7 to August, 307 B.C., there were ten tribes and hence nine *proedroi*.<sup>1</sup> At this later date two new tribes, Antigonis and Demetrias, were added to the roster, thus raising the membership of the *boulé* to six hundred and the number of the *proedroi* to eleven.<sup>2</sup> These numbers continued until 224 B.C.<sup>3</sup> Then, out of compliment to Ptolemy Euergetes, a new tribe, Ptolemais, was introduced. This change brought the number of *bouleutai* up to six hundred and fifty and that of the *proedroi* up to twelve. In 201 B.C. the tribes Antigonis and Demetrias were dropped because of their Macedonian associations, with the result that there were ten *proedroi*.<sup>4</sup> But this arrangement lasted only a year, since in 200 B.C. the tribe Attalis was added.<sup>5</sup> Thus there were again eleven *proedroi*, a number which, so far as we know, continued in use until Athens was absorbed in Rome.

A system such as has been described obviously affected a considerable number of citizens. During the period best known to us, from 378/7 to 322/1 B.C., nine men were chosen for the office on each of the

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cease, the priest of Asclepios was rotated through the tribes (see *IG*, Index, pp. 11-15). From 303/2 until 103/2 B.C., beyond which date the evidence is too fragmentary to permit conclusions, the prytany secretary was rotated through the tribes (see *ibid.*, pp. 10-22). (2) The *boulé* at the end of the fourth century was chosen by lot (see *IG*, I, 514. 5). The *astynomoi* were so chosen in 287/6 (see *ibid.* 659. 9, 20). The *prytaneis* were selected in this way in 289/8 (see *ibid.* 654. 50; 656. 6/7). The *boulé* was so filled in ca. 276/5 (see *ibid.* 678. 11). A *hierex* was chosen thus in ca. 252/1 (see *ibid.* 772. 18). A *kleroterion*, in which elections took place, presumably by lot, was in use in ca. 140 (see *ibid.* 972. 10).

<sup>1</sup> *Ath. Pol.* xliii. 2; xlv. 2; Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 973.

<sup>2</sup> Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 64; Busolt, *op. cit.*, p. 931; *IG* 502. 5 ff. (302/1), where eleven *proedroi* are named; 697. 5 ff. (beginning of third century); 700. 4 ff. (before middle of third century); 770. 4 ff. (ca. 256/5); 832. 5 ff. (229/8); 852. 3 ff. (before 224/3); cf. Index to *IG*, pp. 10-14, where the duodecennial cycle of the prytany secretaries is given (see *IG* 466. b. 45 [307/6]; 687. 53 [266/5]).

<sup>3</sup> Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 242; *IG* 847. 26 (ca. 215/4); Index to *ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Ferguson, *op. cit.*, pp. 268 ff.; Busolt, *op. cit.*, p. 934.

<sup>5</sup> Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 271; Polybius xvi. 25.



assumed two hundred and fifty days. Within the same *prytaneia* the same man could not be *proedros* twice. From these conditions it follows that probably one-half of each non-prytanizing tribal delegation served as *proedroi* during each *prytaneia*. Each member of the *boulé* would presumably be a *proedros* between four and five times in the course of a year. Approximately twenty-five different individuals on each tribal contingent would be elevated to the chairmanship in a year. When we reflect that one-half of the *boulé* was each year necessarily composed of inexperienced persons,<sup>1</sup> it becomes increasingly clear that the training afforded by the position of *proedros* was no insignificant matter. The institution spread abroad political discipline and education throughout a large portion of the entire electorate.

If we recall the conditions under which the *proedroi* were evolved, we shall at once see that their duties must be treated in connection with those of the *prytaneis*. The two committees were complementary. The older board was empowered to convene *ekklesia* and *boulé* and to prepare the program for them,<sup>2</sup> while the *proedroi*, acting through their chairman, actually laid the measures before those bodies.<sup>3</sup> During the discussion of a proposal, they were obliged to maintain order with the aid of the Scythians, and also to provide for the reading of documents.<sup>4</sup> After a question had been sufficiently discussed, the chairman (*ἐπιστάτης τῶν προέδρων*) put it to vote, and the college adjudged the vote.<sup>5</sup> In a more general way, the *proedroi* possessed an undefined right of supervising the meetings and of ordering an adjournment.<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, somewhat similar powers may have been exercised by the *proedroi* in connection with *nomothesia*.<sup>7</sup> This interpretation of the sources is to be regarded as most tentative. On the basis of the extant evidence, which is very scanty, most scholars hold that the *proedroi* who were concerned with *nomothesia* were a distinct body

<sup>1</sup> *Ath. Pol.* lxii. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* xliii. 3; xliv. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* xlv. 3; Aeschines ii. 65, 66, 68, 84, 85; Demosth. xxiv 157; [Demosth.] xxv. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Aeschines ii. 83; iii. 4.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 262, below, where the formulas in the *praescriptio* are given; also Aeschines ii. 84; Demosth. xxii. 9.

<sup>6</sup> *Ath. Pol.* xlv. 2.

<sup>7</sup> The principal ancient sources for information about *nomothesia* are as follows: *IG* 140. 7 (ca. 353/2); Demosth. xxiv. 21, 22, 27, 33, 39 (352); *IG* 222. 41 (ca. 344/3); 244. 6 (337/6); 330. 18 (335/4); Aeschines iii. 39 ff. (330); Michel 108. 39 (329/8).

from the *proedroi* we have been so far considering.<sup>1</sup> To the present writer the question seems still open. On the score of probability he feels that we are in all cases dealing with one and the same kind of *proedroi*.<sup>2</sup> The view is accordingly advanced that the *boulé*, through its

<sup>1</sup> For modern treatments of the *nomothetai* see as follows: Glotz, *La cité grecque* (1928), pp. 386 ff.; Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 1011 f.; Rabes, *Das eleusinische Zehntengesetz vom Jahre 353/2* (1924), pp. 6 ff.; Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence*, II (1922), 133 ff.; Bannier, "Zu den att. Gesetzänderungen," *Ber. Phil. Wochenschrift*, 1918, pp. 1215 ff.; Lipsius, "Zur att. Nomothese," *ibid.*, 1917, pp. 902 ff.; Elter, *Ein att. Gesetz über die Eleusinische Aparche*, 1914, pp. 8 ff.; Greenidge, *op. cit.* (1914), p. 172; Schoemann, *op. cit.*, I (1897), 415 ff.; Gilbert, *op. cit.*, I (1893), 336 ff.; Schöll, "Ueber att. Gesetzgebung," *Sitzungsberichten der Bay. Akad.*, 1886, pp. 83 ff.

<sup>2</sup> This note gives a summary of the reasons that led the writer to the view held above. At the outset it is necessary to point out that the lapidary evidence must be the basis of any sound conclusion. (1) Except for ambiguous references in Aeschines (see note 5, p. 261), the literary evidence comes chiefly from the documents in the twenty-fourth oration of Demosthenes. Even if we follow Blass and Butcher and hold these documents to be genuine, we do not find that they present a clear and consistent picture. Nevertheless, if we read Aeschines (iii. 39 and 40) and the passages in Demosthenes and understand the terms *proedroi* and *epistates* in the way that seems natural (at least to the writer), these terms would refer, not to a new kind of official, but to the regular *proedroi* and *epistates* that function regularly in conjunction with *prytaneis* and *boulé*. (2) There are two inscriptions in which *proedroi* are described as actively participating in *nomothesia*. In IG 330 the following words are found:

ὅπως δ' ἂν ὁ τ[α]μίς ἀπολάβ[ῃ] τὸ ἀργύριον τὸ εἰρημένον], 18  
[τ]οὺς προέδρους, οἱ ἂν λαχῶσι[ν] πρῶτον προεδρεύειν εἰς το]  
[ὅ]ς νομοθέτας προσνομοθετῇ[σαι περὶ τοῦ ἀναλώματος ὅπως] 20  
[ἄ]ν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ καθιστάμε[νοι] ἱεροποιοὶ φιλοτιμῶντα]  
ε κτλ. . . .

While it is true that there are a number of restorations in this passage, it is not probable that they misconstrue the sense. From l. 18 to l. 21 the meaning seems to be as follows: "Voted . . . in order that the treasurer might receive the sum aforesaid, that the *proedroi* who, being chosen by lot, should first preside over the *nomothetai*, should introduce a supplementary provision concerning the expense, in order that the other *hieropoioi* appointed might also be eager, etc." Clearly, in this passage there is nothing that makes it necessary to assume the existence of a second college of *proedroi*. The second inscription to be considered is IG 222, where the text runs as follows:

ἐν δὲ τοῖς νομοθέται[ς] τ[ο] 41  
[ὅ]ς προέδρ[ο]υς οἱ ἂν προεδρεύωσιν  
καὶ τὸν ἐπ[ι]στ[α]τήν προσνομοθετῇ  
[σαι τὸ ἀργύριον τ[ο]ῦτο μερίζειν τ  
[οὺς ἀποδ]έκτας τῶι ταμίαι τοῦ δήμ  
[ου εἰς τὸ]ν ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον. ὁ δὲ τ  
[αμίς ἀπ]οδότω Πει[σι]θελβει κατὰ  
[τὴν πρυ]τανείαν ἕκαστην. εἰάν δὲ μ  
[ὴ ἐπιψ]ηφ[ίσωσιν οἱ] [πρ]οέδροι καὶ [ὁ]  
[ἐπιστά]της τῶν νομοθετῶν, ὀφειλέ 50  
[τω ἕκασ]τος αὐτῶν X δραχμὰς ἱερὰς  
[τῇ] 'Αθην[ῶ]ν.

From l. 41 the translation would seem to be read thus: "Voted . . . that the *proedroi* who should be presiding and their chairman should introduce a supplementary provision among the *nomothetai* to the effect that the *apodektai* should distribute this sum

two committees, the *prytaneis* and the *proedroi*, supervised the nomothetic procedure. The *prytaneis* prepared the matters to be submitted, and the *proedroi* submitted these matters to the *nomothetai* and presided over their meetings. By this reconstruction, hazardous and conjectural though it is, we are at least enabled to visualize in part the history of *nomothesia*. This institution seems to have been established in 403/2 B.C.<sup>1</sup> From that year until 378/7 B.C. the *prytaneis* presided over the *nomothetai*. After the *proedroi* were evolved, they naturally took over this duty as their own.

These tasks, however, are relatively of little importance. Accordingly, we turn to consider the larger aspects of the duties falling to the *proedroi*. The Athenian democracy attempted, and in general successfully attempted, to secure honesty in the public administration. One of the most important methods by which this end was achieved was the division of authority and responsibility between colleges of magistrates and between the members of a single college. By thus weakening the potential elements of intrigue and corruption, the state was able to triumph over internal enemies of this kind. How widely the principle we have mentioned operated is illustrated by the number of committees composed of ten members all devoted to a single task. The principle is specifically exemplified by the relationship of the

to the treasurer of the people for each year. The treasurer should give this money to Peisitheides each prytany. If the *proedroi* and the chairman of the *nomothetai* should not put the question to vote, each of them should be bound to dedicate to Athena one thousand drachmae." This passage is the basis for the view generally held. It is certain that the words *οἱ πρυτάνεες καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάτης τῶν νομοθετῶν* may be construed to mean a board whose special and normal function is to preside only over the *nomothetai*. To the writer it seems no less certain that the words may also mean simply those who preside over the *nomothetai*, without necessarily implying that these *proedroi* and this *epistates* are other than the *proedroi* and the *epistates* who are regularly connected with the assembly and *boulé*. The question thus comes to one of probability. On that score the scales would appear to incline in favor of a belief in merely one college. It is hardly safe, on the basis of one inscription, to infer the existence of an office not indubitably attested elsewhere. Neither is it wise, without explicit evidence, to assume the presence of two colleges identical in name though distinct in function. If we accept the substantial genuineness of the documents in Demosthenes, it is perhaps simpler to believe that the *proedroi* there mentioned are the ones that usually co-operate with *prytaneis* and *boulé*. Finally, none of those scholars who think that there were two colleges has satisfactorily explained the relationship of the "nomothetic" to the "ekklesiastic" *proedroi* and shown which was the earlier college and what were the circumstances under which the "nomothetic" *proedroi* originated; nor has anyone described the nomothetic procedure from 403/2 to 378/7 B.C. on the hypothesis that there were special "nomothetic" *proedroi*.

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Ancient History*,<sup>4</sup> V (1927), 374.

*proedroi* to the *prytaneis*. The latter body, though chosen by lot from successive tribal contingents, held office long enough to learn the ways of political intrigue and aggrandizement. Because of their natural cohesiveness and unity of interests, they might at any time have successfully plotted corruption. There is some reason to believe that the Athenians were aware of this danger.<sup>1</sup> At any rate, it seems clear that one of the chief motives for establishing the *proedroi* was the desire to correct this constitutional weakness.

Because of the conditions surrounding the office, the *proedroi* effectively carried out this task. No one knew in advance who of the *bouleutai* would be *proedroi* on a given occasion. For this reason no member of the prytanizing tribe could enter into a corrupt agreement with a *proedros*. Furthermore, even if some unusual circumstance did allow corruption to be started, the single day during which one group of *proedroi* held office would not allow it to become far advanced. With the passage of that day, the chance would be gone and the whole business would have to be begun anew.

There was, moreover, a second major constitutional duty devolving upon the *proedroi*. The claim can be justly made that the ancient Athenian government utilized and exemplified a truly representative principle to a greater extent than any important political system of Western Europe or America. By a truly representative principle we mean, of course, something quite different from the principle embodied, for example, in the government of the United States. Owing to the system of party government that prevails in the United States, minorities are often wholly unrepresented and true representation is rarely, if ever, achieved. In ancient Athens, on the other hand, the representative principle was successfully applied, chiefly through the wide use of election by lot. In the *boulé*—to take as an example the body from which the *proedroi* were drawn—the tribes and demes were represented.<sup>2</sup> Election by lot guaranteed a fair representation of minority interests within these units. In each deme individuals presented themselves as candidates, and lot determined which of the volunteers should be *bouleutai*. The *dikastai* were similarly chosen, at least during

<sup>1</sup> The law of 410/9 B.C., which controlled the way in which the *bouleutai* sat, may be taken as evidence of the Athenian attitude; see Philochorus, *FHG*, I, frag. 119.

<sup>2</sup> *Ath. Pol.* xxxii. 1; xliii. 1; lxii. 1.

the latter part of the fifth century. At the period to which Aristotle's *Constitution of the Athenians* applies, the Athenians retained election by lot and some form of tribal distribution in the process of choosing *dikastai*. The nomothetic procedure, to take a final instance, was based upon the jury panel and aimed to secure the representation of all classes in what may be loosely called the "act of legislation."

Clearly, in these forms of government the Athenians sought to realize the representative principle. A similar motive, though perhaps less obviously applied, lay behind the *proedroi*. It would seem natural, if not inevitable, that the *prytaneis*, as members of a single tribe, should prefer the interests of that one unit to those of the others. No matter how honest, they would tend to view political questions in a way that represented only a small minority. For this one-sidedness the *proedroi* afforded a corrective. They were the protectors of a majority, otherwise unrepresented in the function of presiding over assembly or council, against the prejudice or aberration of a changing minority. By law they could not be chosen from the prytanizing tribe, and in the long run election by lot insured a fair representation of all interests. We are easily led to believe, finally, that the *proedroi* were naturally alive to any impropriety on the part of the *prytaneis*.

This natural interest was confirmed by the various conditions by which the office was controlled. As members of the *boulé*, the *proedroi* were subject to the regulations that governed admission to that body.<sup>1</sup> They had to pass their *dokimasia*. They had to take the bouleutic oath, binding themselves to a strict performance of all duties that fell to them. If accused of malfeasance during their incumbency, they were tried in accordance with the quaint and archaic procedure of *ekphyllophoria*. If they were found guilty, they were expelled from the council, unless they were acquitted by a second vote or an appeal to the public courts. When their term of office as *bouleutai* was over, they had to submit to their *euthuna*, the formal and thorough investigation of their official conduct.

In addition to these restraints by which the *proedroi*, as *bouleutai*, were surrounded, they were liable, as *proedroi*, to be tried before the

<sup>1</sup> For *dokimasia* see *ibid.* xlv. 3; lv. 2; for the bouleutic oath see *ibid.* xxii. 2; for *ekphyllophoria* see Aeschines i. 111-12; Harpocration, *ἐκφυλλοφορῆσαι*; Bekker, *Anec.* 248. 7; Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 1023 f.; for *euthuna* see *Ath. Pol.* xlviii. 4 f.

*dikasteria* under the *graphé proedriké*.<sup>1</sup> This form of public suit, though barely referred to in the extant Athenian records, belonged to a group of processes that were designed to control the illegal actions of presiding officers. If a *proedros* was convicted on this charge, he might be fined. We are specifically informed that, if any member of the *proedric* college laid before the *ekklesia* a proposal in favor of a convicted person who had not complied with the terms of his sentence, the penalty was *atimia*. It is possible, though not certain, that the effectiveness of the *graphé proedriké* was improved when, after 320/19 B.C., the *symproedroi* were specifically named.<sup>2</sup>

As it was a principle of Athenian government that no magistrate should be exempt from *dokimasia* and *euthuna*, so also it was a general rule that none should go unpaid. The position of the *proedroi* in this respect was anomalous. They were not in a sense magistrates at all, but functionaries delegated to carry out certain normal and regular duties implicit in the office of *bouleutes*. For this reason no pay was given the *proedroi* beyond that which they received as *bouleutai*.<sup>3</sup> But the Athenians were not insensible to the claims of superior merit, even if they did not consider that the *proedroi* deserved added remuneration. They honored *proedroi* who had carried out the duties of their office with unusual distinction, and conferred upon them the public reward of a crown.<sup>4</sup>

We have enumerated the duties, both specific and general, which were imposed upon the *proedroi*, and the restraints and conditions by which their official career was surrounded and controlled. These conditions illuminate a fundamental practice of Athenian political life. We have seen that the *proedroi* were chosen by lot. This circumstance was naturally reflected in the scope and character of their duties. These were essentially routine. They were necessarily familiar to all who frequented the *ekklesia* or *boulé*. They were well within the

<sup>1</sup> *Ath. Pol.* lix. 2; Lipsius, *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* (1915), p. 397.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 259 above.

<sup>3</sup> The reason why supplementary pay was given the *prytaneis* and especially their *epistates*, namely, continuous tenure for a relatively long period, did not operate in the case of the *proedroi*. For the *prytaneis* see *Ath. Pol.* lxii. 2; Foucart, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-59. For the general question of *buleutic* pay see Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 1023.

<sup>4</sup> *Hypereides* ii. 4, 5, 6.



capacity of an average citizen selected by chance. They did not require special training or technical competence, even in such a small matter as the possession of a good reading voice.<sup>1</sup> They did not demand unusual honesty in any individual.

### III. INSCRIPTIONAL FORMULAS INVOLVING "PROEDROI"

The chief source of our knowledge about the *proedroi* is the corpus of Athenian inscriptions. It is accordingly both important and instructive to study in some detail the inscriptional formulas involving the *proedroi*.<sup>2</sup> At two points in an Athenian document the *proedroi* are regularly found. They are mentioned as the last or the penultimate element of the *praescriptio* of a decree. Here the *epistates* was named both for the purpose of designating the time of the particular action embodied in the particular inscription, and for the purpose of attaching personal responsibility to the chairman who submitted the particular question to vote. For this object and in this connection two formulas were employed from 378/7 until 343/2 B.C. The usual phraseology was a combination of the name of the individual, regularly followed by his deme name, and the verbal form *ἐπισταται*: thus, for example, *Χαρῖνος Ἀθμονεὺς ἐπισταται*. This formula, if we may judge from extant evidence, was not used after 343/2 B.C. The second formula found in the *praescriptio* during this period is *τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισεν ὁ δέινα* with the deme name added. During the period from 378/7 to 343/2 B.C. this phraseology is found about one-half as frequently as the first formula mentioned. The use of the phrases seems interchangeable. If we are to detect any difference between them, the distinction lies in the fact that the shorter formula was slightly ambiguous because the chairman of the *prytaneis* was also called *epistates* and once performed duties similar to those of the *epistates* of the *proedroi*.

From 343/2 until 318/7 B.C. the only formula regularly used was *τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισεν ὁ δέινα*. From the latter year onward we meet

<sup>1</sup> The necessity of having a good reading voice was clearly the reason why the *γραμματεὺς ὁ ἀναγνώσκμενος* was selected, not by lot, but by "show of hands."

<sup>2</sup> This aspect of the *proedroi* is briefly treated by Larfeld, *Handbuch der gr. Epigraphik*, I (1907), 465 ff. All of the statements concerning the formulas in the following lines are based upon my own complete index to the formulas which is too extensive to print here.



a new expression: τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισεν ὁ δεῖνα καὶ συμπρόεδροι. Here the name of the *epistates* is usually followed by his patronymic and his deme name. It happens not infrequently that the names of the *symproedroi* are given. In this case, the phraseology assumes one of two forms. It is either τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισεν ὁ δεῖνα· συμπρόεδροι, in which instance both the *epistates* and the *symproedroi* are named and accompanied by their deme names; or it is τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισεν ὁ δεῖνα καὶ συμπρόεδροι, in which instance the name, patronymic, and deme name of the *epistates* are given, while the *symproedroi* are specified by name and deme name.

There is also a second place in certain forms of Athenian decrees where we regularly find the *proedroi* cited. Usually, after the preamble to the proposal, there is a provision to the effect that "the *proedroi* are to bring the person concerned and the question at issue before some subsequent session of the *ekklesia*." In the phraseology used to express this idea the inscriptions show considerable variety. For the period from 378/7 to the end of the third century B.C. the following expression was most frequently employed: τοὺς προέδρους οἱ ἂν λάχωσιν προεδρεύειν εἰς τὴν πρώτην ἐκκλησίαν προσαγαγεῖν τὸν δεῖνα πρὸς τὸν δῆμον καὶ χρηματίσαι. . . . After the end of the third century these divergent formulas disappear. In their place we find only one set form of words: τοὺς λαχόντας προέδρους εἰς τὴν ἐπιούσαν ἐκκλησίαν χρηματίσαι περὶ τούτων. To conjecture what were the reasons that led to this simplification is of course futile, so little can we ascertain the inner currents of Athenian political life. It is none the less proper to call attention to the reduction of expense which the shorter formula would insure. There is, moreover, a certain probability that the growing conventionalism in the later periods of Athenian history eschewed eccentricity and welcomed regularity even in the forms of public documents.

#### IV. THE "PROEDROI" OUTSIDE OF ATHENS

At the time when the *proedroi* were first installed in her political system as regular officials, Athens was still the chief power in the Aegean world. It was inevitable that, in the course of the fifth and fourth centuries, her influence should have extended far beyond Attica. In some cases other states borrowed deliberately. We are

specifically informed, for example, that the Syracusan institution of petalism was copied from the Athenian institution of ostracism, the only difference being the material of which the counters were made.<sup>1</sup> The peculiar procedure embodied in petalism and ostracism is found in one form or another at Argos, Megara, and Miletus; and it is a fair inference that these city-states derived the principle of the institution from Athens.<sup>2</sup>

In other cases the spread of an Athenian institution was due to compulsion exerted by Athens. That it was the policy of Athens to establish and maintain democratic factions in her dependencies is well known and does not require detailed proof.<sup>3</sup> A few particular instances, however, will illustrate her methods. No case is more striking than the constitution Athens forced upon the city of Erythrae.<sup>4</sup> At Siphnos, which was also a member of the Delian League, we find a law compelling Athenian subjects to adopt the Attic coinage.<sup>5</sup> The city of Carystus<sup>6</sup> in Euboea and the city of Carpathus<sup>7</sup> serve to illustrate still further the scope of Athenian influence, although the inscriptional evidence from these places does not show the forced acceptance of Athenian institutions but rather implies a thorough acquaintance with the forms of Athenian public life. Even as late as the second century B.C. we detect at Ceos the persistent influence of Athens in the names of officials and the manner of their election.<sup>8</sup>

We are accordingly fully justified in searching for places in which *proedroi* are found and in determining whether in such places they were based upon an Athenian model. At the outset of our inquiry we have to consider an example of singular interest, for it is the only case where beyond doubt the *proedroi* were adopted from Athens to be an element in federal government. In 303/2 B.C. the Hellenic League which Philip II and Alexander had established was revived by Demetrius Polior-

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus xi. 86-87; *Cambridge Ancient History*, IV (1926), 151.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1302. b. 18; scholiast on Aristophanes, *Equites* 855; see also Newman's note on Aristotle *Politics*, 1284. a. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Pseud. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* i. 14 ff.;

<sup>4</sup> *IG* 1. 10 (ca. 470-460).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* 12. 5. 1. 480.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* 12. 9. 11. 5, an inscription once regarded as an Athenian decree.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* 12. 1. 977a, an inscription that is a copy of an Athenian decree.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* 12. 5. 1. 595. 14 ff. (second century); 12. 5. 1. 599. 13.

cetes. Fragments of the charter are extant.<sup>1</sup> According to its provisions, five *proedroi* presided over the *syndrion*. No city or *ethnos*—i.e., no member of the federation—might supply more than one to this board. During times of peace the *proedroi* were chosen by lot, while it is probable that in time of war they were appointed by the kings. The range of their duties was considerable. They called meetings of the *syndrion*, acted as a probouleutic committee when it was in session, received diplomatic communications addressed to the league, preserved order during meetings, and arranged for recording the action taken at such meetings.

In view of the sympathetic attachment which Demetrius Poliorcetes always felt for Athens, scholars have generally concluded that this statesman borrowed from Athens the institution of the *proedroi* and embodied it in the revived league.<sup>2</sup> It is a conclusion also suggested by a general similarity of functions. Moreover, during times of peace the *proedroi* of the league were chosen by the method always used in Athens during periods of democratic ascendancy. Finally, the provision by which no member of the federation might contribute more than one to the proedric committee reveals an intention to reproduce, under slightly different conditions, the principle of representation so widely characteristic of Athenian government.

When *proedroi* are incorporated in a political scheme sponsored by Macedon, there is reason to suppose they will be found in governments more closely related to Athens. On this point there is a considerable body of evidence. In some of the cases where we find *proedroi*, it will be possible to show a direct and clear connection between the particular state and Athens. In other cases we shall be able to establish only the probability of such a relationship. In a third group we shall be able to prove only the existence of *proedroi*.

a) There is nothing surprising in the fact that *proedroi* are found in certain of the Athenian cleruchies.<sup>3</sup> These political units were simply

<sup>1</sup> SEG 1. 75; Larsen, "Representative Government in the Panhellenic Leagues," *Class. Phil.*, XX (1925), 325 ff.

<sup>2</sup> There is almost no evidence of the existence of *proedroi* outside of Athens before 378/7 B.C. The one case known is Mytilene and the date is 427 B.C. (see Thucydides iii. 25. 1).

<sup>3</sup> For material bearing on this part of the paper the writer is greatly indebted to Swoboda, *Die griechischen Volksbeschlüsse* (1890).

transplanted sections of the Athenian electorate. Naturally they would tend to preserve, with more or less fidelity, the institutions with which they were familiar. This is clearly the case at Salamis.<sup>1</sup> We should not assume, however, that the *proedroi* were transferred bodily and without any modification. It is true that the executive function was reproduced, and it is also true that the *proedroi* at Salamis were chosen by lot. On the other hand, it is significant that the office is not mentioned in the *praescriptio* of any of the extant documents. We have no other evidence and, if we may draw the natural inference suggested by the inscriptions, we should conclude—of course, most tentatively—that the *proedroi* did not have an important part in presiding over the meetings of the cleruchy.

At Samos the similarity to Athenian practice was not so close.<sup>2</sup> The one inscription upon which all conclusions are based is dated 346/5 B.C., thus falling about midway between 365 B.C., when Timotheus drove out a part of the native population and established the cleruchy, and 322 B.C., when the Athenians in turn were forced to withdraw.<sup>3</sup> In the *praescriptio* the Athenian forms are in general followed, though it is interesting to notice that the *proedroi* are chosen out of all the tribes, no exception being made in the case of the prytanizing tribe. A more important difference is found in the wording of the prescriptive formula. While at Athens in 346/5 B.C. only the *proedroi* and their *epistates* were mentioned, we meet at Samos the following phraseology: τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισε Φ[αί]ν[ιπ]πος Κητι[ος]· συμπρόεδροι, followed by eight names each of which is accompanied by his deme name. This formula is found at Athens only after 320/19 B.C. In two respects, accordingly, the Samian cleruchy anticipated Athenian usage by about twenty-five years: in the mention of *symproedroi* and in the precise phraseology used. Whether any inference can be properly drawn from the subsequent appearance of *symproedroi* at Athens is, of course, highly disputable. It is none the less significant that the first extant citation of *symproedroi* at Athens and the first use of the formula just quoted followed very shortly upon the return of the cleruchs in 322 B.C.

<sup>1</sup> IG 1227. 23 (131/0); 1008. 79 (118/7); 1011. 56 (106/5); Swoboda, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

<sup>2</sup> Swoboda, *op. cit.*, pp. 41 f., 94.

<sup>3</sup> Beloch, *op. cit.*, III, 1 (1922), 194; III, 2 (1923), 245 f.; IV, 1 (1925), 75 f.

*Proedroi* are also found in the cleruchy on Imbros.<sup>1</sup> This body of citizens, left on the island after the end of the Peloponnesian War, Conon reunited to Athens in 393/2 B.C.<sup>2</sup> The inscriptions that concern the present inquiry date from the end of the fourth century, that is, a very few years before Antigonos won the island away from Athens. There is no important discrepancy between the functions of the *proedroi* at Imbros or the formulas in which they appear and the functions and formulas at Athens.

From Myrina on Lemnos we have a single inscription attesting the existence of *proedroi* in the cleruchy there located.<sup>3</sup> The document is from the middle of the fourth century B.C. After the island was reunited to Athens by Conon in the early years of the century, it became a member of the Second Athenian League; and, in spite of its desertion to Antigonos in 315 B.C., it remained for long the center of the Athenian insular possessions.<sup>4</sup> The only portion of the decree that has survived is the *praescriptio*. From its formula, apparently identical with the phraseology used at Athens at the same period, we may conclude that the *proedroi* at Myrina, like those at Athens, presided over the assembly.

Delos, finally, presents a considerable number of documents proving that *proedroi* existed there.<sup>5</sup> Because of the close ties that long bound the island and Athens together, we expect to find, and do in fact find, many transplanted institutions.<sup>6</sup> All of the lapidary evidence bearing on the *proedroi* comes from the period after Athens regained her colonies in 166 B.C.<sup>7</sup> We have no reason to doubt, on the basis of this material, that the *proedroi* at Delos had essentially the same functions that they had at Athens.

<sup>1</sup> IG 12. 8. 46. 4 (end of fourth century); 12. 8. 47. 3/4 (318/307); 12. 8. 48. 4/5 (318/307); 12. 8. 52. 14 (second century); Swoboda, *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 94.

<sup>2</sup> Beloch, *op. cit.*, III, 1 (1922), 78 f.; IV, 1 (1925), 122 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Michel 161 (fourth century); Swoboda, *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 94.

<sup>4</sup> Beloch, *op. cit.*, IV, 1 (1925), 122 f., 152; Pauly-Wissowa, *op. cit.*, s.v. "Lemnos."

<sup>5</sup> *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, Vol. X, 35. 23 (152/1); CIG. 2270. 23 (148/7); *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, Vol. X, 37. 3, 22; Vol. XIII, 245. 22; 409 B 13; 413. 15; 420. 15 (ca. 140); Swoboda, *op. cit.*, pp. 40, 94 f.

<sup>6</sup> Pauly-Wissowa, *op. cit.*, s.v. "Delos."

<sup>7</sup> Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* (1911), pp. 317 f., 351; Roussel, *Délos Colonie Athénienne* (1916), pp. 34 ff.

b) If, however, we wish to prove the influence of Athens, we must no less show that the *proedroi* occur also in places not directly subject to her influence and control. Here the inquiry is difficult, and the conclusions less certain. We must find places where *proedroi* existed and where, at the time in question, we need not assume Athenian dominance. We must determine whether such *proedroi* occupy a position corresponding to that occupied by the office at Athens; and whether, in the second place, there is any evidence that the office was derived from Athens.

We know of the existence of *proedroi*, toward the end of the second century B.C., at Aigiale on the island of Amorgos.<sup>1</sup> While this town had been a member of the Second Athenian League,<sup>2</sup> it would hardly be safe to infer on this ground alone that the institution was of Athenian origin. There are, however, many institutions that appear to be common to the two city-states.<sup>3</sup> The people were divided into tribes and demes. We find also *logistai*, *praktore*s, *prytaneis*, archons, and apparently something like *nomothesia*. Under these circumstances, we may conclude that the *proedroi* at Aigiale were probably modeled ultimately upon the *proedroi* at Athens.

At Ios the situation is similar.<sup>4</sup> The inscriptions containing references to the office are from the fourth and third centuries B.C. The citizens might well have personally known or remembered Athenian institutions once familiar to them as members of the First and Second Athenian leagues.<sup>5</sup> The plausibility of this view gains force when it is noted that other magistrates appear at Ios who are attested at Athens. We find *logiastai*, *praktore*s, and archons.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the *proedroi*

<sup>1</sup> IG 12. 7. 515. 116, 125 f.; Swoboda, *op. cit.*, pp. 185 f., 197, 221.

<sup>2</sup> IG 43. b. 28 (378/7).

<sup>3</sup> In the matter of common institutions I have derived great help from Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, and shall here refer only to his treatment of individual magistracies. For the *logistai* see Busolt, *ibid.*, I (1920), 472; for *praktore*s, *ibid.*, p. 488; for *prytaneis*, *ibid.*, p. 476; for archons, *ibid.*, p. 504, where it is interesting to note Busolt's conclusion that "zu seiner [i.e., the eponymous archon's] weiten Verbreitung über die ionischen Inseln hat gewiss das Vorbild und der Einfluss Athens erheblich beigetragen"; for an institution something like *nomothesia* see *ibid.*, p. 462, and for tribes and demes, *ibid.*, p. 267.

<sup>4</sup> IG 12. 5. 2. 1002. 1 (fourth century); 1004. 1 (fourth century); 1007. 1\* (third century); 1008. 8 (third century); 1011. 11, 12 (third century).

<sup>5</sup> E. Meyer, *op. cit.*, III (1912), 610; Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

<sup>6</sup> For *logiastai* see Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, I (1920), 472; for *praktore*s, *ibid.*, p. 488; for archons, *ibid.*, p. 504.

formed a college, perhaps presided over by an *epistates*, and submitted questions to the vote. It will not seem unreasonable, accordingly, if we suggest that the *proedroi* at Ios were derived from Athens.

The claim can hardly be made that the evidence from Ephesus is equally satisfactory.<sup>1</sup> The document mentioning the office is very late, and is ascribed to the year *ca.* 86/5 B.C. Thus it comes from a period when it is unlikely that there was any tendency to imitate Athenian political institutions. The claim has been made, it is true, that the governmental system of Ephesus was based on the programs of the Four Hundred and the Five Thousand at Athens.<sup>2</sup> This hypothesis, even if accepted, would not entitle us to assume that the *proedroi* were of Athenian origin. Moreover, there are very few institutions common, even in name, to the two cities.<sup>3</sup> There is in fact no evidence at present available that would justify us in assigning the Ephesian *proedroi* to an Athenian source.

There is no substantial difference in the case of Samothrace.<sup>4</sup> No evidence exists that shows any general parallelism of magistracies;<sup>5</sup> and even the functions ascribed to the *proedroi* in the decree honoring Dymas of Iasos do not correspond with those carried out by the Athenian office.

From Magnesia on the Maeander we have an abundance of evidence testifying to the existence of *proedroi*.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the college of *proedroi* was presided over by an *epistates*,<sup>7</sup> and if we may infer a function from an isolated inscriptional reference, one of their number put

<sup>1</sup> Michel 496. 18, 21, 47; Swoboda, *op. cit.*, pp. 96, 123 f.; Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, I (1920), 477, n. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Pauly-Wissowa, *op. cit.*, s.v. "Ephesos," p. 2803.

<sup>3</sup> For an *agoranomos* at Ephesus see Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, I (1920), 431. In the inscription cited in note 1, above, the *proedroi* are mentioned in connection with *strategoi* and a secretary of the council. For the general topic of the Ephesian constitution see Gilbert, *op. cit.*, II (1885), 142 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *IG* 12. 8. 156. b. 8 (239-223); 159. 1 (*ca.* second century); Michel 352; Swoboda, *op. cit.*, 93.

<sup>5</sup> For archons at Samothrace see Michel 350. 26 (middle third century); for probouleutic function of *boulé* see *ibid.* 351. 17 (middle third century); 352. 4 (*ca.* second century); 353. 13 (second century); for *agonothetes* see *ibid.* 352. 10, 27 (*ca.* second century).

<sup>6</sup> Kern, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander* (1900), 2. 5; 4. 6; 5. 4; 6. 3; 7. b. 10; 9. 3; 10. 4; 11. 3, 13. 4, 14. 3; 15. a. 4; 37. 4, 23; 50. 50; 73. a. 21; 89. 9; 90. 4; 92. a. 9, 14; 98. 5, 57.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* 9. 3.



questions to the vote.<sup>1</sup> It is also important to observe that the same formula was used to describe the action of the committee in submitting a proposal to the vote as was regularly used at Athens from 378/7 to 318/7 B.C.<sup>2</sup> These coincidences are interesting, but we do not find other institutions common to both Athens and Magnesia.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, while a better case could be made out for an Athenian origin of the *proedroi* at Magnesia than for the *proedroi* at Ephesus or Samothrace, the evidence is at best inclusive.

c) Before bringing this part of our inquiry to an end, it has seemed best, in the interest of completeness, to mention the other places in which *proedroi* are met, but between which and Athens no interchange of institutions is proved or probable. The office is found in the Aetolian League of the second century B.C.,<sup>4</sup> at Stymphalus,<sup>5</sup> at Tyros,<sup>6</sup> in the Tauric Chersonesus,<sup>7</sup> perhaps at Paros,<sup>8</sup> at Mytilene,<sup>9</sup> and perhaps at Andros.<sup>10</sup> In each of these cases we find either that the *proedroi* are essentially different in function from the Athenian office or that the sources are so scanty that we cannot determine precisely what their function was. In the Aetolian League the name of the official chairman was either *boularchos* or *prostates*.<sup>11</sup> At Stymphalos the *proedros* was connected with the court. The inscription from Tyros is too late for our purpose, even if identity of function could be shown. The evidence from the Tauric Chersonese is too fragmentary to permit any fair conclusions. At Mytilene the fact that Thucydides implies that the *proedroi* were the chief magistrates shows that we are there dealing with a more important body than the Athenian college. Finally,

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* 37. 4.

<sup>2</sup> For the formula referred to, τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισεν, which is found in Kern, *loc. cit.*, see p. 267 above.

<sup>3</sup> For *euthunoi* see Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, I (1920), 472; for *prytaneis*, *ibid.*, p. 505.

<sup>4</sup> IG 12. 2. 15. 21; Cary, "A Constitution of the United States of Greece," *Class. Quart.*, XVII (1923), 141, n. 8.

<sup>5</sup> IG 5. 2. 357. 14; cf., however, Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, I (1920), 477.

<sup>6</sup> CIG 5853. 20 f. (174 A.D.); Swoboda, *op. cit.*, 201.

<sup>7</sup> Swoboda, *op. cit.*, pp. 79 f., 195.

<sup>8</sup> IG 12. 5. 1, 123. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Thucydides iii. 25. 1; Gilbert, *op. cit.*, II (1885), 164; cf. p. 270 above.

<sup>10</sup> IG 12. 5. 1. 715. 2 (third century); 716. 1 (third century).

<sup>11</sup> Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II (1926), 1524 ff.

the instances that appear at Paros and Andros are not clear enough in meaning for us to draw any conclusions as to the function or origin of the office.

From this study of the *proedroi* as they are found in places other than Athens, the inferences are, of course, obvious. Where the influence of Athens was strongest and most direct—namely, in the cleruchies—we find the institution in general carefully reproduced. Where there was not this direct connection but where there was or had been some close contact with Athenian customs, the office is occasionally found although the function is less carefully preserved. If we believe that here, no less than in the cleruchies, we detect the influence of Athens, it is largely because the city-states in question have other political institutions seemingly Athenian in origin. There is also a group of instances in which we may affirm that, so far as our present evidence goes, there is no trace of Athenian influence.

The object of the present inquiry has been to set forth the origin, the history, the function, and the influence of one of the relatively minor instruments of Athenian government. The *proedroi*, it has been shown, contributed their share to the effectiveness of popular control. They aided, for example, in diffusing that political experience without which no democracy can be master in its own house. They served as a constant and effective representative of the majority against the possible selfishness and corruption of the changing minority. They typified the Athenian tendency in politics to subdivide authority and thus to subordinate administrative boards to the sovereign assembly. A relatively full treatment of these problems supplies a starting-point from which to enter into the spirit and technique of Athenian politics. And such a treatment is needed, if we are to understand accurately what Aristotle described as the "most architectonic of the sciences."

BOWDOIN COLLEGE

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

### GREEK LYRIC METRE

My book seems to have disturbed Professor Shorey, even if it has not convinced him, because some of his criticisms bear the marks of impatience.

The real issue lies in the two doctrines formulated by the late Walter Headlam. First: *The rhythmical structure of Greek lyric is based on the principles of musical form.* The life and breath of the theory is music. Professor Shorey makes no mention of this, and thus gives an entirely false impression of the character of my book. Is the musical analogy sound? It is an important question, because, if it is sound, then Greek lyric metre becomes the province of the student of music rather than of the mere metrician.

Second: *Different rhythms are conventionally associated with different feelings and ideas.* Professor Shorey rightly says that it would have taken him too long to discuss my argument in full, but he should have taken the trouble to state it fairly. He says that I endeavor "to show that Pindar and Aeschylus systematically and consciously associate every important feeling and idea with its appropriate rhythm." Even in the case of Aeschylus, who (I contended) used significant rhythm more extensively than any other poet, this is an exaggeration; in the case of Pindar, the reader of Professor Shorey's review will be surprised to hear that I maintained that systematic use is made of significant rhythm in only one of his odes. Professor Shorey has misrepresented what is a fair matter for argument as something on the face of it absurd.

Again, after referring to Headlam's doctrine (adopted by me) that the phrase is the smallest unit which can convey an adequate impression of the rhythm, and that the phrase-divisions correspond, in general, with the natural divisions dictated by the sense of the words, Professor Shorey quotes some passages which, he declares, as interpreted by me, are "gross violations" of the doctrine I have myself laid down.

Pind. O. i. 24: ἐν εὐάνορι Λυδοῦ Πέλοπος ἀποικία

Soph. OC. 695: οὐδ' ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ Δωρίδι νάσῳ Πέλοπος πίσιποτε βλαστὸν

Now, each of these verses represents a single phrase, the subdivisions marked by the underscoring being merely the figures out of which the phrase is built up. And the first phrase ends, while the second both begins and ends, with a pause in the sense. To musicians this distinction between figure and phrase needs no explanation; but, although I did my best to make it clear to the non-musical reader (and really it is very simple), Professor Shorey seems to have mixed them up.

One more point. Professor Shorey "is tempted to disqualify the instinctive judgments" of my ear because I scan as dactyls those lines of Moore's which begin:

Dear/ harp of my/ country, in/ darkness I/ found thee.

I did no such thing. If Professor Shorey will read the passage again, he can hardly fail to see that I am not discussing the rhythm of the words at all, but the bars of the music to which the words are set. I have printed the score of the first nine bars at the head of the page, and then, wishing to point out how useless the bars are as indications of the rhythm, I reprint the words grouped according to the bars, as shown above.

However, if Professor Shorey is interested in the rhythm of this poem, I am willing to discuss the matter with him. He affirms (without discussion) that the rhythm is "unmistakably anapaestic":

Dear harp/ of my coun/try, in dark/ness I found/ thee,  
The cold/ chain of si/lence had hung/ o'er thee long,

To my ear that is a distortion. I would not go so far as to disqualify Professor Shorey's ear in consequence of this difference between our instinctive judgments, but I would seriously suggest to Professor Shorey the following alternative:

Dear harp of/ my country,/ in darkness/ I found thee,  
The cold chain/ of silence/ had hung o'er /thee long.

This, call it what you will, is a common rhythm in Irish poetry, and is the Irish original of this very poem: "A cheol-chruit/ mo thire/ . . . ." I defy Professor Shorey to turn *that* into anapaests.

GEORGE THOMSON

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The general public smiles at the controversies of scholars and fancies that they are irritated when they are only interested or possibly excited. I assure Mr. Thomson that I felt and feel no impatience and am glad to print his letter.

No, I do not accept the musical analogy. Musical notation, I believe, applies to metric only in so far as it is another way of indicating times, stresses, and pauses that I think are more conveniently marked by the conventional signs. As I do not accept the musical analogy we are entirely at cross-purposes when he defends his scansion of Pind. *O. i.* 24 and Soph. *O.C.* 695 (slightly misprinted I see in my review, in spite of my proofreading) as marking correctly the figures and phrases out of which the line is made up. He seems to mean musical phrase, which I think has nothing to do with the matter. I do not think we can justify the violations in our scansion of the natural grouping of words in Greek syntax, idiom, and rhetoric by calling them musical phrases or figures. In short, I meant simply what I have said before in criticism of the "new metric" of Schroeder and others, that the natural phrasing of the Greek words is on the whole more violated by such schemes than it is by a "logaoe-

die" scansion by feet. In the present case, e.g. (if the under scorings mean anything for practice), the adjective is separated from its noun, the noun from its dependent genitive.

I am sorry if my criticism of Mr. Thomson's use of the principle of significant rhythm (or, as I prefer to call it, *ethos*) seems to him exaggerated. I did mention his qualifications of his theory, but I supposed he meant his examples to be typical. In any case my main point was and is, that he employs this method of interpretation much more systematically than I think the evidence justifies.

Moore's verses are certainly anapaestic in movement, i.e., trisyllabically ascending with the "apparent dactyls" and other variations allowed in Greek poetry and in Swinburne's adaptations of the anapaest to the English language. The alternative, which Mr. Thomson proposes to me, is with the exception of the first two feet which I would scan "Dear harp/of my country," precisely the scansion I had in mind, as he will see if he thinks it worth while to consult my little article on "The Issue in Greek Metric," *Classical Philology*, XIX, 169. I cannot discuss the Irish original. By the way, did Moore know Irish? It doesn't matter. I only ask for information.

PAUL SHOREY

#### *SORTITO AND SORTI IN CIL, I, 200*

Recent discussions of the agrarian law of 111 B.C. have raised anew several questions. Among these is the problem of the meaning of *sortito* and *sorti* in lines 3 and 15-16. Mommsen<sup>1</sup> believed that the passages in question refer to colonies, and argued that the use of sortition is itself a proof of this. In opposition to Mommsen, Saumagne, in a study of the agrarian law, has argued that the use of sortition is no proof of the planting of colonies.<sup>2</sup> Later, in an article which takes Saumagne's study as a starting-point but on several points disagrees with its conclusions, Levi has also argued that it is unlikely that the law contains any reference to colonies.<sup>3</sup> He suggests that the Gracchan triumvirs employed sortition in their regular assignments of land to select the citizens that were to profit from the distributions. This was done both because at times there were more applicants than lots, and because the lots might be of unequal value. I shall not attempt to enter into this controversy but merely wish to point out that Cicero *Ad fam.* xi. 20. 3 contains a reference to the use of sortition in assigning land to veterans, and specifically suggests that it was employed when the lots were of unequal value. In writing about a suggested distribution of land D. Brutus says: "aequaliter aut sorte agros legionibus adsignari puto oportere."

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<sup>1</sup> *Gesammelte Schriften*, I, 98. For the opposition between *viritim* assignation and the use of sortition in planting colonies cf. *ibid.*, pp. 99 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Revue de philologie*, I (1927), 67 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Rivista di filologia*, LVII (1929), 237 ff.

ON PINDAR *PYTH.* IV. 96 ff.

Κλέπτων δὲ θυμῷ  
 δείμα προσέννεπε· Ποίαν γαῖαν, ὦ ξείν', εὔχεται  
 πατρίδ' ἔμμεν; καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπων σε χαμαιγενέων πολιᾶς  
 ἐξανήκεν γαστρός; ἐχθίστοισι μὴ ψεύδεσιν  
 καταμῖναι εἰπὲ γένναν.

The ingenious but, I believe, mistaken interpretation that finds a succession of insults in these words of Pelias to Jason has been accepted by so many interpreters that it is perhaps worth while to discuss the point again. I believe that the tone of the passage is that of calm, dignified epic and not of passionate, dramatic satire. Pelias hides in his heart his fear and gives Jason the ordinary epic greeting.

The question turns on the interpretation of *ποιάν*, *χαμαιγενέων*, *πολιᾶς*, and *ἐξανήκεν*.

Having once adopted his interpretation, even so great a scholar as Gildersleeve chose to forget for the moment what he of course knew, that *ποιάν*, so far from being "something disrespectful," is quite normal in such a greeting both in epic and in tragedy. There can be no disrespect intended in *Odyssey* i. 406,

ὁππόθεν οὗτος ἀνὴρ, ποίης δ' ἐξ εὔχεται εἶναι γαίης,

for in 411 the speaker adds

οὐ μὲν γὰρ τι κακῷ εἰς ὧπα ἐπέκει

so in Eurip., frag. 1:

ποιαν σε φῶμεν γαῖαν ἐκλελοιπότα  
 πόλει ξενούσθαι τῇδε.

For that matter Pindar himself makes Apollo use *ποιᾶς* of the maiden of whom he is enamored (*Pyth.* ix. 36; cf. also *Bacchylides* v. 88).

*Χαμαιγενέων* is taken by Gildersleeve to insinuate that Jason was "ditch-delivered by a drab," and Sandys following Gildersleeve translates "Which of the groundling wenches was it that spawned thee forth from her aged womb?" The word is taken in a disparaging sense by Böckh, Puech (Budé), Dissen, Metzger, Schröder, Billson ("dropped thee on the earth with senile pangs"), Tafel, and others. But here again the epic tone is more probable. All mortals are earthborn and walk the earth in contrast with the gods of Olympus. Cf. *Iliad* v. 442, Ἀθανάτων τε θεῶν χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων τ' ἀνθρώπων; Hesiod *Theog.* 879, ἔργ' ἐπατά φθείρουσι χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων; and *Homeric Hymn, Ven.* 108 and *Cer.* 352. *Πολιᾶς* presents greater, but not, I think, insuperable difficulties. If the abusive tenor of the whole passage were established it might be taken as a transferred epithet in the sense of "hoary" or "senile." But as it is, it is more probably an epithet in the Homeric style for the white or glistening flesh walls of the body and the womb. Cf. ἀργέτι δῆμῳ

(*Il.* xi. 818) and *ἑμᾶς σαρκὸς αἰόλας* (*Soph. Philoctet.* 1157). "Livid," or as Jebb renders, "discolored."<sup>1</sup>

Many strained interpretations have been proposed. Wilamowitz on Eurip. *Herakles* 693 takes it as "Gegensatz zu φαίδιμος, sordida mater." Schröder thinks Pindar intentionally allows himself an "Umdeutung der Homerischen Epitheta." Christ supposes it to mean "pullum" of the darkness of the womb, which Hartung before him expressed more explicitly by the emendation *σκοτίας*, referring to Aesch. *Septem* 621 and Pind. *Nem.* i. 53. The idea then would be that of Tennyson's "antenatal gloom." But this meaning can hardly be got out of *πολιάς*, and *σκοτίας* would suggest another meaning to a Greek ear. Cf. *Il.* vi. 24, *σκότιον δέ ἐ γείνατο μήτηρ*. The scholiast tries to make it mean *τιμίας*, *παρὰ τὸ τοῦ γήρως ἔντιμον*! In any case the meaning is too doubtful to support an interpretation of the entire passage that is not otherwise established. There is no good reason for translating *ἐξανήκεν* "spawned." The expression is drastic, but no more so than the Homeric *πέσῃ μετὰ ποσσὶ γυναικὸς* (*Il.* xix. 110). Finally, there is to Greek feeling nothing disrespectful in the epic admonition to speak the truth, and therefore no reason to take *καταμάνας* in an ironical or insulting sense.

Donaldson (1841), Christ (1896), and Cerrato (1918) are right in rejecting the interpretation that reads a succession of insults into the entire passage.

PAUL SHOREY

#### A GREEK ENIGMA (*GREEK ANTHOLOGY*, XIV, 41)

An epigram in the *Greek Anthology*, XIV, 41 is thus translated by W. R. Paton in the Loeb Classical Library: "I bring forth my mother and am born from her, and I am sometimes larger, sometimes smaller than she is."

Mr. Paton appends answers for a rather large number of other riddles, so that I conclude from his failure to give one for this epigram that none had been suggested at the time he made his translation.<sup>2</sup> The conditions are fulfilled by the "inconstant" moon, crescent phases of which gradually give birth, figuratively speaking, to the full moon and are in turn born from it. Obviously in some of its phases the moon is both larger and smaller than in others.

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<sup>1</sup> Similarly Cerrato comparing *ἔαρ πολίων* calls it an "epitheton ornans."

<sup>2</sup> After the appearance of Mr. Paton's translation I proposed a solution for the riddle in XIV, 30, in the *Classical Review*, XXXVI, 165.



## BACON AND DEMOSTHENES AGAIN

A note from Professor Lofberg reminds me that Lysias xii. 4<sup>1</sup> comes somewhat nearer to the language of Bacon about Cephalus than does the passage of Demosthenes on the *Crown*, § 251, to which I referred (*supra*, p. 190). That is true and interesting. Bacon as a classical scholar may have read Lysias. But I cannot remember that he ever quotes him, and there is, I believe, no reference to Lysias in the full indexes of the Spedding and Ellis edition. Lysias, I fancy, was relatively less familiar to the older scholars than the unwise inclusion of his orations in the Freshman curriculum made him to the last generation of Americans.

PAUL SHOREY

## APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS ON HOMER

Apollonius Dyscolus, a grammarian who flourished in the second century A.D., quotes, or refers to, a great many classical authors, but his quotations from Homer outnumber those from all other prose and verse writers combined. For example, Aristophanes, Demosthenes, Euripides, and Theocritus are not quoted more than a half-dozen times, respectively, while Pindar and Plato occur in quotation less than a dozen times each. Homer is quoted so frequently that it seems worth while to give the figures for the individual books of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.<sup>2</sup> They are as follows:<sup>3</sup> *Iliad* i/36; ii/19; iii/20; iv/12; v/27; vi/14; vii/14; viii/26; ix/20; x/13; xi/13; xii/9; xiii/17; xiv/12; xv/9; xvi/15; xvii/8; xviii/8; xix/8; xx/8; xxi/5; xxii/9; xxiii/8; xxiv/9; *Odyssey* i/28; ii/10; iii/13; iv/26; v/5; vi/6; vii/6; viii/12; ix/18; x/12; xi/14; xii/8; xiii/12; xiv/6; xv/6; xvi/7; xvii/11; xviii/2; xix/14; xx/2; xxi/6; xxii/3; xxiii/4; xxiv/4. This table reveals quotations from every book of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The "Catalogue of Ships" in *Iliad* ii is not excluded; furthermore, *Iliad* xxiii and xxiv, which are regarded as late by many disintegrating critics, are quoted more frequently than are xxi and xxii. In general, the quotations leave the impression that the Homer text used by Apollonius resembled very closely the form which our vulgate has had since the day of Wolf. Not a single verse is attributed to Homer which is not found in the present-day vulgate also. There is not the slightest suggestion that Apollonius regarded Homer as the author of all, or any, of the poems of the *Cycle*.

<sup>1</sup> Καὶ οἶδενὶ πάποτε οὐτε ἡμεῖς οὐτε ἐκείνος δίκην οὐτε ἰδικασάμεθα οὐτε ἐφύγομεν.

<sup>2</sup> After compiling my own *index locorum*, I found that my figures did not in all cases agree with those of Schneider and Uhlig. I included only such passages as could surely be regarded as quotations, though I felt positive that shorter phrases in a number of cases were not chance inventions of Apollonius, but quotations from his favorite poet. Many verses are quoted more than once; I have not counted the repetitions, but have given only the total number of different verses quoted.

<sup>3</sup> The Arabic numerals do not refer to specific lines in the respective books, but give only the total number of different quotations from each book.

Schneider and Uhlig, in their excellent edition of Apollonius in the *Grammatici Graeci*<sup>1</sup> collection, write (II, 504): "Saepius discrepant scripturae Apollonianae versuum Homericorum ab ceteris lectionis Homericae testibus." In perhaps a dozen cases, where Apollonius misquotes or confuses passages pretty badly, these words apply. A careful study, however, of the less as well as the more serious errors in quotation will convince anyone, I think, that Apollonius always quoted from memory.<sup>2</sup> When this fact is borne in mind, one is led to wonder not that Apollonius misquoted a few passages from Homer, but rather that he quoted so many of them correctly. By way of comparison, it may be stated that Apollonius quotes his namesake, of Rhodes, not more than twice, and on one occasion very incorrectly. In the four books on *Syntax*, Menander is quoted but once, and that, too, incorrectly. Quotations from Sappho are not numerous, but one of them is so incorrect that no editor has yet been able to bring much meaning into the verse. There are only two quotations from Aratus; one of them shows a remarkable divergence from the text of that author as it has come down to us today.

From these brief comparative studies two salient facts seem to stand out above all others: first, the frequency of the quotations from Homer; and, second, their essential correctness.<sup>3</sup>

Apollonius sheds some interesting light on the methods of the Alexandrian critics of Homer, including Zenodotus and Aristarchus. That these scholars of old had better manuscripts than we now possess cannot be denied, but the extent to which they used them in constructing their text of Homer is problematical. Apollonius reveals that his forerunners regarded their own inability to understand or appreciate the phenomena of Homeric orthography or usage as a sufficient excuse for re-writing or athetizing the passage. He protests against some of the readings of Zenodotus, for which the latter had no warrant other than his own invention and imagination. Though he was a great admirer of Aristarchus, he did not hesitate to disagree with him. For example, we have it on the authority of Aristonicus that Aristarchus athetized *Iliad* v. 64. In his *Syntax* ii. 19, Apollonius brands the athetizing of this verse as stupid and silly. Clearly there was a very considerable amount of the subjective element in Alexandrian criticism. From Apollonius it becomes manifest that neither he nor his Alexandrian masters had a clear understanding of Homeric grammar or usage. Consequently, if these men actually succeeded in restoring Homer, we must believe them to have been endowed with supernatural intuition and divine inspiration.

<sup>1</sup> Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1910.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Syntax*, III, 36, 3, 2.

<sup>3</sup> For other literature bearing on this point cf. Professor John A. Scott's studies, "Diodorus and Homer," *Class. Jour.*, XXII (1926-27), 540 f., and "Homer and Aelian," *ibid.*, XXIV (1928-29), 375 f.; my note on "Polyaenus and Homer," *Class. Jour.*, XXIV (1928-29), 530. Professor Bolling, in *Class. Phil.*, XXIV (1929), 330-34, under the title "The Quotations from Homer in Polyainos 1, Proem. 4-12," discusses not only the quotations from Homer in the *strategemata* but also those in Aelian.

Since the interpretation of the phrase "the poet" in its application to Homer has been a recent subject of dispute, I shall set down briefly what Apollonius offers toward the solution of this problem.<sup>1</sup> In discussing the various uses of the definite article in his *Syntax* i. 6, he says that in the expression  $\delta \piοιητῆς$  (for Homer) the article has been assimilated as an additional syllable of the noun, since Homer has gained for himself distinction above all others and is best known. A little farther on in the same book (i. 12) Apollonius remarks without further explanation or limitation that "the poet" means Homer. In practice we find that he usually quotes Homer anonymously, and that the expression "the poet" applies only to Homer. These results are not startling. In view of Apollonius' high regard for Homer, we are not surprised to find him call Homer  $\delta \piοιητῆς κατ' ἐξοχὴν$  any more than we are to observe that he quotes him more frequently than he does all other prose and verse writers combined. In spite of Apollonius' precise statements, I still feel, with Professor Scott, that it is a highly questionable procedure to foist on blind Maeonides any hexametrical piece of poetry, simply because some second- or third-rate source once ascribed it to "the poet."

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<sup>1</sup> The following studies will show the trend of the controversy: John A. Scott, "Antigonus and the Homeric Authorship of the *Thebais*," *Class. Jour.*, XVI (1920-21), 367 f., and "Whom Did the Greeks Mean by the Poet?" *ibid.*, XVII (1921-22), 330; A. M. Harmon, "The Poet κατ' ἐξοχὴν," *Class. Phil.*, XVIII (1923), 35-47; Edward Fitch, "Pindar and Homer," *ibid.*, XIX (1924), 57-65, and "Homerica," *Class. Jour.*, XVII (1921-22), 94 f.; finally, W. Rhys Roberts, "The Poet in Greek," *Class. Rev.*, XLI (1927), 10.

## BOOK REVIEWS

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*Studies in the Script of Tours. I: A Survey of the Manuscripts of Tours.* By EDWARD KENNARD RAND. Vol. I (text). Pp. xxi+245. Vol. II (plates). Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1929. \$50 (\$45 to members of the Mediaeval Academy of America).

Professor Rand was happy in the choice of his subject. Palaeographers are wont to complain of the disadvantages of their pursuit as so much of their work deals with minutiae that are of interest, and indeed often intelligible, only to a few kindred spirits; so much chaff has to be winnowed to obtain a few grains of pertinent truth that the results often seem out of all proportion to the effort involved. The investigator in this field generally feels himself fortunate if he can contribute some small items of interest to the philologist or historian. But to no student of the Middle Ages can Tours and its *scriptoria* fail to appeal. The palaeographer, the philologist, the theologian, the student of the history of art, of text-history, of classical and mediaeval literature, and of mediaeval history will all find pleasure and profit in reading these pages.

It must also be said that the *scriptoria* of Tours are equally fortunate in their historian. It would be difficult to find a scholar who is so well equipped to deal with a subject that has so many and such wide ramifications who is at home in so many fields; *multis pedibus stat*, to adopt an expression of Trimalchio. In the present task he is the worthy successor of illustrious pioneers, Delisle and Traube. The extent of his achievement may be measured by the fact that Delisle's list of twenty-eight Tours manuscripts has grown to more than two hundred—the result of an examination of over three hundred manuscripts. There are still some gaps to be filled, but Professor Rand is probably right in saying that the missing manuscripts would not affect the general results of his studies.

The School of Tours is of paramount importance for the history of writing. It was a melting pot where were fused the various conflicting elements that produced the finest type of Caroline minuscule. The rapidity of this evolution is astounding, for, as Rand points out, Tours in the eighth century was inferior to Corbie, Luxeuil, and Fleury in the art of illumination and of writing, but before the end of the first quarter of the ninth century it surpassed them all. The resulting script might impress one as a "hothouse" product, but the explanation seems clear. While the other centers were struggling with their environment in an effort to develop a script of simplicity and beauty from the various forms of cursive writing, the School of Tours broke with its

own times and went back to older models for its guidance. The monks knew how to write excellent rustic capitals and beautiful half-uncials, though their uncials often left something to be desired. These models showed them the advantages of uniformity and enabled them to free themselves from the trammels of the cursive. That they could, however, write beautiful minuscules with cursive elements is shown by the various hands of the Leyden *Nonius*.

The survey covers a period of five centuries beginning with the earliest products of the School (seventh century). The manuscripts of the eighth and ninth centuries are treated with great detail; the following centuries are more briefly sketched.

The wide range and the character of Professor Rand's treatment may be well shown by giving the contents of Part I: (chap. i), "A Brief Account of the Libraries at Tours"; (chap. ii), "Characteristics of the Script of Tours and Its Importance in the General History of the Script"; (chap. iii), "Details in the Description of the Books of Tours." This section of twenty pages deals with the technique of bookmaking and should be of great value to editors of classical texts as a guide for the scientific description of manuscripts. The topics are: (a) "Dimensions"; attention is again called to the fact that the measurements of the script-space are of more importance than those of the page; (b) "Ruling"; the author describes (pp. 11-18) the two methods in vogue (Old Style and New Style) and shows their importance for dating manuscripts of the ninth century. This section is a recapitulation of the author's article published in Lindsay's *Palaeographia Latina*, V (1927), 52-78, and is an important contribution to the study of palaeography. (c) "Gatherings"; the manuscripts of the eighth and ninth centuries are practically always bound in quaternions. (d) "Signatures"; the practice in the older manuscript is strikingly regular; interesting observations on the insertion of the names of scribes, of quire signatures in Tironian notes, and other evidence of the activity of a man who supervised the work of the scribe or revised the copy. (e) "Abbreviations"; a list of the regular abbreviations is given. Two interesting details that are of importance for dating are noted, the struggle between the two symbols for *tur*, *t* with the apostrophe and *t* with the figure 2 symbol; the other is the use of the Greek *H* and *C* in the *nomina sacra* *IHS*, *IHC*, *XPC*. (f) "Punctuation"; the system finally adopted was the high dot for full pauses, the low dot for half-pauses, described by Donatus i. 5 and Isidore *Etym.* i. 20. 2-5. (g) "Text"; it is important to consider the evidence of the text in determining manuscript relationship. Chapter iv is entitled "A Brief Account of the Development of the Script of Tours." The headings show how detailed the subdivisions are: "I. The Earliest Books of Tours"; "II. The Irish at Tours"; "III. The Pre-Alcuinian Style"; "IV. The Reforms of Alcuin"; "IVa. The Embellished Merovingian Style"; "IVb. The Regular Style"; "V. The Régime of Fridugisus"; "VI. The Mid-century Style"; "VII. The Post-mid-century Style"; "VIII. Tours and the Franco-Saxon Style"; "IX. The End of the Century." These narrow boundaries have been

determined, not by dates, for only a few Tours manuscripts are dated, but largely from purely palaeographical considerations; evidence of this sort is of course often indecisive and the personal equation must be taken into consideration, but the *ipse dixit* of one who has spent nearly thirty years in studying a script must carry weight. These sections contain a wealth of palaeographical observations, of shrewd and stimulating comment. The remaining periods are somewhat summarily treated: "X. The Tenth Century" (pp. 73-75); "XI. The Eleventh Century" (p. 75); "XII. The Twelfth Century" (pp. 76-78).

Part B is devoted to "A Summary Description of the manuscripts of Tours," grouped according to the periods mentioned above, with details itemized according to the list in chapter iii. Selected bibliographies are occasionally added. Most of the manuscripts described (181) are earlier than the tenth century. "A List of Manuscripts Examined and Rejected" concludes this part of the work.

The volume is generously provided with Indices: an Index of Manuscripts, with a table of the books of St. Gatian's, St. Martin's, and Marmoutier; an Index of Plates; an Index of Authors and Works; and, finally, a General Index.

The second volume contains two hundred splendid collotype plates. The format, which is large enough to contain full-size reproductions of the larger pages, has made it possible to include in some cases specimens of two or three manuscripts on one plate. The result is that the script of Tours can now be studied from a larger collection of facsimiles than is available for any other center. A valuable feature of this volume is the sliding binding release, which preserves the book form but enables one to remove the sheets if occasion demands.

CHARLES H. BEESON

*Euripides: A Student of Human Nature.* By WILLIAM NICKERSON BATES. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1930. Pp. xiii+315.

The object of this book is to try to give the modern reader within reasonable compass a more accurate account and truer appreciation of the dramatic genius of Euripides than is to be found elsewhere. . . . The writer has sought as far as possible not to repeat information readily accessible elsewhere, but to give a truer perspective of the great dramatist from the original sources only (p. xi).

It is with eager anticipation, therefore, that one begins the perusal of the book, hoping to be given a new clue to the almost feminine waywardness of the much-discussed poet.

What do we find?

In the first twenty pages, on the life of the poet, the author does little more than repeat the uncertain traditions with which one is already familiar and which contribute little to the understanding and appreciation of the plays. The account is fairly critical, but there is some incautious acceptance



of statements that are not quite credible. To maintain, for instance, that Euripides was born in 480 B.C. is a little like believing in a miracle.

The next thirty-five pages are given to a discussion of the characteristics of his tragedy. This means, precisely, the prologues, the *deus ex machina*, humor, and the "child motive," together with a very little on scenery, costumes, dramatic types, and the chorus. The author believes that the prologues were welcome to the Athenians because they were useful. Of the *deus ex machina* he says that it is sufficient justification for its use that the audience could not fail to be delighted by its startling, theatrical effects. This would, of course, justify vaudeville. Besides, there is some confusion in the discussion between the *machina* itself and the special dramatic device called the *deus ex machina*. Euripides' employment of children is fully illustrated. But it is difficult to agree with the author when he makes Ion a child of twelve or fourteen (cf. *Ion* 102: ἡμεῖς δὲ πόνους οὓς ἐκ παιδὸς μοχθοῦμεν δαί), or when he asserts that the plot of the *Medea* "largely centres" about the fate of the children (p. 166). The chorus, we are told, "would require a volume in itself," but we are given only two pages, which contain little of greater importance than such statements as "the composition and treatment of the chorus naturally varied with the individual play" (here, as often in the book, one gathers the meaning not from what the words say but from the obvious intention of the author), and "the choruses of Euripides contain much beautiful poetry" (p. 34). What we miss in this chapter is discussion of such important elements in Euripides' drama as his tremendous power in individual scenes, ranging from the tenderest pathos to the most violent invective; his use and abuse of rhetoric; the irrelevance of many scenes and the inorganic structure of many of the plays; the magical narrative skill in the messengers' speeches; the brilliant and spectacular *parodoi*; the inimitable charm of the limpid verse; the adventurous mind, ranging boldly over all the ideas of a seething intellectual society. There is, indeed, little of significance about the dramatic technique aside from its theatrical aspect. The author thinks (a little unfairly) that most people "fail to visualize" the plays, and that we shall find salvation for Euripides if we just remember that his plays were produced in a theater. And yet he tells us that in the *Bacchae* the slopes of Mount Cithaeron are visible in the distance!

The following section of the book, by far the longest, discusses separately the nineteen extant plays. Each account includes a detailed summary of the plot, a recital of bits of information concerning the play, and some remarks about the characters—the usual formula for the brief introduction to a school edition. The criticism is seldom penetrating or illuminating. The difficulties in the interpretation of such plays as the *Bacchae*, the *Alceste*, and the *Hippolytus* are scarcely suggested.

The last chapter contains similar accounts of all the lost plays, as far as they can be reconstructed. This is the most useful part of the book, not because it contributes much that is new, but because it offers to the English



reader a view of the wide range of subjects which were employed by the Athenian dramatists.

If we ask at the end whether the promise of the Introduction has been fulfilled, we must confess that Professor Bates's book does not do much to deepen and broaden our knowledge of Euripides. One would still send an inquiring student to Nestle, Haigh, Decharme, and Lucas. Too many important aspects of the subject are neglected, and those aspects which are presented are not treated with any depth of understanding or with any recognition of the significant problems. The author is an admirer of Euripides and a special pleader in his defense; but when he is writing about a piece of doubtful merit, he has little to say except that he himself finds it excellent or that it is "interesting and would probably act well." Nor does the book possess qualities of style likely to captivate the reader. The verse translations, in particular, will not give him a high opinion of Euripides or lead him to explore further the delights of his poetry. Fortunately, however, there are not many examples of *Midsummer* "Bottomry" like the following:

From a golden bowl  
Gaea's dew I'll cast,  
Castalia's stream,  
Sprinkling liquid water round.

or

Come, thou thriving branch of bay  
Which dost Phoebus' altar sweep. [v.l. dust?]

On the whole, a fairly poor case is made out for Euripides by one who undertakes to vindicate his right to stand by Aeschylus and Sophocles.

In the Introduction the author makes the rather startling statement that "occasionally a slight liberty is taken with the text with the object of giving a truer idea of what the poet had in mind." Fortunately, this does not refer to meddling with the text but to the inalienable right of the translator to freedom in the composition of his English verse. But in the following instances the translator does not seem to have given what the poet had in mind.

HF 636, *πάν δὲ φιλότεκνον γένος*, is not "but all the race has love of children" (p. 42), but "every class of men has love of children" (*γένος* alone, without *ἀνδρῶν* or *βροτῶν*, cannot mean "the human race" at this date). *Ion* 1173, *προθύμα πράσσω*, is not "as he prepared to make an offering" (p. 128), but "by his eager activity" (cf. 1211, *σὴ γὰρ ἡ προθυμία*, and *Hom. Il. i. 599 f.*). *Ion* 1226, *τὴν ἀθλίως σπεύσασαν ἀθλίαν ὁδόν*, is not "while she is hastening on her wretched way" (p. 130), but "who has eagerly followed a fatal path to a fatal end" (explained by the next two lines). *Medea* 887 f., *νύμφην τε κηδεύουσιν ἡδεσθαι σέθεν*, is not "and pleased by thy newly wedded bride" (p. 159), but "and found joy in attending thy newly wedded bride." *Medea* 901 f., *ἄρ', ὦ τέκν', οὕτω καὶ πολὺν ζῶντες χρόνον | φιλήν ὀρέξερ' ὀλένην*; is not "My children, if you live for a long time Will you stretch forth your darling hands to me?" (p. 159), but "Are ye destined long to live and thus stretch forth

your hands to me?" *Medea* 904, χρόνος δὲ νῆκος πατρὸς ἐξαιρουμένη, is not "freed by time from strife against your father" (p. 159), but "freed at last."

It should also be noted that the great speech from the *Erechtheus* which is quoted by Lycurgus is assigned by Professor Bates to Erechtheus himself (p. 246), whereas it is really the mother's argument in support of the sacrifice of her daughter. One may also point out the falsity of the statement that a play with a happy ending, like the *Iphigenia Taurica*, can "only by courtesy be called a tragedy" (p. 39); and express some objection to *Heracles Furens* as a new and unacceptable form of the title.

In the Appendix the author has supplied a very useful list of the portions of Euripides which have been recovered in recent years from papyri. It would have been desirable to add to this list the fragments found in 1908 by Rabe in the Vatican manuscript of Johannes Logothetes, which are referred to on pages 259 and 291.

IVAN M. LINFORTH

*Thucydides and the Science of History.* By CHARLES NORRIS COCHRANE. Oxford University Press, 1929.

This is an attempt to prove in refutation of Mr. Cornford's *Thucydides Mythistoricus* that Thucydides is a truly rational and scientific historian. And more specifically, that he consciously transfers to history and the study of society the scientific method of Hippocrates and Greek medicine.

The first half of the thesis is not difficult to sustain. Mr. Cornford's elaborate parallel between Thucydides and Attic tragedy is quite fantastic, and could easily have been refuted if Mr. Cochrane had cared to go into detail on that point.<sup>1</sup> Thucydides was and has been widely acknowledged to be a scientific historian in the sense that he was a hard-headed (Mr. Cochrane will not allow us to say cynical) rationalist who was contemptuous of all teleological and providential interpretations of history and explained everything by natural causes and unchanging human nature—the psychology, motives, and the conflicting interests of men. These qualities of Thucydides and the fact that he anticipates and is often the inspiration of a similar attitude of mind in such moderns as Machiavelli and Hobbes were brought out with full specific reference to his text in my paper on the implicit ethics and psychology of Thucydides.<sup>2</sup> Professor Cochrane confirms it by a very readable and suggestive comment on the main events of the Peloponnesian War and Thucydides' purely scientific treatment of them, which rather than his ostensible main thesis is, I think, the most valuable part of his book. What he especially commends in Thucydides is his abstention from any ultimate and absolute philosophy of history. As he (Mr. Cochrane thinks fortunately) was unacquainted with the distinction between mind and matter, "which, so far as history is concerned, has probably obscured more problems than it has solved," he

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my article, "A Dramatic Historian," *Dial.* XLIII (1907), 202.

<sup>2</sup> *AJP*, XXIV, 266-88.

escaped the fallacies of both the materialistic and the idealistic interpretation of history. He is, Mr. Cochrane thinks, what our sociologists and philosophers of history too rarely are, a scientific empiricist. And his postulate of physical determinism and nothing more than that anticipates the day when materialism and idealism are to disappear as canons of historical interpretation and "the scattered limbs of history" will "once more be brought together."

Less plausible is Mr. Cochrane's contention that Thucydides consciously applies the method of Hippocrates, which we are told is the method of Democritus and the atomists, to the study of man and society. I can see no real evidence for that. Mr. Cochrane collects some of the more rationalistic passages of the Hippocratic corpus, including the eternally quoted statement that the sacred disease is no more sacred than another. He then argues that Thucydides with other enlightened spirits at Athens must have felt himself in sympathy with this rationalistic temper. That is probable enough, but the attempt to prove it in particular instances tempts him to argue from analogies and parallels that will not bear examination. He takes Thucydides' description of the plague, which naturally resembles some things in the Greek medical writers, and perhaps without quite sufficient warning to his readers and without drawing any definite line transfers its language and its methods to the history as a whole. The analogies, the parallel passages, and the implications that Thucydides actually uses, the technical terms which Mr. Cochrane himself borrows to describe his procedure, cannot always be trusted without verification. I cannot now take space to illustrate this and it is not necessary. If Mr. Cochrane or any Thucydidean scholar will compare with the text of Thucydides his parallels and analogies and what the English reader will take for his attribution of Hippocratean expressions to Thucydides, the uncritical character of much of this part of his argument will be apparent.

Mr. Cochrane does not approve of Plato, whom he regards as the antithesis of the scientific spirit and uses as a foil to the brilliancy of its revelation in Thucydides and Hippocrates. He seems in this matter not to have got beyond the historical criticism of Macaulay's essay on Bacon, Lange's history of materialism, and that history of the warfare of science and theology whose often absurd footnotes were apparently compiled for Andrew D. White by secretaries whose work he neglected to revise.

Professor Cochrane's attention has apparently not been called to the passage of the *Phaedrus* (270 C) on the method of Hippocrates or to Poschenrieder's *Die Platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnis zu den Hippocratischen Schriften* or to my *Platonism and the History of Science* or to Eva Sachs on *Die fünf Platonischen Körper* or John Burnet's little essay republished in the recent volume of his addresses, or the concurrence of a score of recent reputable philosophers and scientific men in the statement that Plato is nearer to the spirit of modern science than Aristotle.

He may of course feel that this criticism is unjust because I am overlooking his sharp distinction between science, on the one hand, and religion and

philosophy, on the other. I must admit that I assumed this to be ironical, and to be of practically little more significance than the Schoolmen's convenient distinction between matters of faith and matters of the reason. In this I may very well be mistaken.

PAUL SHOREY

*Platonis Epistulae commentariis illustratae.* By FRANCISCUS NOVOTNÝ.  
Opera Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Masarykianae Brunensis, 1930.

Professor Novotný regards as genuine the thirteen epistles with the exception of the obviously spurious first.<sup>1</sup> It is impossible to reopen the debate with every book review.<sup>2</sup> Professor Novotný is acquainted with the literature of the subject including the American, and is temperate and courteous in the expression of his own opinions. With the aid of his predecessors (especially Hackforth) and Ast's *Lexicon* he finds in the *Laws* and elsewhere plausible parallels for most of the ideas and turns of expression that have been challenged by Karsten and others who followed Karsten in his rejection of the epistles. Like too many other recent critics he sometimes seems to think that the exposure of some exaggeration of Karsten is in itself a proof of the genuineness of the letters. By that logic what would be the inference from Bertheau's misinterpretation of *καριδαί*, *Epistle* vii. 326 A, which Professor Novotný considerably overlooks? He argues with Grote and others that instead of judging the letters by our preconceptions of Plato's character we must correct our idealization of Plato by the letters.<sup>3</sup> This argument, as I have already said,<sup>4</sup> misses the point. It is not simply a question of Plato's personal moral character, though the idealizer has a right to his presumptions about that. It is a question of the unfailing consistency of Plato's taste and moral tact, which several passages of the letters grossly violate. But I was not going to argue that question.

The admirable commentary in clear fluent Latin rarely shirks a difficulty, supplies all the evidence on problems raised by historical discrepancies, real or fanciful, quotes the translation and interpretation of many scholars for all doubtful passages, and is always copious and often nicely discriminative in illustration of Greek idiom and Platonic usage. Professor Novotný is sanely conservative in his treatment of the text, recording and discussing but usually rejecting emendations that are merely possible Greek in the context. He pa-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Class. Phil.*, VIII (1913), 387-88.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, X (1915), 87; XVIII (1923), 361; XX (1925), 78-79; XXI (1926), 257; XXV (1930), 205.

<sup>3</sup> P. 97 on 315 A: "ai quis dixerit eiusmodi rem a Platonis moribus abhorreere, nihil nisi praeiudicatam ostendit de Platone opinionem." Cf. p. 87 on the attribution to Plato of affected secrecy; p. 218, 341 D, on Plato's vanity; p. 235, 345 C, on his self-praise; p. 285 on Marsilio Ficino's refusal to translate the thirteenth epistle.

<sup>4</sup> *Class. Phil.*, 1926, p. 257.

tiently examines and dismisses as superfluous or unnecessary some ten emendations of Wilamowitz, accepting three or four. He corrects Burnet's punctuation in several passages and gives a list of his own variations from Burnet's text.

I note a few points that have interested me:

Page 162: 326 C, οὐχ οὕτως, etc. The rhetoric of this should be illustrated by *Laws* 905 A and *Julian Orat.* vi. 198 C.

Page 116: 320 D. For the correction of the usual rendering of ἀρχαῖον ἀποδείξων cf. *Class. Phil.*, 1926, page 257, and *supra*, page 205. But my point that Plato would never have used ἀρχαῖον in such a context as a term of disparagement is overlooked.

Page 131-32: He rejects all proposed interpretations including mine<sup>1</sup> of the silly passage 326 D, καίπερ γέρων ὦν, etc., but to support his own interpretation he is driven to the violent emendation γερόντων ὄντων.

Page 166: 327 B. The correction of Howald is already given in *Class. Phil.*, XVIII (1923), 361, and a second time in *ibid.*, 1927, page 108.

Page 209: For the note on κατακαλυψάμενος 340 A cf. my correction of the Loeb translation *supra*, page 205.

Page 251: 353 A. The punctuation πολεμίοις σχεδόν, ἐξ οὗπερ γέγονεν overlooks the improbability of σχεδόν following the word it qualifies.

Page 233: 344 C. He takes ἐν χώρᾳ τῇ καλλίστῃ, etc., to mean *in pulcherrimo quodam scriptoris animae loco*. I am still in doubt.<sup>2</sup>

PAUL SHOREY

*Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic.* By CHARLES HENRY BEESON. Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America. Pp. x+51. 109 plates. \$12.00.

This volume consists of a facsimile reproduction of the 109 folios (218 pages) in natural size of Harley MS 2736 containing Cicero's *De oratore* copied by Lupus, Abbot of Ferrières, in the ninth century, preceded by a detailed discussion of the manuscript. The work has a twofold interest: It is of importance for the history of the text of the *De oratore* and in general for the critical methods of the ninth century. That the manuscript was written by Lupus was discovered by Beeson in 1910. Six other manuscripts owned and annotated by Lupus have been identified by Beeson and others, and discussions of these may be expected in the future. The Harleianus is the only one entirely written by Lupus.

The manuscripts of the *De oratore* are divided into two groups: the *mutili*, which are represented by manuscripts of the ninth and tenth centuries, though incomplete, and the *integri*, represented only by fifteenth-century copies. The Harley manuscript is the best of the *mutili*.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, X (1915), 87.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 1925, p. 79.

A letter of Lupus reveals that he was almost as eager to get a second copy of the *De oratore* and other works as to obtain a new work—so anxious was he to correct the texts he owned. A study of the Harleianus and other Lupus manuscripts leads Beeson to conclude that Lupus preserved old readings as variants in the few cases where he emended. Beeson suggests that the Harley manuscript was copied in 836 from one belonging to Einhard.

The volume contains a full description of the manuscript, its orthography, syllable division, punctuation, abbreviations (a full and valuable list), technical signs, variants, corrections, erasures, etc. Particularly interesting is Lupus' care in preserving blank spaces which he found in his original. The manuscript shows signs of having been written in haste. Yet an examination of all the data is rather reassuring in revealing that Lupus was careful and conservative and that the manuscripts which passed through his hands did not suffer much either from mistakes or arbitrary emendations. When we reflect, as Beeson suggests, that he must have owned perhaps scores of manuscripts and that he passed on his methods to his pupil Heiricus of Auxerre, a very important scholar, and that the latter's still more distinguished pupil, Remigius, probably continued the practices of Lupus, we can realize the significance of this study and the others that will follow. The text tradition of many Latin authors probably goes back in part to Lupus and his followers. It is of the utmost importance to study the scholarly activity of the ninth century in order to determine the extent to which our rather numerous ninth- and tenth-century manuscripts may be trusted.

With the exception of a few rather light pages, the reproduction of the manuscript is an excellent one. The price is one of the lowest at which a facsimile has ever been offered. To members of the Mediaeval Academy it is only \$10.00. Those who wish to have a complete facsimile of a classical work in inexpensive form will find no volume more suitable than this.

B. L. ULLMAN

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*The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt: Legal Administration by the Jews under the Early Roman Empire as Described by Philo Judaeus.* By ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929. Pp. vii+268.

The main contention of Dr. Goodenough is that Philo is setting forth—especially in the four books *De specialibus legibus*—not an abstract system based on the Pentateuch, but the actual law administered in the Jewish courts of Alexandria. There is nothing inherently impossible in this hypothesis. In all probability such courts existed and they must have consciously applied a body of law. This law, too, might well have been based on the Pentateuch but it would be saturated with local usages as well as with general Hellenistic customs. If Dr. Goodenough could show that the system which Philo presents to us is easier to understand as a rationalization of these Hellen-



istic customs than as the result of philosophic doctrines and of an academic tradition, he would have gone far to prove his thesis.

Evidently we cannot ask for a scientific demonstration, or even for one which will convince all doubters. We should have to know more of Philo's life than we do and much more of the Jewish courts. But is it even a plausible hypothesis? For one thing, it scarcely accounts for the tone which Philo adopts throughout the treatise on "Particular Biblical Laws." That tone is unmistakably that of a philosophic legislator for an ideal community, one who has the advantage denied to Plato and Aristotle, that a divine code is already in his hands which has merely to be made intelligible to imperfect human minds. If Philo is giving us a living law, it is curious that he devotes so much space to painfully expounded ordinances regarding priest and sacrifice, which could have no relevancy to Alexandrian conditions. No Talmudic doctor could have been more careful to create the impression that the only background in his mind is that of the Holy Land, as far as any concrete background is to be assumed at all.

As a matter of fact, the hypothesis is unnecessary. There is no reason why we should not take Philo at his word when he says that he is expounding a code which he devoutly and firmly regards as the embodiment of Supreme Wisdom, but which is in need of interpretation of various types, rational, allegorical, metaphysical. Philo was something of an eclectic in philosophy and in his ethical doctrines was profoundly influenced by the later Stoa, a school that had a marked predilection for interpreting and refining, reconciling, and differentiating. Those passages in the Pentateuch which shocked current susceptibilities or were ill adjusted to an urban and sophisticated civilization would have afforded abundant opportunities for just this technique. It is hard to see what experience in judicial practice—which there is no reason to suppose Philo had—could have added to the scholastic experience which he obviously and demonstrably possessed.

Still, Philo was an educated man of a particular time and place and to sift his extensive works in order to enlarge our knowledge of Alexandrian law, as of the rest of his social background, would certainly be worth while. We might therefore reject Dr. Goodenough's hypothesis and still look to the *De specialibus legibus* for substantial information on the local law. That procedure, however, would have been more promising if the author had acquired a little surer footing in the law of both Greeks and Romans. Law is no more mysterious than any other aspect of human institutions, but it is true of every branch of knowledge that those who are not particularly familiar with it need especial care in securing a warrant for their statements. I have elsewhere (*Yale Law Journal*) indicated that on legal matters Dr. Goodenough is an inexpert guide—although it must be promptly stated that he claims no special competence. It is accordingly in other fields that we must expect to find the chief value of the work.



One of these values lies in the fact that it is, as far as I know, the only English commentary on the *De specialibus legibus* besides the relatively summary notes of Mangey. Commentaries on Philo are few enough in any language. As far as this treatise is concerned, the German translation of I. Heinemann (Part II of the German translation of Philo edited by Leopold Colin) appeared in 1910 and contained many notes chiefly on the relation of Philo to Jewish tradition and Greek philosophy. Dr. Goodenough's book frequently resolves itself into a criticism of Heinemann or a supplementary discussion of the same passages which Heinemann annotated.

Unfortunately Dr. Goodenough is not rigorous in his methods. He has been tempted by haste into a number of lapses which come with peculiar inappropriateness when he is censuring Heinemann or some other predecessor. So, for example, on page 45 he declares that Heinemann has confused Philo's discussion of Lev. 27:3 in which the rates of redemption from a vow are given. Leviticus says fifty shekels and Philo speaks of two hundred drachmae. Heinemann says that Philo has doubled the figures of the LXX and is taken to task for the statement by Dr. Goodenough who says that Philo quadrupled them. But he has failed to notice that the LXX reads διδραχμα, and that therefore Heinemann is right. And to this slip there is added an additional one when he charges Heinemann with making an Attic drachma equal to four shekels. Heinemann does nothing of the kind. He merely quotes Josephus as saying that the shekel is equivalent to four Attic drachmae—which is substantially true.

The discrepancy between Philo and our texts of the LXX therefore remains and neither Heinemann nor Goodenough has adequately explained it. It may be an attempt to discriminate the "shekel of the Sanctuary," mentioned in Lev. 27:3, from the ordinary shekel.

Again on page 69 he states:

Heinemann is wrong in saying that Philo has inaccurately reproduced the biblical passage (Deut. 21, 18-21) because he makes no mention of the elders first giving the son a hearing, for the Torah itself mentions no judicial hearing by the elders, though the Jewish rabbinical tradition, which demanded that act of justice for the accused, went not much beyond the implications of the text.

But again it is Dr. Goodenough who is wrong and not Heinemann, since the latter gives no such reason as that here ascribed to him, but merely says that Philo's words are *ungenau*. *Ungenau* they are, since Philo has omitted to mention the elders altogether. And when Dr. Goodenough summarizes the passage in Deuteronomy, he concludes it with the words, "whereupon the elders will stone him." It would be an astounding thing for the elders to do and Deut. 21:21 explicitly contradicts the statement.

When lapses such as these become the basis of an argument, the superstructure is necessarily as insecure as the foundation. On page 54 we find: "But it is surprising to find so thoroughly Greek a conception as that the

hearth is an altar, thus (Philo *De Virt.* 124) recognized by Judaism." It would be surprising but his own translation does not bear him out, since it runs: "Even a slave is a suppliant when he flees to the hearth as to a temple." Temples are after all more than altars and the asylum of Greece was regularly a sacred inclosure or precinct, sometimes an entire island. Dr. Goodenough's misconception on the subject (p. 41) is that the Greek asylum was essentially an altar, a misconception to which I have adverted in another place (*loc. cit.*). Evidently to say what Philo says is far from the portentous heresy of considering the hearth a place of sacrifice. The only thing Greek about the passage is the synecdoche involved in using *ἑστία* for the house.

Dr. Goodenough finds difficulties in curiously simple things. There is no contradiction, scarcely even a contrast, between Philo's *Vita Mosi* i. 36 and *Sp. leg.* iv. 223 (p. 52, n. 78): The latter merely asserts that when a hostile city is sacked, the women are to be spared, in which the humanization of the Deuteronomic passage (20:14) should have been noted. Again there is no failure to enforce the Augustan laws involved in permitting an adulterer to be killed without trial. The *adulter* was not the wife, and the privilege of killing him when taken *in flagranti* was by the Lex Iulia made absolute in the father of the wife and limited to certain classes in the case of her husband (D. 48, 5, 25 [24], pr.). There is nothing in *Quint. V* x. 30 which runs counter to that.

Here and there, despite the general fulness of the author's discussion, it is rather a defect of comment that surprises us. Philo (*Sp. leg.* ii. 22) insists on the Levitical prohibition of marriage between brothers and sisters of either the whole or the half-blood. He contrasts that with Egyptian license and the Greek laxity that permits marriage between such relations when they are *δμοπάτριοι*. Dr. Goodenough annotates this fully as Bernays and Heinemann do, but he says nothing of the fact that such marriages as that of Abraham, Gen. 20:12, and that implied in II Sam. 13:13 are like the Athenian custom, and disregard the Levitical prohibition. The latter instance Philo ignores altogether, although he is familiar with the Book of Samuel. The former he twice cites and discusses (*Ebr.* 61 and *Quis rer. div. heres.* 62), and considers allegorical. It would not have been without importance to note this characteristic of Philo's method, a characteristic he shares with the rabbinic commentators.

These are not the only blemishes to be noted in a work which gives us much and might well have given us more. Philo is so important and has been so much neglected, except by philosophers and theologians, that we can only trust that Dr. Goodenough will continue his researches and, it may be, revise this particular embodiment of them. It is a type of study full of pitfalls for the unwary but it is eminently worth while.

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*The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa.* By HAROLD FREDRIK CHERNISS. "University of California Publications in Classical Philology," II, No. 1, 1-92. University of California Press, 1930.

This excellent dissertation covers much the same ground as Gronau's Göttingen Dissertation, *De Basilio, Gregorio Nazianzeno Nyssenoque Platonis Imitatoribus*, but the trenchancy, the philosophic breadth, and the freshness of Dr. Cherniss' treatment, not to speak of his corrections of Gronau's errors, more than justify his return to the subject.

Though he has faithfully collected Gregory's explicit and latent references to Plato, adding considerably to Gronau's list both of passages and of dialogues known to Gregory, Dr. Cherniss is not primarily interested in the accumulation of parallel passages. He aims to show the real relation of Gregory's thought to Plato's, and the effect of the unavoidable compromises between Platonism and Christian dogma. This he does in four readable chapters on "The Soul," "Creation," "The Divine Nature," "Good and Evil." On all these fundamental topics he shows that Gregory's thought was essentially Platonic, and that the Stoic coloring, which Gronau attributes to the use of Posidonius as an intermediary and secondary source, is nothing more than the incidental adoption of a few terms which Stoicism introduced into current philosophical usage. Of interest also is his proof against Gronau that Gregory must have been, and in fact was, acquainted with fundamental doctrines of Neoplatonism. In general Dr. Cherniss sensibly rejects the dogma of the source-hunters that an intelligent and well-educated ancient of the post-classical centuries must have used only one source for one topic, and couldn't write a sentence without a source book at his elbow.

Dr. Cherniss feels an imperfect sympathy for bishops and saints, and finds a close connection between the equivocations and compromises of Gregory's philosophy and some unpleasant ambiguities in the tradition of his personal conduct. I am content to leave the apology for Gregory's character to its official guardians.

PAUL SHOREY

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*Platons Suchen nach einer Grundlegung aller Philosophie.* Von WALTHER FREYMAN. Leipzig: Kommissionsverlag Alfred Lorentz, 1930.

This book seeks to trace the development of Plato's thought in eleven of the "earlier" dialogues. I am of course aware that Plato was once a boy, and grew to be a man, a taxpayer, and a philosopher; and I do not doubt that his moods, and to some extent his ideas, altered with the changes of his life and environment. But I do not believe that the extant dialogues supply the evidence for a critical study of his development from this point of view, and I think that the most helpful working hypothesis is the assumption of the essential unity of his thought from the age of, say, thirty or thirty-five. "Die ganze vorliegende Untersuchung," says Dr. Freymann (p. 21), "kann als eine

Widerlegung dieser Auffassung und als eine Bestätigung der genetischen Auffassung dienen." I naturally then regard his attempt as foredoomed to failure. With this proviso I will try to give as fair an account of his volume as I can.

The *Apology* Dr. Freymann treats as the earliest dialogue, and an example of Socratic seeking on Plato's part. Seeking for what? I ask. "The problem of being" is so equivocal as to be meaningless, and "das Sosein der Gegenstände" is no improvement on Aristotle's quest for the definition. But Dr. Freymann prefers to say that what Socrates sought was the real *structure* of things, and protests against the representation of him as a mere logician. And I will cheerfully admit that Socrates probably never said to himself, "Go to, I will now evolve a tentative logic of the definition, which Plato and Aristotle will perfect for me."

Chapter ii on the *Laches*, then, is entitled not the definition of bravery but "Die Struktur der Mannheit." "Das Dasein der soseienden Struktur," we are told, "ist also die zweite formale Forderung des Wissens: nur das Dabeisein des Soseins bewirkt das Wissen des Daseins." I can only gasp with poor Theaetetus, *νῦν πολλὸν πλέον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε*.

In similar style we are invited to study the "Struktur der Sophrosyne" (*Charmides*), "Die Struktur des Frommen" (*Euthyphro*), "Die Struktur des Schönen" (*Hippias Major*), "Die Struktur der Freundschaft" (*Lysis*), "Die allgemeine Struktur der Tugend" (*Protagoras*), "Das Gute" (*Gorgias*), "Die Wiedererinnerung" (*Meno*). The rubric for the *Euthydemus* is "Aporien," which also includes many aspects of the *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus*. A chapter is given to the "Anteil der Sprache an diesem Suchen." He says of the *Cratylus* (p. 120), "Wie ein roter Faden zieht sich durch den Dialog das Seinsproblem und seine Ausdrucksmöglichkeit in Wörtern." That, if I understand it, is slightly misleading. The *Cratylus* merely plays for a little while with the *δν* and *μὴ δν* fallacy and then leaves it for final solution in the *Sophist*.<sup>1</sup> The question of the use of etymologies to support a theory is not identical with the *Ausdrucksmöglichkeit des Seinsproblem*, whatever that may mean.

A final chapter sums up the results. "Die grosse Tat des Sokrates besteht darin dass er den Gegenstand des Denkens vom Denkakke unterscheidet. . . . Sein Suchen erwies sich immer als ergebnislos." Plato advanced to two formal postulates "des Wissens," "als erste das Schauen des Soseins, und als zweite, das Dabeisein des Soseins. . . . Dieses Schauen, von uns auch als eidetisches Schauen bezeichnet, ist ein unmittelbares Erfassen des Soseins, ohne dass damit die Transzendenz aufgehoben wird." I think I can guess what these three sentences mean. But I doubt if they will prove very helpful to the ordinary student of Plato. In this connection Dr. Freymann employs the expression *ἴδιος παρουσία* as an equivalent of "ihre selbständige Struktur." It is a pity that he has not given a reference to the text for it, for I cannot find it.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 53.

Obviously I am not the proper reviewer for this book. But I take pleasure in adding that there is considerable meat and abundant reference to the contemporary (mostly German) literature of the subject in the thirty-eight pages of *Anmerkungen*.

PAUL SHOREY

*Totenklage um Tiere in der Antiken Dichtung.* By GERHARD HERRLINGER. "Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft," Vol. VIII. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1930.

The Introduction to this useful collection is a sketch with copious footnotes of the history of the idea and the practice of keeping animal pets in antiquity. There follows under thirty-eight numbers an edition with critical and exegetical notes of the literary texts from Anyte of Tegea to Catullus, Martial, and Ausonius. The notes deal mainly but not exclusively with points of style and elegiac metre. Questions of history and attribution are not neglected. The "Simonidean" inscription on the hunting hound Lycas is attributed to Simias of Rhodes. Here as throughout the book the literature of the subject is abundantly cited. A reference could hardly be expected to the book of Norman Douglas, *Birds and Beasts of the Greek Anthology*, which I reviewed in the *New Republic* (LX [1929], 78-79).

After the literary texts, Nos. 39-53 edit with equal care the epigrams from the stones. A few epigrams from Egypt and a convenient chronological table are appended.

Part II, "Stilgeschichtliches," classifies the epigrams as (1) *ernst-sentimentale*; (2) parodies in the Greek sense of the word; (3) *pointierte* or conceited, which if we were not speaking of epigrams might almost be translated "epigrammatic." A chapter is given to each. In the first class Anyte leads, both in numbers (5) and in quality and originality. Herrlinger finds, he says, no feminine traits in her work, but practically withdraws the statement afterward. Surely only a woman could have written (ix. 745) the epigram on the goat that the children had harnessed and are driving about the precinct of the well-pleased god.

The only literary Latin epigram in the serio-sentimental style is Statius' poem on the lion of Domitian, to which some five pages are given. Catullus' *passer* is classified as *parodistisch*. It is interestingly compared with Ovid's "Psittacus." A footnote on page 82 observes:

V. 17 ff. Solche rhetorischen Fragen wie "Was nützte Schönheit und Tugend?" sind Eigenheit der Elegie (zahlreiche Belege bei Galletier, *Poésie funéraire* 205, und Anton Zingerle, *Ov. und sein Verhältnis zu den Vorgängern und gleichzeitigen röm. Dichtern* I. Innsbr. 1870, 45. Die Stellen bei Statius gibt Lohrlich, *De Statio* 35 ff.) und von ihr aus auch ins Epitaph übergegangen, s. Bücheler 543. 1; 737. 7 f.; 1066, 5 ff.; 1106. 9. Über die Vorstellung vom frühen Tod des Schönen vgl. Lier, *Philol.* 62 (1903), 477.

The English reader murmurs, *A qui le dites-vous?*

Ah! what avails the sceptered race

Ah! what the form divine?

What every virtue, every grace?

Rose Aylmer, all were thine.

The chief representatives of the *pointierte Epikedium* are Antipater of Thessalonica and Martial. The "points" are classified, and there is a study of the *topik* in this chapter. Among other things it is noted that the epigrams betray the feeling that an animal has properly speaking no claim to a grave and an inscription and that therefore the topic of consolation and the appeal for sympathy to the passer-by are omitted. That may or may not be true of all classical epigrams in this kind, but such generalizations are dangerous:

Then some who through this garden pass,

When we too, like thyself, are clay

Shall see thy grave upon the grass

And stop before the stone and say:

People who lived here long ago

Did by this stone, it seems, intend

To name for future times to know

The Dachshound Geist their little friend.

An Appendix gives first the three Byzantine epigrams of Agathias and Damocharis on the cat that ate the canary so to speak, and then, Nos. 59-81, a selection of "Mittelateinische Texte." This section is better than its title, for it gives the "Testimentum Domini Asini" and selections from the *Carmina Burana*, as well as specimens of the Latin poetry of the Renaissance and after, including Andreas Naugerius on the shepherd dog, Hylax, and Petrus Lotichius' famous nightingale, the many imitations and translations of which might well have been added. Lastly, Nos. 82-136 give the "Neuhochdeutsche Texte," which include many poets as caviar to the English readers, as the more than a thousand authentic American poets of the past few decades doubtless would be to readers in Germany. English examples are either unknown to the author or perhaps rather he leaves them for English commentators to collect.

PAUL SHOREY

### BREVIORA

[The managing editor establishes this subdepartment because of the difficulty of procuring substantial critical reviews of all books, and the impossibility if they were found of printing them in our limited space. It is believed that brief but fair *complexes rendus* will prove more useful than a mere biographical notice. Contributions to this department should never exceed a page, and a paragraph is preferable.]

*Aristotelis Meteorologica*. By F. H. FOBES. Harvard University Press, 1919.

This recognition of the excellent work of an American scholar has been delayed so long because the only adequate reviewer of Professor Fobes's



book would be Professor Fobes himself. I can claim no such competence, but I have re-read the *Meteorology* in his text and am glad to pay tribute to the brazen-boweled industry with which he has constructed it. His Preface describes about twenty manuscripts which he has collated: twelve which he has consulted without collating, twelve which he has not seen. It enumerates more than five hundred passages in which he departs from the text of Bekker, and more than three hundred in which Bekker's report of the reading of the manuscripts is inaccurate or incomplete.

Emendation seems to have done little for or to the text of the *Meteorologica*. Professor Fobes ignores all printed emendations which yield readings found in the manuscripts. His apparatus records a few slight suggestions of Vatable, one of Schleiermacher, one of Heidel, eight or ten of Thurot, one of Koenigmann, one or two of Capelle, two or three of Bonitz, one of Vicomercatus, and three or four of his own.

It must be admitted that for practical purposes all this labor makes little difference. Browning's grammarian would say that the establishment of a critical text is not concerned with practical purposes, or, as the old Greek saying would put it, excellence differs by a trifle but is not itself a trifle. But I only mean that the deviations from the text of Ideler (1836) rarely affect Aristotle's meaning or even his style.

PAUL SHOREY

*Euripides Alkestis*. Erklärt von LEO WEBER. Teubner: Leipzig, 1930.

This edition is intended to fill a gap. Germany, Dr. Weber says, has had no critical edition of the *Alkestis* since that of Hermann in 1824. Meanwhile the careful edition of Haley (Boston, 1898) records all the older literature, and Murray has laid the foundations of the text. Weber's Introduction treats of Thessaly, which he has visited, of the character of Alkestis, of the figures from the underworld in the play, and of the constitution and significance of Euripides' drama. The modern world, he thinks, like Phaedrus in Plato's *Symposium*, has overemphasized the part of love in Alkestis' sacrifice. Without apparently knowing Browning he comes essentially to Browning's conclusion that the object of the play is to bring Admetus to a realization of the nature of his conduct. In the selfishness of his father he sees himself.

Little is said of the text in the Introduction. The critical apparatus, though mainly abbreviated from Murray, must have cost some labor. The result is slight. In the first half of the play there are only about twenty-five deviations from Murray's text, and only three or four of them are of any significance. In 41 ἐνδίκως is preferred to ἐκδίκως. In 153 Wilamowitz' impossible τήνδ' ὑπερβεβλημένον is accepted, and in 527 καὶ θανὼν οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτι is read. Earle's suggestions are generally ignored, and at 631 explicitly rejected. At 77 Earle's paragraphing is attributed to Murray.

The notes are well apportioned between questions of language, antiquities, and literary criticism. In 230 φιλαν . . . φιλάταν is a little more than "Variation der Anapher." It is a characteristic of Euripides' style to outbid



his own first expression (cf. *Alcestis* 1082, *Hecuba* 667 and 1121, *Hippolytus* 359-60 and 914). In 552 the colloquialism of *τί μᾶλλον* εἰ is rather ponderously rendered "Warum handelst du so ohne Überlegung?"

PAUL SHOREY

*The Poetics of Aristotle in England.* By MARVIN THEODORE HERRICK.  
"Cornell Studies in English." Yale University Press, 1930.

This treatise covers somewhat more fully much the same ground as the unpublished typewritten Master's dissertation of Miss Mildred E. Lambert in the University of Chicago Library (1916). It collects all the references to the *Poetics* in English literature, from Roger Bacon, Ascham, Sidney, and Ben Jonson to Dryden and Rymer, and from Addison to Fielding, Johnson, Coleridge, Hazlitt, Arnold, and Henry Arthur Jones. It is a faithful and useful compendium. But the results are slight, whether for the interpretation of the *Poetics* or the development of English literary criticism. Recent fashion has indeed somewhat exaggerated the significance and the influence of the *Poetics*. It is short, quotable, and presents problems for debate, and so is often mentioned. The doctrine of the unities, rightly or wrongly understood, did actually exert a shaping pressure for good or evil on the French drama. English dramatists did not take it seriously enough to be helped or hampered by it. Apart from this, the *Poetics* merely supplied a few quotable texts and topics for the discussion of such themes as the quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns and the superiority of epic to tragedy, or tragedy to epic. But most of the references imply no real knowledge of either Aristotle or Greek. Until we come to Twining in the eighteenth century and to Butcher and Bywater, who in our day have turned the tables on the Continent, the most learned English critics are only the echoes of some Castelvetro, Scaliger, Heinsius, Boileau, or Rapin.

The interpretation and history of the *Poetics* will continue to provoke endless disquisition and commentary. But in fact Aristotle's encyclopaedic and analytic mind lacked the first requirements of a great literary critic—an instinctive apprehension of beauty of expression, and the immediate perception of literary values. He has nothing to say of the *Agamemnon* or of Pindar. A scholar who really understood him could sum up in a few paragraphs the possible answers to the problems or the irreducible oppositions of temperament and taste suggested by his definitions and formulas and what used to be called his "rules." His interest for the critics and the philologists is that of Euripides for the translators and poets—he leaves things unfinished for them to do.

PAUL SHOREY

*M. Tulli Ciceronis ad Atticum epistolarum libri sedecim.* Fasciculus secundus libros v-viii continet. Recensuit H. SJÖGREN. Göttingen, 1929.

The first fascicle of this work appeared in 1916. At the present rate we shall have to wait another twenty-six years for the edition to be completed.

But it is worth waiting for, as it is the first modern critical edition of the letters to Atticus. No important Latin work has needed a new edition as badly as this collection of letters. Schmidt and Lehmann began the task of studying the manuscripts but did not live to complete the work.

The purpose of this note is merely to call attention to the publication of this fascicle of a most important work. Detailed comment should be reserved for its completion. This edition is not to be confused with the less complete Teubner edition by the same editor.

B. L. ULLMAN

*Das Erbe der Alten.* Zweite Reihe, gesammelt und herausgegeben von OTTO IMMISCH. "Platon und der George-Kreis," Heft XVII. Von FRANZ JOSEF BRECHT. Leipzig: Dieterichsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1929.

This book is obviously written for Germans and the few Americans who are informed about and interested in the minor intellectual movements, fashions, and literary cliques of post-war Germany. Other Americans may be interested in Plato, but the George-Kreis as such leaves them as cold as the Concord or the Jacksonville, Illinois, or the Osceola, or the Point Loma Kreis would leave the average German scholar. So far as I can make out from a rapid reading, the George-Kreis represents devotion to the poetry of George and to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, and an enthusiasm for certain aspects of Greek life which I have elsewhere defined as Corybantic Hellenism. This temper is described as the *scienza nuova*. In history and biography its ideal is not the pedantic accumulation of uninteresting matters of fact but the instinctive appreciation of the totality of essential personality. Gundolf's *Goethe* and his *George und Shakespeare* are here the models. Even Wilamowitz' *Stimmungsbiography* of Plato and his distressing eloquence about the equivocal passions of Sappho and the *Symposium* fail to placate this group, who cannot pardon his presentation of Plato in the *Kultur der Gegenwart*, or his, as they deem them, soulless interpretations of Greek tragedy:

Der menschliche Grund solcher Betrachtungsweise für die Tragödie wie für Platon scheint Hildebrandt in dem Wunschziel Wilamowitzens zu liegen: einem Kulturleben, in dem die Leidenschaft ausgelöscht, die Existenz möglichst gefahrlos, jeder Zweifel beseitigt, der Wille in der Festlegung "objektiver" Wahrheiten aufgebraucht, die dem Durchschnittsmenschen angepasste Moral allgemein gültig festgelegt sei.

Who would have thought it?

However, if the George-Kreis, or any other Kreis, can produce as good books as Julius Stenzel's *Platon der Erzieher* or Paul Friedländer's *Platon*,<sup>1</sup> far be it from me to satirize their rhetoric or to pick flaws in the logic of their endeavor to square the circle that encompasses the head and the heart.

PAUL SHOREY

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Class. Phil.*, XXIII (1928), 293-97.

